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The thesis takes as its starting point the importance of community in contemporary 
political societies across the world, most notably, for present purposes, the Third World. 
Community importantly determines questions of social inclusion, exclusion, identity, 
belonging and well-being. As is no surprise, the role and significance of community is well 
recognised in several academic disciplines today.  Consider this one example. Recent 
literature on development has generally drawn attention to the potential benefits of 
participation in certain aspects of governance. More specifically, proposals for community 
participation have emerged in response to State failure, or now the pervasiveness of market 
exclusion. Community participation is motivated by several grievances, the most emphatic 
of which is the profound gap between the lived experiences of the poor and institutions that 
affect their lives. This gap between discourse and lived experience is more vividly evident 
in human rights practice, and this not only reflects the dominance, but also the 
inadequacies of State and market-based understandings alike.  A fundamental aspect of this 
debate – largely overlooked by human rights discourse – is the role of community. Whilst 
there remain marginal references to community in certain aspects of human rights 
discourse, over all it has not sufficiently or comprehensively embraced community.  More 
specifically, the Declaration of Right to Development, Rights-Based Approaches to 
Development and the World Bank‘s concept of good governance fail to offer an adequate 
role for community in human rights terms.  Drawing from a range of literature in legal 
theory, political theory, philosophy and sociology, and developing its insights in the 
context of the supply of the – human right and – public good of electricity in Nigeria, the 
thesis offers a theory of community, which seeks to enable individuals, particularly, the 
poor and vulnerable, to organise themselves democratically, to claim ownership of the 
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Whenever a man cries inwardly: ‗Why am I being hurt?‘ harm is being done to him. 
He is often mistaken when he tries to define the harm, and why and by whom it is 
being inflicted on him. But the cry itself is infallible.  
The other cry, which we hear so often: Why has some-body else got more than I 
have?, refers to rights. We must learn to distinguish between the two cries and to do 
all that is possible, as gently as possible, to hush the second one, with the help of a 
code of justice, regular tribunals, and the police. Minds capable of solving problems 
of this kind can be formed in a law school.  
But the cry ‗Why am I being hurt?‘ raises quite different problems, for which the 
spirit of truth, justice, and love is indispensable.  
 
 

































Two fundamental characteristics of life in Nigeria have motivated this thesis. First is the 
relational effect of the lack of access to water, healthcare, education and electricity 
(hereinafter ‗public goods‘), on poverty in the country. Daily life – for millions of 
Nigerians – is defined by the experience of unbearable levels of suffering due to 
unacceptable standards of access to public goods.  By public goods, I do not just mean 
economic goods – that is, non-rival or non-excludable goods – which a person‘s 
consumption does not prevent the consumption of others.
1
 Whilst this is a plausible way to 
speak about public goods, there is more to the term than just how they are produced or 
consumed. They are not just economic goods, but also social and ethical goods. The idea of 
public goods is underpinned by important social and ethical connotations, for the simple 
reason that they are vital to human survival and well-being.
2
 What this also implies is that 
public goods could be a range of things – including a general framework of human rights– 
in so far as their significance to human well-being and survival can be established. 
3
 This is 
particularly the case with access to water, healthcare, education, and – as I would argue – 
electricity, not because of their instrumental value, but because they are intrinsic to the 
                                                 
1
 The classical economic idea of public goods is influenced by the seminal work of Paul Samuelson, see; 
Samuelson P. ‗The pure theory of public expenditure‘, 36(4), Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954, at 
387-389.  
2
 See, Kaul I Grunberg and Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st 





quality of our lives.
4
 It is because of their essential and ethical character that they are also 
recognised and protected as human rights. In particular, they are protected as economic and 
social rights by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International 
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which are applicable to 
everyone by virtue of their humanity. These documents enjoin States to take the necessary 
steps to enable acceptable levels of access to all individuals.  It is the failure, amongst other 
things, of States to fulfil this basic requirement that can explain the suffering in Nigeria, 
and perhaps, other parts of the Third World. 
 
More recently, States have looked to markets as alternatives, but they have also 
failed to ameliorate such problems. At one level, the State has either neglected, failed or is 
too weak to perform its primary functions.  At another level, the market – the alternative to 
the State – is either too exclusive or only inclusive to those who can afford to participate, 
as many are too poor to afford to buy alternatives provided by the market. This point leads 
to the second fundamental experience of life that has inspired this thesis. It arises from the 
following question – how do Nigerians, especially the poor, survive without being able to 
access these essentials of life from either the State or market?  
 
Two visible trends are evident – the second is developed into this thesis. The first 
concerns individual provisioning of public goods, especially through the opportunities 
offered by the market – that is, for those who can afford to do so.  There is, however, a 
second trend which has immensely supported the poor. It arises from the different forms of 
solidarity, collaboration and cooperation that is often generated in the processes of trying to 
find solutions to such problems. One example is the different forms of community that 
                                                 
4
  See, Deneulin S and Townsend N. ‗Public Goods, Global Public Goods and Common Goods‘, WED, 
Working Paper 18, ESRC Research Group on Well-being in Developing Countries, 2006,  at.3. 
11 
 
have emerged to fill the inadequacies of the State and market. This has ranged from the 
Church or Mosque to primordial communal associations, such as family, kinship, tribe, 
ethnic associations to work-based, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and 
neighbourhood groups.
5
 What is visible in many townships and villages is a strong sense 
and spirit of community, which continues to be the only source of hope, relief and comfort 
for the poor. It is this significance of community to individuals in Nigeria – as perhaps 
other parts of the Third World – that is really at the heart of this thesis. Whilst the thesis 
developed here is inspired by Nigerian experiences, it is also relevant for other societies in 
Africa, and the Third World in general, given the generalisable nature of the problems, 
experiences, and prospects. As will become clear below –and in chapter six – I take a local 
residential neighbourhood as a point of departure from other ways of defining community 
to illustrate what it means in a given context, and how the human rights framework can 
benefit, as well as contribute to building forms of solidarity within it, for different 
purposes, including for particular human rights claims.  If public goods are more than just 
economic goods, but also ethical goods, such as human rights, then it is apparent from the 
perspective of this thesis that community has insufficiently been analysed in human rights 
discourse.  
 
 Before looking at the specific contribution in this respect, a brief attempt is made 
to understand how and why this thesis departs from current approaches.  I then outline the 
approach in this thesis, and proceed with a discussion of its implications on human rights, 
especially how it deals with the tension between human rights and community, which has 
impeded a balanced understanding of both concepts. I will specifically argue that 
understanding human rights themselves as public goods can contribute to unlocking this 
                                                 
5
 On the importance of community based organisations in Nigeria, see; Ayoola G. B et al. Nigeria: Voices of 
the Poor, Country synthesis report Nigeria, World Development Report, World Bank, 2000-2001, at 32 – 35.  
12 
 
deadlock. After this, I proceed to discuss the meaning and significance of human rights to 
this thesis, and follow on by providing a  conception of human rights that not only supports 
this thesis, but also  remedies of some of their inadequacies in this and other contexts. 
Following on from this, I discuss aspects of the application of the thesis, particularly the 
justification of the choice of electricity as a human right capable of explaining the 
problems of access, and furthermore, bringing out the value of the role of community. I 
conclude thereafter with an outline of the structure of the thesis. 
 
2. Dominant Approaches 
Two dominant approaches can be deduced from human rights discourse – the approach 
through the State, and more recently, the role of the market.  The first is the more 
traditional human rights approach. It is built on the existing State structures of the 
international order, particularly with the emergence of UDHR, and the accompanying 
international covenants.  It is a discourse built on this framework, which has meant that 
matters of implementation are primarily a question of State action. Here individuals are 
seen as primary rights-holders, while the State is the main duty-bearer.  Individual rights 
can only be claimed against the State, and law is the primary vehicle for enforcing human 
rights.  Economic and social rights are designated to deal with the problems mentioned 
above, and they are dealt with as a question of justiciability. 
6
 Apart from attempting to 
clarify the specific content of the economic and social rights, the debates focus on the role 
of law and the judiciary as a means of enforcing these rights.
7
 Without in any way limiting 
                                                 
6
 For a general insight on the justiciability of economic and social rights debate, see; Ghai Y and Cottrell J. 
(eds.) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Practice: The Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Interights, 2004. 
7
 See, Bilchitz D. Poverty and Fundamental Rights, the justification and enforcement of socio-economic 
rights, Oxford University Press, 2007. See also; Ferraz O. ‗Poverty and Human Rights‗, 28(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 2008, at 585-603. 
13 
 
the significance of justiciability of economic and social rights debates, three limitations of 
the approach are noted below.  
 
First, they do not engage with the question of State failure and how this impedes the 
State from effectively fulfilling its obligations.
8
 The current State model – particularly in 
parts of the Third World – is engulfed in a structural crisis, and unable to meaningfully 
address such problems of human rights.  This is not in any way to deny that there have 
been and continue to be benefits of the traditional State-centred human rights framework, 
but its limitations are such that they raise questions about whether it requires adaptation to 
enable, as it were, new ways of thinking about how certain human rights should be 
provided. 
 
Secondly, the justiciability debates do not sufficiently address the problems of the 
State system owing to the emergence of economic globalisation, especially the problems, 
and paradoxically, new opportunities for participation that have accompanied it. Parallels 
here can be drawn with the literature in development discourse and political economy
9
, 
which have embraced these changes, particularly the movement beyond the State and 
                                                 
8
 By State failure I simply mean the inability of institutions of the State to guarantee acceptable levels of 
access to economic and social rights as well as other functions like providing security. The arguments about 
State failure here are by no means universal. They are unique to the Third World and not necessarily 
applicable to First World country contexts. Even so, there are varying degrees of State failure in Third World 
countries; it is certainly more visible in certain countries than others. As such, I do not in any way also claim 
that the concerns expressed here are universal to all parts of the Third World. The concerns apply to specific 
conditions of State failure, such as where the State has failed or too weak or in countries like Nigeria, where 
the State has hardly kicked off.    
9  These questions are addressed in political economy in response to the transformations of the traditional 
State-centred framework mainly due to the phenomenon of economic globalisation.  The new governance 
approaches (as illustrated in chapter two), suggest the inability of State centred, command and control 
systems to deal with the advent of economic globalisation. New governance marks a transition from 
regulation to dispersed and collaborative forms of participation in the economy. For a good overview on 
these developments in the United States (US), and the European Union (EU) see; Lobel O. ‗The Renew Deal: 
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought‘, Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series No. 07-27, School of Law, University of San Diego, 2005. See also, de Burca G and Scott J. Law 
and New Governance in the EU and the US, Hart Publishing, 2006.  
14 
 
markets in processing social transformation.
10
 Surprisingly, traditional human rights 
discourse, for all its claims and potential to address deep-rooted injustice, has failed to 
adapt to the changing situation. Human rights continue to operate as a State-centred 
discourse, as if the State exists without deficiencies.  
 
Thirdly, the justiciability debates do not consider other forums for participation 
apart from courts in securing economic and social rights. This is perhaps more of general 
characteristic of human rights law than their specific manifestation as economic and social 
rights. Whilst human rights law generally offers an array of participatory rights to take part 
in different aspects of society, it is not clear if it encourages participation for securing 
specific rights claims. One cannot help but conclude that although participation is an 
inherent part of human rights law discourse, there appears to be no participation – apart 
from through courts – for particular human rights claims. 
 
The second dominant approach is an emerging one – that is, the inclination towards 
markets. It is largely influenced by the Bretton Wood institutions (BWIs), especially the 
World Bank (the Bank), as a result of the increasing overlap between the fields of human 
rights and development. Though the approach emerges outside the traditional human rights 
reporting system, it can be understood as an attempt to give programmatic content to the 
international human rights texts, especially the ICESCR through the Bank‘s policies, 
practices and programmes.  It has structured thinking about how economic and social rights 
are provided for the simple reason that there is hardly any Third World country that has not 
been on the Bank‘s (or its related institutions) lending programmes.   
                                                 
10 See, Hickey S and Mohan G, Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Zed Books, 2004. Also see 
the following, Cook B and Kothari U. Participation: The New Tyranny, Zed Books, 2001 and Chambers R. 
Participatory Workshops: A source book of 21 ideas and activities, Earthscan limited, 2002.  Kapoor I. 




The current policy initiatives are structured by the Bank‘s Comprehensive Development 
Strategy (CDF), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the World Development 
Report (WDR), Making Service work for the Poor,
11
 and particularly, the Bank‘s concept 
of good governance.  Problems with public goods, as with human rights in general, are 
diagnosed as a government problem, the solutions of which are in turn linked to the Bank‘s 
initiates for good governance. This view can be implied from a reading of the WDR, the 
Bank‘s most comprehensive advisory statement on public goods.
12
 The report – apart from 
reading the public goods of concern as human rights – makes the claim that they fail to 
reach the poor because States, amongst other things, lack competent institutions and 
mechanisms of governance. In short, the Bank suggests that the lack of public goods is a 
governance problem. Ironically, the main responsibility for resolving this problem, as 




More specifically, the report suggests that the inability to access public goods is 
caused by regressive budgets, corruption and the failure of governments to act 
responsively. Key recommendations to resolve these problems include a range of 
approaches to increase transparency, competition, citizen involvement in monitoring, and 
private market participation. They also include the introduction of suitable user fees, 
decentralising onto local governments and indeed community participation.  The latter is 
indicated when the WDR notes that public goods and services can be expanded to reach the 
                                                 
11
 World Bank, Comprehensive Development Framework, (Ongoing) accessed online at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTWEBARCHIVES/0,,MDK:2220140
9~menuPK:64654237~pagePK:64660187~piPK:64660180~theSitePK:2564958,00.html 20th January 2010. 
World Bank, Making Services work for Poor People, World Development Report, 2004.  
12
 With the exception of electricity and water, the WDR acknowledges that healthcare and education are 
human rights in which community involvement may be one way of ensuring access. Ibid., at p.34. 
13 The report specifically mentions ‗public responsibility‘ which lies on the State and citizens. But the State 
carries much of this responsibility towards resolving this problem. 
16 
 
poor by ―putting poor people at the centre of service provision: by enabling them to 
monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice in policymaking, and 
by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor.‖
14
  As such, participation is 
recognised as a key strategy for public goods. This is really no surprise since the WDR 
itself emerges under the auspices of the CDF and the Bank‘s PRSPs, where country-
ownership and citizenship participation are both considered as essential for the reduction of 
poverty. In spite this, as demonstrated in this thesis with the case study of electricity in 
Nigeria, the reform proposals still continue to be dominated by the so-called advantages of 
privatisation and other neoliberal market-based development strategies, to the exclusion of 




3. Point of Departure 
Taking the significance of community in contemporary political societies, this thesis 
departs from the approaches above. In doing so, the thesis offers a theory of community 
(hereinafter, ‗the theory‘) of three related components to enable access to particular 
economic and social rights or public goods, so to speak. The first component addresses 
definitional questions about community. As mentioned above and discussed below, it takes 
residential neighbourhoods as an example of community.
16
 The second component 
                                                 
14 Ibid at 1. 
15
 Nigeria‘s PRSP addresses these questions, and it is unreservedly a market-oriented approach to 
development. For more details, see; National Planning Commission. Meeting Everyone’s Needs: The 
National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, Abuja-Nigeria, 2004. 
16
 We must appreciate that whilst recognising that the idea of community is generally desirable on the 
normative level of human rights discourse, its actual definition in every context must be open to local 
interpretation. This also has implications for the proposed theory of community, and not just how community 
is defined.  It implies that the theory is not proposed as a ‗one-size fits all‘ approach; rather it should be 
considered as one amongst a range of alternatives, one adaptable to local circumstance, especially if the 
situations permit it as such. What this means is that whilst the theory of community may be general, it is not 
general in its application. Indeed, if there is anything universal about the idea or theory of community 
proposed here, it is the importance of locality. It is the importance of encouraging people to work together to 
find solutions to their problems.  It is the importance of one‘s immediate surroundings, and how it forms a 
source of meaning, identity and belonging.  Whilst communities will vary in context these attributes, it is 
argued, are universal to all communities. 
17 
 
proposes actual spaces for participation. In particular, Community Forums are proposed as 
deliberative decision-making bodies. They are bodies through which individuals 
collectively claim ownership of their human rights. However, the internal workings of 
Community Forums require a further component, one that anticipates the type of problems 
that can emerge from processes of participation. Accordingly, a third component is 
proposed in recognition that participation can be divisive even in the most tolerant or 
democratic societies. As problematic as these issues might be, it is argued that they are still 
reducible even though they cannot totally be eliminated.  This component is called the 
deliberative theory of incompleteness, which places emphasis on ongoing dialogue and 
compromise. All three components must be seen as part of a comprehensive theory, which 
should work together for the purposes of human rights. They provide the philosophical and 
structural framework for understanding how community participation can be 
institutionalised. In proposing community as an alternative, this thesis does not by any 
means suggest that the approach through the judiciary, courts or State should somehow be 
dispensed with.
17
 Rather, the suggestion is that community can offer an alternative forum 
for participation, one that is not currently available, and that can augment existing 
approaches. A detailed discussion of the theory is carried out in chapter six, but a little 




                                                 
17
 An example of what I am talking about can be found in Charles Sabel and William Simon‘s seminal article 
on the emergence of a new type of public action litigation. Analysing the changes in public law litigation due 
to the shift from centralised to dispersed forms of governance in the US, Sabel and Simon have spoken of the 
existence of a new kind of democratic experimentation made possible by Roberto Unger‘s idea of 
destabilization rights. It is simply certain rights that allow courts to encourage collaboration between public 
institutions and members of the public affected by their services. If destabilization rights refers to ―a right to 
disentrench or unsettle public institutions when, first, it is failing to satisfy minimum standards of adequate 
performance and, second, it‘s substantially immune from conventional political mechanisms of correction,‖ 
then this is exactly what I am talking about in this thesis. Sabel C and Simon W. ‗Destabilization Rights: 
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds‘ 117 (4), Harvard Law Review, 2004, at 1062.  
18 
 
3.1. Community  
Community, in this thesis, is defined as a given locality – that is, a neighbourhood 
composed of people joined together by accident of proximity. It is the social environment 
for a bundle of social practices and relationships that exist in the same space. It constitutes 
a significant part of everyday life, which often has both positive and negative connotations. 
It importantly determines questions of belonging in ways that can translate into either 
social inclusion or exclusion. Whilst chapter six discusses its potential, and offers some 
solutions to some of its problems, it is important from the outset to hold onto the idea that 
what is important about community in this thesis – particularly the metropolitan residential 
community – is the plurality of identities, and differences that exist within it, such that 
make it more open for inclusion, particularly more inclusive than other ways of defining 
the concept. It is true that one may belong to a residential community because of one‘s 
ethnic, religious or racial background, but one can also belong to such a community 
independent of such characteristics. What is more, amidst such differences lies a collective 
agency that can be nurtured or harnessed (where or when it does not exist) for different 
objectives. What is promoted is the intrinsic value of face to face relationships, which is in 
turn a way of building and sustaining the quality of individual lives. This may sound 
idealistic, but there is certainly value in seeing people who are accidentally joined together 
by space, not only cooperate and participate in trying to resolve common problems, but 
also how they show concern for each other, including those in other communities. As such, 





The definition of community above is conspicuously sociological, mainly because it takes 
locality, amongst other things, as its defining feature.
18
 Apart from local residential 
neighbourhoods, villages and townships have also been subject to sociological analysis, for 
the reason that ―common residence is a congenial condition – perhaps the most congenial 
condition – for forming and sustaining communal life‖.
19
 This definition of community 
does not exclude the concept from being depicted or formed in different ways.  Similarly, it 
does not exclude individuals within a community from belonging to others. This is, 
however, contingent – as the seminal work of Philip Selznick elaborates – on 
understanding the notion of community as a ―variable aspect of group experience.‖
20
  What 
he means is that no single community, even the ones we live in, determine all of our social 
relationships.
21
  Once community is proposed this way it means that it potentially would 
accommodate a variety of interests, including how the concept can be formed in different 
ways. It helps us understand that a variety of individuals that belong to different 
communities can also be united by a framework of shared beliefs, interests and 
commitments. The experience of community therefore becomes the experience of different 
opportunities for participation, in different ways and about different interests.  If such 
opportunities do not exist within various neighbourhoods, it is difficult to conceive that the 
experience of community exists.  
 
4. Unlocking the Deadlock 
There are a number of implications of framing proposals for community within the existing 
human rights framework. The first is how the relationship between human rights and 
                                                 
18
 See, Selznick P. The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the promise of Community, University of 
California Press, 1994.  
19





community is to be understood given the contention that is often invited from attempts to 
collectively use both concepts. In the extreme view, both concepts invoke a profound 
tension between individual and collective autonomy. On the one-hand, collective will is 
aggressively asserted over that of the individual to the extent that his or her autonomy may 
be lost. On the other-hand, individuals, thanks to human rights become self-centred, over-
individualistic, or even narcissistic – absolved from the collective duties and 
responsibilities. Whilst discussions about these concepts have proceeded along these 
general lines, human rights and community have not, and need not be proposed in such 
oppositional terms. As will be discussed, there is a middle ground approach.  In chapter 
five, communitarian liberalism or liberal communitarian
22
 – regardless of the noun or 
adjective – is indicative of this, so is the importance of dialogues discussed through the 
literature on deliberative democracy in chapter six.   
 
From the perspective of this thesis, however, there is a further way of 
understanding the relationship between human rights and community. This requires a slight 
reversal of the relationship between human rights and public goods presented in the 
beginning of this chapter. It requires, not only understanding how specific public goods can 
be called human rights, but also how human rights can in turn be understood as public 
goods. This is the most helpful way of reframing the debate between human rights and 
community, and furthermore, bringing their relational dimension into attention. Not only 
does it significantly help unlock the deadlock between the concepts, or open new ways of 
overcoming this problem, it demonstrates the intrinsic value of human rights as well as 
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their importance to the general ideas in this thesis.  This is not a claim that it resolves all 
possible tensions that arise from questions of individual versus collective autonomy (such 
as problematic questions about the autonomy over reproductive rights). Rather, it has 
modest intentions in mind, and is framed for the general purposes of this thesis.   
 
This argument arises from understanding the intrinsic value of human rights, 
particularly because of their relational and ethical effect on human survival. This is 
particularly – but not only – a characteristic of economic and social rights, as other human 
rights particularly those that guarantee liberty, equality, anti-discrimination are intrinsic in 
themselves. Once this point is appreciated, then a further argument can be made that such 
human rights can – but are not always – enjoyed independently. The point I am getting at is 
that the value of a human right is at times such that it generates externalities beyond the 
individual concerned.  This argument blurs the distinction between the private and public 
by showing that individual rights – though enjoyed privately – have an important public 
effect.
23
  Not only is the intrinsic value of a human right brought to light, it possibly 
explains why they can be goods to the public.  From this perspective, understanding human 
rights as public goods, not only challenges how we traditionally think about human rights, 
but also connects the individual and community in a less antagonistic way.  
 
To ground this argument further, I find support in Amartya Sen‘s seminal work on 
Development and Freedom.
24
 It is mentioned briefly here because other aspects of Sen‘s 
work are discussed in chapter two and three. It comes from his attempt to encourage a shift 
of the focus of development from the pursuit of narrow values of incomes to wider social 
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values like human freedoms.  A focus on human freedoms, he argues, requires attention to 
the ends of development – that is, the awareness of certain social and economic 
accomplishments like education or healthcare – that are vital to the quality of life.    Using 
education
25
 as an analogy, Sen demonstrates how the gains of enjoying the right to 
education always transcend the individual.
26
 Sen‘s argument is taken empirically from 
development initiatives that have stressed the transformative potential of women‘s 
education in the Third World. They mark a shift from approaches that have only sought to 
give women equal rights with men to those that recognise that having such rights produce a 
wider effect on society. Such education and literacy programmes have placed women in a 
position, not only to transform their own lives, but also those of their children, husbands 
and communities. This has particularly had an effect on reducing infant mortality rates of 
children. It is possible to make similar arguments in favour of healthcare, water and – as 
justified later on – electricity.
27
 Although they are enjoyed privately, their satisfaction is 
such that it generates externalities.  It is such externalities that can be used to show the 
interdependencies between individuals and community. As such, individual rights like 
these can become collective aspirations for everyone in community.  
 
Framed this way, much of the tension between individual rights and community can 
be circumvented, even if it is not totally eliminated. As with the definition of community 
proposed earlier on, it is possible for everyone to be recognised as a potential agent of 
social change, who can all contribute to the good of community.  It is also possible to 
convince individuals that certain values are best protected as collective goods. This is 
implicated in the idea cooperation that underpins the concept of public goods itself – 
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particularly in its classical economic context. It draws attention to the importance of 
cooperation,
28
 in that independent action – either by States or markets – for public goods is 
not always possible. This can be used to analogise that independent action cannot 
satisfactorily take care of the needs of the individual – an individual need also depends on 
cooperation with others.  Once the discussion is pursued along these lines, it is possible to 
demonstrate that a lot more can be achieved by a community than by disaggregated 
individuals. The strength of this approach is showing the interdependencies that exist 
amongst individuals, including the less fortunate in community. But as with any 
arrangement that implies some sort of distribution or even cooperation, it is only likely that 
it would generate controversies, especially when there are scarce resources, or when some 
have more than others. Much will depend on opportunities for open public dialogue, where 
individuals in community can work out their grievances, and the arrangements for 
distribution no matter how difficult. This is a further indication of the need for Community 
Forums, as will be discussed in chapter six. Discussions in such Forums can focus on 
different things, including questions about human rights and other important values. 
Creating such opportunities for dialogue should be seen as a further way of bringing the 
relational dimension of human rights and community into light.  
 
4.1. Human Rights as Instrumental values  
There is a further way human rights are interpreted in the context of this thesis, and this 
leads to a broader point about another value of human rights to community.  By proposing 
a role for community within the framework of human rights, the thesis is suggesting that 
there is something more about human rights than just their intrinsic value. It is suggesting 
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that human rights can also serve as a means to pursue certain objectives, including public 
goods. It is a call to understand that a specific claim for public goods cannot always 
succeed without an overarching framework of human rights at its background.  It is 
possible to understand this argument irrespective of how public goods are proposed – 
either as economic goods or ethical goods, such as human rights themselves.   For instance, 
as human rights, a background framework of human rights would always be necessary to 
guarantee other human rights. Put differently, certain civil and political rights, apart from 
their intrinsic value, would depend on certain economic and social rights. Similarly, certain 
economic and social rights would also depend on certain civil and political rights. This is 
one way of interpreting the Rights-Based Approaches to Development or the use of human 
rights to pursue goals such as global justice. This has made the importance of human rights 
quite remarkable today. Human rights have become a way in which many ills are addressed 
or sought to be addressed across the world.  
 
This particular point leads to the question about the conception of human rights that 
underpins the whole approach in the thesis, especially the potential of community 
participation in human rights discourse. It comes from the understanding of why human 
rights have become so appealing or used to promote different goals. This is simply because 
of their moral appeal and the strength of moral persuasion they give to all sorts of claims. 
Because of this, I argue that even when human rights are invoked in an instrumental sense, 
there is still something ethical about such claims. When individuals or communities seek to 
advance their claims for water, healthcare or such other claims through the language of 
human rights, they are making ethical claims. It is not merely an ordinary claim for respect 
or for a certain kind of treatment; rather it is a powerful moral claim about something that 
25 
 
is owed to them because of their humanity. In this sense, human rights can be distinguished 
from other instrumental claims because of the underlying ethical nature of such claims.  
 
To justify my argument, I turn once again to work of Amartya Sen. He also invites 
us to understand human rights as ethical claims, which every person, irrespective of 
citizenship is entitled to make, and which can motivate all sorts of things, including 
legislation.
29
 It is this aspect of human rights – their moral force – that not only explains 
what they mean in this thesis, but also why they are important in contemporary political 
societies. Sen‘s point of entry into this discussion is how he notes one of the most 
fundamental problems of human rights – that is, their lack of reasoned foundation. In spite 
of their importance to many struggles, or how they provide a means to resist different 
deprivations, they still suffer from a lack of reasoned foundation.
30
 This accounts for a lot 
of scepticism of human rights by philosophers and legal theorist alike, who refer to them as 
―loose talk‖.
31
 Conceptual justification of human rights was overlooked at the period of 
their foundation, especially when the UDHR emerged. At the time of their birth, the 
universal truth of human rights was taken as self-evident without the need for proper 
justification.  Sen sites Jeremy Bentham‘s famous attack on rights, as ―nonsense on 
stilts‖
32
, as an example of the kind of scepticism that still hangs over them today. Bentham 
dismissed the idea that individuals could have natural rights because of their humanity, and 
without being supported by law. According to this view, human rights only make sense if 
they are backed up by legislation.  
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Sen tries to rescue human rights from this particular criticism by suggesting that a plausible 
way of justifying the existence of human rights today is to consider them as ethical 
pronouncements which tell us what to do to achieve certain objectives. In other words, they 
are not just legislated law but ethical guides that we appeal to in order to understand ―what 
should be done‖, 
33
 and furthermore, how to achieve the freedoms enshrined in them.  
What is important from the standpoint of his argument – and for purposes of this thesis – is 
that human rights are proposed as a motivational instrument to encourage the reduction of 
deprivations. This motivational aspect of human rights may encourage many things, 
including legislation. They ought to be seen as an important motivation for legislation and 
not the other way round. According to him, this is what the framers of the UDHR 
anticipated when they proposed it as a model for domestic laws.  Sen draws parallels 
between this idea of human rights as ethical pronouncements, and H. L. A. Hart‘s idea of 
moral rights.
34
 Hart similarly saw moral rights as ―parents of law‖
35
, which motivate 
specific legislation. It is this motivational element that is at the heart of Sen‘s argument. 
However, they not only provide a motivation for law or for the respect of certain freedoms, 
but also for political agitation for other demands.  The ethical force of human rights can be 
deployed in other ways to address different deprivations.  
 
Two questions usually arise from proposing human rights as ethical claims; the first 
is the content of the claim, whilst the other is the viability of such claims when compared 
with others. With regards to the content, Sen argues that an ethical claim is concerned with 
securing certain freedoms embedded in rights. Sen here draws parallels between human 
rights and the idea of human freedoms mentioned above. The significance of an ethical 
claim for human rights is that it recognises and seeks to protect human freedoms, such as 
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freedom from torture or starvation. 
36
  Secondly, the viability of human rights as ethical 
claims depends on the extent to which they along with other competing ethical claims can 
withstand open and informed scrutiny. As such, he argues that any framework of human 
rights ought to have interactive processes of ―critical scrutiny and open argument, even if 
such reasoning leaves considerable areas of ambiguity and dissonance.‖
37
 Sen explains this 
point by drawing parallels between this interpretation of human rights and utilitarian ethics, 
with the latter seeking to maximise the sum total of individual utilities.  Human rights on 
the other-hand are concerned with protecting certain freedoms and the social obligations 
necessary to guarantee them. Nevertheless, they are both ethical imperatives, one is geared 
towards freedoms, and the other towards happiness. Once it is recognised that they are both 
ethical values, interactive processes can be established to provide a means to determine 
which of these competing ethical claims would be prioritised at any given time – whether it 
is happiness, liberties or autonomy. This particular argument might even provide a formula 
through which much of the tension between human rights and community can be 
addressed, since the values they both represent are ethical, and can only be sustained 
through public debates. 
 
The following point brings another aspect of Sen‘s argument that further grounds 
the whole approach in this thesis – in other words, it offers a conception of human rights 
compatible with the goal of community participation.  One consequence of recognising 
human rights as pre-legislated rights or ethical pronouncements is that it calls the 
dominance of the role of law in human right discourse into question. The legislative route 
or making new laws, according to Sen, should not be seen as the only way to achieve 
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human rights. It is a call to consider other ways of implementing human rights apart from 
through law: 
 
The ways and means of advancing the ethics of human rights need not be confined to making new 
laws (even though sometimes legislation may turn out to be the right way to proceed); for example, 
social monitoring and other activist support provided by such organisations as Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, OXFAM, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Save the Children, the Red 
Cross or Action Aid (to consider many types of NGOs) can help to acknowledge human rights. In 
many contexts, legislation may not, in fact, be involved.38 
 
Sen here is, of course, speaking about NGOs, but this argument makes it possible to 
explore other avenues of contributing to human rights, such as the approach in this thesis.  
After all, the legislative route is not even open to many who seek to advance their claims 
for economic and social rights, as they remain non-justiciable. This point must not be 
glossed over – the possibility of dealing with such questions does not arise for many in the 
Third World.
39
 The legislative route or agitating for new legislation is indeed an important 
way of achieving this objective, but it is not the only approach. This is even a more 
important reason for the approach in this thesis.  
 
4.2. Are Human Rights Enough? 
The argument for human rights as ethical claims should not be confused as a suggestion 
that the language of human rights cannot be misused, abused or used to advance parochial 
claims. It is indeed because of the moral weight behind human rights claims that has made 
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them vulnerable to the pursuit of different ends, including unethical ones. This is certainly 
one explanation for their co-option by the various neoliberal market discourses, as will be 
discussed in chapter three. The ethics of human rights must be alive to such possibilities as 
well as the potential limitations of the language itself, the most important of which is 
whether actions in the name of human rights principles, not only tell us what to do, but the 
right thing to do. Much will depend on how well human rights – as well as other competing 
values – survive dialogues and public scrutiny, as Sen has suggested. But this also depends 
on opportunities for the internal critique of human rights, especially in such ways that can 
enable a better understanding of the kind of ethic implied.  It requires an understanding of 
the epistemic resources they give us when we appeal to them to direct us to make the right 
decisions, particularly those which involve recognising and responding to deprivation and 
suffering.
40
 It is a question that goes to the heart of human rights, one that questions their 
central objective or relevance in society. This can only be understood by critical scrutiny, 
and measuring the ethical quality of the language of human rights itself.  There is 
something to be said about the complacency that often develops from leaving normative 
languages – not just human rights – unquestioned.
41
  It could lead to indifference or that we 
take a lot for granted.  It is only through such processes of questioning that the strengths 
and limitations of human rights can be made known. It is only with such knowledge that 
we can understand how their work can be improved by other ethical resources or if they are 
to be abandoned altogether. 
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One way of questioning the ethical quality, strengths, limitations, and perhaps, how human 
rights work can be improved by other values is pursued here through the writings of 
modern mystic and Christian anarchist, Simone Weil.
42
 It is explored through her 
engagement with human rights through her approach to justice, one which differs from 
contemporary approaches, particularly that influenced by John Rawls. Differences between 
approaches of both scholars are not explored here in detail, except to say that Weil‘s work 
departs from Rawls on the constitutive role of human rights in the pursuit of justice.
43
 In 
other words, her work was sceptical about rights-based approaches to justice. According to 
Weil, when rights become the dominant moral discourse in any given society, it is a sign 
that the society itself has become commodified to the effect that rights become substitutes 
for justice. For her, rights are a materialist concept because they exude ―commercial 
flavour‖,
44
 and this was why she warned against the danger of replacing justice with human 
rights. This was also for the reason that she considered rights-based claims for justice as 
symptomatic of a contentious society. Indeed, she warned that ―...[R]ights are always 
asserted in a tone of contention; and when this tone is adopted, it must rely upon force in 
the background, or else it will be laughed at‖. 
45
 For her, rights were inappropriate for 
problems that can better be resolved by the impulse of love and charity.  
 
The point above comes out clearer when she offers another reason for her 
scepticism of rights. Her anxieties were also that rights were unable to intricately express 
the most silent cries of injustice. She argued that human rights claims were quite 
superficial and were akin to ―the motive that prompts a little boy to watch jealously to see 
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if his brother has a slightly bigger piece of cake‖.
46
 This is a different cry from one from 
the depth of the heart that asks, ―Why am I being hurt?‖ This cry is more profound, and 
difficult to grasp, ―it is a silent cry, which sounds in the secret heart‖.
47
 It is the sort of cry 
that is hardly expressed in any comprehensible language. It is often the case that those who 
express such cries are not able to articulate themselves audibly. In such situations, the heart 
which cries out is the only human faculty that is capable of freely and publicly expressing 
itself.  For her, such cries can only be heard by the act of attentive silence and love.  
 
To illustrate this point, she demonstrates that ancient Greece had no concept of 
rights, as it adequately made do with the concept of justice. Weil demonstrates this from 
Sophocles‘ tragic play, Antigone.
48
  To briefly summarise this story; it involved two 
brothers, Polyneices and Eteocles, who lost their lives after being embroiled in a fight over 
the kingdom of Thebes.  Creon, the uncle of both men, and King of Thebes prohibited the 
burial of the aggressor of the fight, Polyneices. Their sister, Antigone disobeyed this 
injunction and went ahead to bury Polyneices. She was in turn punished by Creon, and was 
sentenced to death for her disobedience. Weil found nothing wrong with the fate that had 
befallen Antigone, especially for what she considered her foolish attempt to treat both 
brothers equally. Creon was justified to take the decision he reached, as Antigone simply 
was wrong to do what she did. At the same time, Antigone‘s actions did find justifications 
in Weil‘s thinking, especially when they are considered non-rationally.  She was, as Weil 
says, overwhelmed by love, which seemed to take precedence over everything else.  
Antigone was not concerned with what each person had done, what they deserved or their 
personal qualities. Rather (as illustrated below), she was motivated by a type of love that is 
sacred and impersonal.  This was simply because she considered it as a type of love that 
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circumvents all empirical qualities of humanity. It was a ―foolish, unreasonable, absurd‖
49
 
type of love. The point is that Antigone‘s actions were not determined by rights.
50
 They 
were motivated by justice, a kind of justice that ―… dictated this surfeit of love‖. It had 




More fundamentally, Weil questioned rights for their close relationship with the 
concept of personality. By personality, as Christopher Hamilton
52
 explains, she meant 
something derived from the concept of personalism. This simply refers to the metaphysical 
core in all human beings – that is, a way of understanding the dignity and inviolability of 
humanity. The problem for Weil is that personalism does not quite grasp what is sacred 
about human beings. It functions like a shield, which presumes that the destruction of 
humanity is impossible.
53
 It assumes that each individual is indestructible, and thereby 
capable of withstanding the most abhorrent of circumstances. The metaphysical centre 
shields human beings from being afflicted, and by the same token, human beings are 
incapable of inflicting harm on others.  
 
Part of the problem arises from its definition.  It is difficult to know what it is let 
alone rely on it as a ―standard of public morality‖.
54
 This is similar with the notion of 
rights, and to combine two inadequate concepts accounts for the latter‘s limitations. 
According to Weil, understanding the sanctity of humanity lies in comprehending how the 
soul is lacerated by the thought of harm being done to them. It comes from the expectation 
that good not evil will be done to us. This is an expectation that exists in all human beings 
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even the vilest. Paradoxically, the point Weil is getting at is that the ―cry of sorrowful 
surprise‖
55
 resulting from the infliction of evil is not personal; rather they are impersonal 
protests. Whilst there are many important personal cries, they do not in any way violate 
what is sacred.   According to Weil, it is ―neither his person, nor personality in him, which 
is sacred. It is he. The whole of him‖. 
56
 If it is down to his human personality, ―I could 
easily pull out his eyes‖.
57
 After all, ―as a blind man he would be exactly as much a human 
personality as before.‖ 
58
 Her point is that it is erroneous to justify morally abhorrent 
wrongs on some empirical quality of humanity.  If this is done (as in most cases), it means 
that no individual is capable of harming the other. This is an unrealistic response to the 
question of why it is wrong to harm others.  
 
Impersonality can only be understood through a form of solitude – that is, through 
what she called a form of attention.  It is impersonality that draws obligations towards 
others, especially those with the weakest potentials. Antigone‘s actions are important for 
another reason here. They revealed the power of impersonality, given that she was not 
concerned about what each of her brother‘s had done, or what they deserved, or their 
personal qualities. Rather, she was motivated by a type of love that is sacred and 
impersonal.   
 
4.4. Human Rights Matter 
Simone Weil‘s criticisms of human rights are very telling, and have certainly failed to 
attract an adequate response. But even on the strength of her criticisms, it can also be 
argued that they do not in any way reduce the continuing moral appeal for human rights 
                                                 
55 Weil above n 42, at 12. 





across the world today. Human rights may be hugely inadequate, but it must be recognised 
that in certain circumstances they may be the only source of inclusion or hope for the poor. 
Weil‘s criticisms at best point to the limits of human rights, especially how observing them 
will not always lead to the right thing to do.  Much as she is owed huge debts for pointing 
out these problems, it does not necessarily mean that we should abandon them. Rather than 
reject them or replace them with something entirely new, what is needed is to rescue them 
from such imperfections. This can be achieved – as argued earlier on – by understanding 
human rights as ethical claims, and furthermore, the need to subject them to processes of 
internal critique. Human rights as ethical claims invite us to understand and question the 
sort of ethic involved. It entails understanding what standards they propose, and how to 
measure them. This entails understanding how well they function when they are called 
upon to assist in addressing many pressing problems, such as those that are related to forms 
of human suffering. This is, after all, why the contemporary discourse of human rights 
emerged after the Second-World War. The ethical significance of human rights today, no 
matter how much that they have been subsequently adapted and narrowed, cannot be 
appreciated without understanding how, and in what ways they can respond to various 
forms of human suffering.
59
 Questioning human rights as proposed can help develop an 
ethic of responsiveness amongst individuals and institutions towards the alleviation of 
human suffering. This can be achieved exactly how Weil herself spoke about it – that is, 
through a system of public education that assists in hearing the faintest cries of suffering. 
She advocated for new regimes and institutions ―… in which this faint and inept cry can 
make itself heard; and …put[s] power into the hands men who are able and anxious to hear 
and understand it‖.
60
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From this perspective, an internal critique of human rights, or measuring and understanding 
their ethical quality cannot be understood without the work of Weil, particularly through 
the lens of her concept of attention.  It is a habit that individuals – particularly those in 
authority – need to cultivate to try to understand better, and address different problems 
around us, especially those that cause human suffering.  To understand the significance of 
Weil‘s idea of attention, it would appear that some clarification is firstly needed of her 
perceived opposition to human rights, or the degree to which she opposed them.  On the 
surface, her criticisms might seem anti-human rights, and somewhat counter-productive 
from the perspective of this thesis. On closer inspection, however, Weil did not oppose 
human rights; rather she placed them at secondary place. She gave more priority to love, 
and it was not that she thought human rights had no value at all.  Agreeing with this point 
Peter Winch writes that: 
Although, as we see, she expresses herself strongly about the language of rights, it is important to 
realise that she is not rejecting it as always inappropriate. I think her discussion does not even rule 
out the possibility that injustice may, in some cases, actually take the violation of someone else‘s 
rights...The inspiration for a demand for rights may well be a concern for justice; it may be in some 
circumstances to struggle for rights is the best way of struggling for justice. But that does not mean 
that the struggle for justice is the same thing as the struggle for rights; the one struggle may be 
successful and the other not – may be that is even more often than not the outcome.61 
 
For Winch, it is important that this distinction is not lost – that is, that rights may not 
always lead us to justice or might sometimes mislead us to think that rights are equivalent 
to justice. With this point put to rest, there is nothing contradictory about trying to 
understand how Weil‘s ideas can assist the framework of human rights, so that when we 
appeal to them as ethical guides, they can comprehensively tell us what to do to achieve 
development, economic and social rights, or alleviate the suffering that results from the 
failure to achieve such objectives.  Attention is a powerful way of achieving this, for it is: 
... a form of discernment of seeing what people are saying when they are hurt...Attention consists of 
suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty and ready to be penetrated…Above all our 
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thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything but ready to receive in its naked truth the 
object that is to penetrate it.62 
 
Accordingly, attention is simply seeing that which we often ignore.  It is an ability which 
exists or can be cultivated by all individuals. As the passage above reveals, this consists of 
an aptitude that includes a number of things; it consists of listening, looking, being still or 
patient and the willingness to embrace the other with compassion and help.
63
 My reading 
of Weil‘s work here is shaped by one of her followers – that is, from the work of Zenon 
Bankowski.
64
  He provides one of the most profound interpretations of attention, one that 
makes such a difficult concept rather easy to grasp. It is obvious that Weil‘s ideas are 
shaped by her Christian orientation, and also her mysticism. As Bankowski elaborates 
further, this influenced what she meant by attention, it was analogous to the way she 
thought one could experience the love of God.  The unconditionality implied by God‘s love 
is key to grasping attention. In other words, individuals had an obligation to love one 
another. It was a kind of expectation that many Christians and non-Christians alike, might 
find absurd, as well as hard to observe.  The Biblical account of the Good Samaritan was 
important in bringing this to light. The significance of the Samaritan assisting the man, 
who was possibly his enemy, and who had fallen amongst thieves, is exactly what attention 
entails. Building on the parable of the Good Samaritan, attention is not simply a question 
of understanding who one‘s neighbour is, but rather; ―...a constitutive act of making the 
other a neighbour by the act of helping‖.
65
  And the act of making one a neighbour is 
achieved through this unique act of compassion, where the non-afflicted takes on the pain 
of the afflicted with love.   
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What Weil is suggesting is not simple, especially if one considers the narcissistic nature of 
individuals.  Even when we are genuinely motivated to assist the afflicted, our self-centred 
disposition only leads to condescension or we fail to connect with the depth of the other‘s 
suffering. Individuals either remain distant or their interventions are paternalistic – they are 
not often made from a position of equality.  This is perhaps why Weil thought that the only 
way that one can sincerely assist the afflicted is when one takes part in the affliction.  What 
she meant was that it was hardly possible to understand the afflicted from a privileged 
position; this was only possible if one embraced their affliction. She thought that our 
privileged position is more of an accident of fate than a natural position.
66
    
 
Weil‘s concept of attention certainly cannot be understood without the concept of 
love at its background. Attention is undoubtedly an expression of love.  Her reference to 
love – as with most of her thought – is distinctively Christian but it can be interpreted in a 
secular way.  Love is sacred and impersonal as seen from the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, where the love of the neighbour was really about the love of the stranger.
67
  
Love is unreasonable, but yet does not totally exclude rationality. After all, attention – the 
act of stillness – is not absolutely a form of irrationality; it requires a certain degree of 
deliberation.  Love certainly cannot be legislated – this should not be mistaken as the 
suggestion. What it can do though is provide a philosophy that guides our actions, or the 
way our laws, legal frameworks, and other institutions are designed to treat those in need 
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with utmost priority. After all, no law, institution or intervention can exist without a 
background operating philosophy. 
 
5. Electricity as a Case-Study 
In terms of its application – particularly to understand the problems, and to consequently 
build a theory of community– the thesis is developed in the context of access to electricity 
in Nigeria, a country where 40-70% of its population are estimated to lack electricity.
68
 The 
choice of electricity as a means of illustrating the arguments in this thesis obviously needs 
justification since it is not traditionally considered as a human right. Unlike water, 
education and healthcare, electricity certainly rarely features in the justiciability debates of 
economic and social rights.  This seems ironic given that the lack of access to electricity 
has far reaching consequences on the enjoyment of other human rights. Certainly, the 
ability to drink clean water or to access good education or healthcare would in one way or 
the other depend on electricity.  In spite of these obvious connections, electricity has not 
been fully embraced by international human rights discourse.  Electricity remains the 
subject of the attention of engineers and to some extent development economists, but it 
enjoys marginal responses from international human rights lawyers.  Electricity is rarely 
discussed in the human rights literature in spite of its vital connection to other rights, as 
well as its importance to addressing poverty.  This might be a consequence of the more 
recognised relationship between electricity and industrialisation to the effect that its social 
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One noticeable exception, and advocate of electricity as a human right is Stephen Tully.
70
 
His work is used here as a vehicle to justify why access to electricity ought to be a human 
right, and furthermore, a public good in light of earlier arguments in this chapter. Of 
course, a case can be made about electricity as a public good in the economic sense of the 
term, but this is not the argument I want to pursue. Tully convincingly argues that it exists 
as an attribute of a pre-existing right or in the context of eliminating discrimination against 
women.
71
 To begin, the right to access electricity exists in international law as a subset of 
housing rights, and as recognised by the ICESCR. According to Tully, even the UN 
Special Rapportuer on housing has been on record to include electricity as a basic 
requirement for adequate housing.  Similarly, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) makes it clear under Article 14(2) 
(h) that State parties are obligated to ―take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in rural areas...and, in particular, shall ensure to such women 
the right...to enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to...electricity‖.
72
 The 
reporting procedure that accompanies CEDAW also makes it a requirement to report on 
access to electricity amongst women.  
 
On the domestic level, some States have gone on to recognise access to electricity 
as a human right in their law, one of which is the United Kingdom‘s (UK) ―people-
approach to electricity‖ 
73
which is a species of a rights based approach, and recognises 
―equity of access to basic energy services for cooking, space heating, and lighting, like 
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access to water…as a human right‖.
74
  Other States like France and South Africa have 
similarly recognised electricity as a human right. In my analysis of the Nigerian electric 
sector reform in chapter four, I show that a right to electricity service now exists under 
Nigerian law but it is unclear if it is proposed as a human right or just – as it seems – a 
consumer right.  Leaving that aside for now, Tully also expands on the content and the 
scope of the human right to access to electricity by trying to understand how it can function 
like other individual human rights claims. For this to happen, he argues that, it must be 
universal and justiciable. In addition, the ramifications of governmental obligation must be 
clearly demarcated.  This, he acknowledges, is difficult, and not much work has been 
carried out in this respect. Nevertheless, this does not deter him from showing what this 
implies.  It entails that all governments should provide equal supply of electricity to 
everyone within their jurisdiction. In other words, the scope and content of the right, 
―entitles everyone to access a reliable, adequate, and affordable electricity supply of 
sufficient quality for personal and household (domestic) use‖. 
75
  He takes each of these 
concepts seriously, and spends time on elaborating on what those terms mean with great 
clarity, and in ways that can inform contemporary reform approaches.  Unfortunately, this 
is yet to be fully accepted, not only amongst human rights lawyers, but also by the BWIs, 
especially the Bank, a key driver of electricity reform in the Third World. This argument is 
explored in more detail in chapter four when I provide a case study of the reform of the 
Nigerian electricity sector. Part of the general objective in this thesis, then, is to show how 
human rights – particularly the ethical language of human rights – might direct those in 
positions of authority to recognise the profound link between electricity, human rights and 
human suffering.  
 
                                                 




It is acknowledged that the jury is still out on the relationship between electricity, human 
rights and human suffering. But the connections can easily be appreciated if we understand 
the implications of the following argument. Life without electricity is a constant struggle to 
cook food, power household appliances, support healthy temperature, whether by air 
conditioning or heating.
76
 Electricity is essential to power pumps, and desalination 
treatment for access to clean water. It is essential for healthcare, especially refrigerating 
vaccines or for functioning life support systems, shock therapy or intensive care units.
77
 
We need electricity, not only for recreational activities, but also for educational aids, such 
as computers. These are all important, including the ways in which it can contribute to 
generating people‘s incomes as some economists would like to look at it.  If history teaches 
us anything, it does reveal that from Lenin‘s electrification scheme in the old Soviet Union 
to the Tennessee Valley Authority Rural Electrification project in United States (US), 
electricity has been an important factor that has helped millions escape the clutches of 
poverty. Vladimir Lenin, in particular, considered electricity as a form of enlightenment, a 
means through which the poor can be educated to eradicate poverty.
78
 He considered every 
power station as a centre of enlightenment, and one does not have to be a follower of Lenin 
to understand the significance of this argument.  
 
6. Structure of Thesis 
The ideas in this thesis are presented through eight chapters. The next three chapters (two, 
three and four) offer a critique of the current market approach – the response to State 
failure – that now influences human rights in the Third World. This thesis, after all, cannot 
be appreciated without a discussion of the problems that arise from the current approach, 
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particularly the emphasis on the markets in human rights discourse, a theme that runs 
throughout those chapters. The chapters also instantiate the general claim in the thesis that 
the idea of community is not well recognised. Chapters five, six and seven also have a 
common theme; they outline the main argument in this thesis – that is, the theory of 
community.  The thesis concludes in chapter eight. 
 
The diagnosis for the general problems of human rights is often seen as a question 
of State failure. Good governance is the response to this problem. Chapter two provides an 
analysis of good governance – the concept that influences the market approach to human 
rights. This chapter is a prior step to understanding how it specifically relates to human 
rights by explaining what good governance really means, its inadequacies, where it 
originates from, its salient features, and its similarity and points of departure from 
governance in transnational discourses.  
 
Chapter three focuses on how the market approach works. It explains reasons 
behind the embrace of markets by the approach, and tries to understand the role of the 
BWIs in such processes. In doing so, it demonstrates that part of the problem is also that 
little attention has been paid to alternative ways of thinking of markets, especially those 
that offer more potential for cooperation and collaboration amongst the poor. As such, the 
problem is not so much the question of markets; it is also of the kind of market involved. 
The chapter concludes by making a case for social markets, particularly the co-operative as 
a suitable model for human rights, and for encouraging participation and cooperation 




Chapter four demonstrates how the good governance approach translates into practice. In 
particular, it explores the way it encourages privatisation to the exclusion of both human 
rights and community. In doing so, the chapter offers a critique of the reform proposals for 
electricity in Nigeria, and concludes by arguing that some of the problems pointed out, 
especially those of poverty, human suffering and participation might better be brought to 
attention by the inclusion of an ethical framework of human rights in the reform. It might 
help shift the focus of the reforms away from more trivial concerns to embrace those that 
understand the kinds of suffering implied as a result of the inability to access and 
participation in electricity.  
 
Chapter five starts to build the case for community by considering in general terms 
how the concept is used in human rights discourse. This is because one cannot understand 
the uniqueness of the proposals for community here without first of all understanding how 
it is currently used in the dominant approaches.  It discusses the use of community, and 
points to the inadequacies relating to it.  Partly responsible for the minimal use of 
community is a tension that arises from the conceptual differences between human rights 
and community. Such differences have generated a lot of debate, but the concepts have not 
always been proposed in oppositional terms.  The chapter considers the work of certain 
theorists who have not seen them in such oppositional terms as a way forward, and 
concludes by showing the indispensability of dialogues in resolving any potential tensions 
that may arise. The chapter provides the groundwork for discussions of the theory of 





Chapter six follows on from the above to explore how the whole approach to community 
might work. It outlines the substantive elements of the theory of community. First, it 
begins with a discussion of community – what it is, problems associated with it, and how 
they might be overcome by offering a vision of what it ought to be.  It then proceeds to 
discuss potential spaces to encourage participation of individuals in community. Finally, 
the chapter offers a theory of deliberation for decision-making within such Community 
Forums.  
 
Chapter seven takes the arguments in the previous chapter a lot further by trying to 
instantiate how a community might participate in relation to the proposed human right to 
electricity. It offers a hypothetical co-operative model as a potential end-product of 
discussions in Community Forums, and furthermore, how the aspirations for participation 
can be operationalised. This chapter is a continuation of discussions in chapter three about 
the potential role for social markets in human rights discourse. It offers a general 
discussion of the potential role for co-operatives in electricity, and how the existing legal 
and institutional framework of electricity in Nigeria, can be reformed to accommodate 
them. 
 
The thesis concludes in chapter eight by offering a summary of the argument and 
reflects on the implications of the thesis on the traditional State-based human rights 







                                                                           Chapter Two 
 
 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AS A METAPHOR FOR DEVELOPMENT  
 
 
It is only with good governance that we can find solutions to poverty, inequality and 
insecurity.
79





Many problems of development in the Third World, including those relating to human 
rights, are often said to arise from a profound governance question. The concept of good 
governance is the response to such problems by the BWIs – particularly the Bank‘s – 
inspired lending initiatives.  It emerges in favour of the role of markets as a substitute for 
the State in processes of governance, including the governance of human rights.  The 
chapter seeks to understand the concept that makes it all possible. In particular, it clarifies 
what good governance really means, its inadequacies, where it originates from, its 
similarities and differences with the more general use of governance in international 
relations and legal theory.  This chapter as such lays the foundations for the discussions in 
the chapters that follow. The reason for this is simple. It is not possible to adequately 
understand the problems that the thesis attempts to address, and furthermore, the potential 
of community participation without first of all grasping the underlying premise that 
underpins the dominant approach.  
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The chapter begins with a general discussion of the perception and changes to the 
traditional notion of governance in international relations. It explains how the perception of 
governance has shifted from centralised notions of economic and social regulation typical 
of the administration of the State to a new era of flexible, participatory, dialogic, complex 
forms of regulation. The chapter proceeds to discuss the changes from the perspective of 
the Third World, as facilitated by good governance.  It offers a critique of the approach, 
which not only explains why it limits the possibility of multiple solutions to the different 
problems, but also the possibility of other ways of thinking of governance. The chapter 
proceeds to explain the emergence of good governance from a historical perspective, 
particularly through the influences of the seminal work of Max Weber and the first law and 
development movement. It concludes by noting some of the ways that good governance 
departs from those early influences as well as briefly highlighting its failure to 
meaningfully embrace community.  
 
2. The rise of Governance 
The term governance often generates contradictory meanings, even though its definition 
can be reduced into two contexts.  In its more traditional or older context, it implies 
attention to government, and the various ways in which political power is exercised.  It 
refers to the exercise of powers or the coordination and administration of social, economic 
and political processes within a given territory. Governance, in this context, is more 
broadly concerned with the political role of the State in directing society through standard 
setting of objectives and priorities. More recent discussions about governance, however, 
now refer to it in the context of the State‘s adaptability to internal and external 
transformations of the late twentieth century.  Governance now prioritises informal as 
47 
 
opposed to formal forms of authority, given the importance it attaches to hybrid forms of 
public and private co-operation.
80
   
Economic globalisation has been responsible for most of these changes in the 
perception of governance.  Globalisation has been symptomatic of the rise of neoliberal 
regimes across the world, the emergence of which is visible in many countries across the 
world. It manifests itself through the revival of classical economics or market liberalism, 
which take the form of monetarism, deregulation, privatisation and the down-sizing of the 
civil service.  As one observer puts it, the current era is marked by ―an ideological and 
cultural shift from collective solutions towards individualism and a heralding of private 
enterprise and the market as the superior resource allocating mechanism‖.
81 
The State no longer has monopoly over governance, just as governance now 
emerges at multiple levels.  Explaining the shift in the language of governance, a very 
comprehensive article by Orly Lobel 
82
 traces the origins of these developments to events 
in the United States (US) and the Europe Union (EU).  In those contexts, as she illustrates, 
the State has embraced the vast potentials of new technologies, market innovation and civic 
engagement in ways that enable different stakeholders to participate in governance 
processes. This, of course, has been encouraged through the advent of globalisation, the 
problems of which have prompted self-reflection about the suitability of existing regulatory 
frameworks and categories within legal theory. 
83
 In other words, the inadequacies of the 
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command and control regulatory models as a result of globalisation have also called the 
existing legal theories, laws and legal frameworks into question.  
  Lobel explains further that proponents of governance argue that traditional ways 
of thinking about laws and legal theory have to be adaptable to changes in the economic, 
social and political climate. They suggest that globalisation has marked a new phase of 
modernity, and this has entailed rethinking traditional categories of legal theory, policy and 
practice to deal with the new complexity of contemporary societies. In this emerging 
environment of complexity, generalised or centralised rules are considered inadequate 
responses to the particularities of the new circumstances.  The uncertainty and 
unpredictability produced by these conditions are such that have made the need for new 
laws to cope with the ―radical indeterminacy‖ and ―unintended consequences‖
84
 of the 
market framework. ―New governance‖ (as it is often called) has been proposed as a 
substitute for regulation and an adjustment to the changes brought about by market rule. 
Consider the following explanation by Lobel: 
 A significant impediment for legal reform today is the diversity of the market and the wide range 
of social issues and problems, which require the adoption of a wide range of organizational forms 
and thus a unitary conception of the regulation of diverse social fields and context is impossible. 
There is no one size-fits-all solution to the challenges facing the regulatory state. No standard 
regulation can effectively govern the multiplicity of settings in which social action operates. The 




Part of the response to these developments has been provoked by what Lobel calls an 
‗internal drive‘ within legal theory. It simply refers to attempts to adjust and respond to 
these changes with more adequate legal theories. What this means is that the emergence of 
new governance has also been explained from a functional response within legal theory. 
Such perspectives have taken the inadequacies of centralised regulatory frameworks as 
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their starting point, but they have also gone much further in recognising the dangers of 
exclusively depending on markets.  Regardless of this, the internal response from legal 
theory has placed more emphasis on the limitations of command and control legislation, 
and consequently, its role in the production of the interventionist State.   
The internal or functionalist dimension has been explained in evolutionary terms, 
thanks to Gunther Teubner‘s
86
 work on reflexive law and autopoetic systems.  Following 
on from Niklas Luhmann‘s 
87
 seminal work on systems theory, Tuebner has proposed 
autopoiesis as an analytical framework to explain the complexity of the contemporary era.  
She is referring to Teubner‘s proposals for a reflexive approach to regulation, which 
functions in ways that enhance the self-referentiality of social systems, and as an answer to 
such complexity. Each social system is described as autonomous or radically closed but at 
the same time open to co-operate with one another. In the US, protagonists of governance 
have operated under this school of thought, quite apart from the fact that they have 
explained such changes through evolutionary theories of law, which in turn, explain the 
rise of modern law. On this view, modern law evolves according to a three stage linear 
progression.  They have argued that modern law evolves from a system of autonomous 
private orders to centralised regulatory model, and finally, to the current approach, that is, 
the governance approach. The origins of modern law can be traced to a regime of private 
entitlements, which proceeds to a system of formal law. Modern law then progresses to a 
centrally coordinated system typical of Roosevelt‘s New Deal regulatory models, given 
that formal law was, at that time, considered an inadequate framework for markets to 
operate. The common view then was that markets needed to be regulated, a task that gave 
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rise to the modern bureaucracy.  This system eventually proved inadequate, quite apart 
from breeding an environment in which one system dominated the other.  The New Deal 
regulatory framework was either open to capture by the more powerful systems, or merely 
became politicised.  Governance has now emerged in the final stage of the progression to 
reinvent the approach to regulation.  It has influenced the substitution of regulation with 
spatial and reflexive systems composed of self-regulatory sub-systems. Looking at the 
specific characteristics of the new governance model, Lobel illustrates how it resembles the 
market organisational model.  Proposals for governance are replete with suggestions about 
how government bodies must also adopt such practices typical of market organisations.  
One consequence of such arguments is that government itself is urged to down-size or 
reduce its costs. This is often carried out through extensive programmes of privatisation or 
downsizing of bureaucracies, apart from contracting out State functions to private entities.  
Another important feature of the new governance model is that it has encouraged 
participation at various levels of decision-making. This is one of the most visible 
differences with the regulatory model, where participation was monopolised by 
technocratic or bureaucratic experts. The new governance model has opened up decision-
making to a whole range of actors. In doing so, it has encouraged a new kind of expertise, 
one unavailable in the past.  Participation has now been extended to a wide range of 
activities, from legislation to the design and implementation of policies.  Governance now 
offers a framework for everyone to participate – it has not been restricted to representatives 
of the market or State. The scope and processes of participation are equally open to 
members of civil society.
88
  As a consequence, a third-sector of government has emerged 
creating a new regime of public sector management as well as new methods of delivering 
social services.  New governance marks a spatial shift from the formal legal entities to an 
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era of private for profit as well as non-profit sector participation.  Such kinds of 
participation not only take place at the domestic level, but also at the multi-national spheres 
leading to claims of the emergence of a global civil society. Apart from participation, new 
governance has also encouraged collaboration amongst different entities. Government – or 
the State‘s – role has been transformed into one that facilitates collaboration of different 
entities.  New governance now encourages shared responsibility between government, the 
private sector and civil society groups.
89
 It is a commitment for dialogue at all levels of the 
public sector, one that now extends to local communities at national and transnational 
levels. There is a democratic element to new governance, in that it has sought to enhance 
the deliberative capabilities of members of the public, the limitation of which is that it has 
encouraged participation of communities through market exchanges.   Even so, new 
governance does not totally rely on the market. New governance is to say the least a middle 
ground between State-based and market regulation. It seems to create flexible approach 
that seeks to build productive relationships from both administrative and private market 
mechanisms. 
A further point that emerges from the following is what is the nature of the 
relationship between the old regulatory and new governance model?  To answer this, new 
governance should not in any way be understood as a substitute for regulation. Both 
models have a more complementary relationship than often acknowledged in the 
governance literature.
90
 New governance does not replace, but co-exists alongside the old 
regulatory model. They have a more balanced relationship than often conceived, even 
though this relationship is often taken for granted.    
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There are other fundamental problems with claims about new governance, one of which is 
the question of democratic legitimacy, which is made obvious, thanks to Paul Hirst‘s
91
 
important essay on this question.  It sheds light on how new governance poses problems for 
traditional notions of political accountability. New modes of participation have created new 
problems of accountability. This, as will be seen in the subsequent chapter, has presented 
challenges for human rights.  More importantly, although it disavows being a ‗one-size fits 
all-approach‘, it is ironically promoted as such across the globe.  Such ideas about 
governance have not only been transferred across disciplines, but also across boundaries. 
And when measured against the demands of the Third World, the claims of novelty about 
governance are questionable.  As considered next, it is part and parcel of the paradigm of 
development.  
  
2.1. Governance in the Third World 
Most presuppositions about new governance above are now replicated in the Third World 
through the Bank‘s concept of good governance, even though it must be appreciated that 
there are considerable differences on how it emerges in this context.   Ideas about (‗old‘ 
and ‗new‘) governance have a more complementary relationship in the Third World in 
proposals for good governance.
92
 It seems to encourage a more progressive relationship 
between legal regulation and governance.  Unique to the Third World, however, is that 
good governance now represents one of the most influential concepts in development 
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discourse.  It is often a phrase touted as the central development orthodoxy by the 
international development institutions.
93
   
The Bank
94
 is arguably the most influential proponent of good governance.  For the 
Bank, governance is primarily the manner in which power is exercised in the management 
of a country‘s economic and social resources for development. The Bank here seems to be 
referring to ‗old governance‘ – that is, the relationship between governance and the quality 
of government.  This can be understood in at least three related contexts. First, governance 
refers to the ―form of the political regime‖, 
95
 which invokes the second dimension – that 
is, processes in which political ―authority is exercised in the management of economic and 
social resources of a country‖.
96
 Thirdly, governance also refers to ―the capacity of 
governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions‖.
97
  
Seen this way, good governance is basically concerned with the ―system of national 
administration‖
98
 or, the ―state of being governed‖
99
, or thirdly, ―the method of government 
or regulation‖
100
 within a given country. This perhaps explains the Bank‘s attention to 
bureaucratic and institutional improvements of government processes that relate to 
transparency and accountability of decision-making procedures, amongst other things. Put 
differently, the bank‘s concept of good governance is premised on ―the creation of a 
government which is, amongst other things, democratic, open, accountable and transparent, 
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and which respects and fosters human rights and the rule of law‖.
101
 Good governance 
attempts to achieve this under the auspices of international human right law, or more 
accurately, specific human rights norms that were privileged in after the Cold War. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Bank also acknowledged the shift from the perception that 
only links governance with government by noting multiple processes that originate from 
non-State or private processes.
102
 This is also mainly due to emergence of economic 
globalisation, which (as considered above) has encouraged multiple forms of authority, 
both from within and without societies. The global economic order is, after all, 
symptomatic of networks of global, regional institutions and transnational corporations 
(TNCs), which now challenge the ideals of State sovereignty. In other words, ideas about 
good governance cannot be separated from those about the need for Third World countries 
to participate in the global economy.
103
 This has, in turn, encouraged proposals to reform 
State governance by creating the environment for ―predictable, open and enlightened 
policy-making, [and] bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos.‖
104
  It is obvious that 
the move to de-centre governance from the State coincides with the prevailing neoliberal 
economic development orthodoxy, which largely distrusts the State in economic affairs. It 
is no surprise then that good governance operates within this mindset, quite apart from 
being aware of the changing dynamics of an increasing globalised world.  Partly in 
response to these developments, the Bank recognises another form of governance –that is, 
third sector governance. It embodies similar proposals with those about new governance 
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above, which also recognises models constituted by civil society. This aspect of good 
governance will be discussed in more detail in the final part of this chapter.    
 
2.2. The Governance Fetish  
One discernable consequence of the emergence of good governance is that, not only does it 
exclude other ways of imagining governance – particularly the role of community – but it 
also excludes other ways of imagining development. This explains why this chapter is 
entitled Good governance as a Metaphor for Development to capture its power of naming – 
that is, its power of ascription of what is, or what is not development.  To understand this 
argument, good governance is described here as a fetish, one that reduces the multiple 
ways of understanding development into a single all embracing category. This mindset is 
captured by the quote at the beginning of this chapter – that is, I repeat, ―[I]t is only with 
good governance that we can find solutions to poverty, inequality and insecurity‖ in the 
Third World. In this section (and indeed the chapter as a whole), I argue to the contrary, 
that a more plausible way of speaking or thinking of governance is to consider it as one 
amongst the many ways of constituting development. Good governance or any form of 




Good governance is presided over by a fetish similar to the one Karl Marx
106
 
famously discussed in his work. In his discussions on commodities, he spoke about how 
they gave rise to a fetish over them.  For him, fetishism involved the propensity to reduce 
various aspects of social life into a single conceptual framework.  More specifically, 
commodity fetishism has the effect of reducing multiple or vibrant forms of human activity 
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into the production and sale of commodities.
107
  Similarly, the governance fetish, which I 
describe, works the same way; it takes the question of development for granted by reducing 
the multiple dimensions of constituting it into a question of the lack of governance. The 
fetish – which is mainly addressed in relation to government – has a moral appeal, given 
the pervasiveness of corruption and other problems with State governance in the Third 
World.  Whilst the governance argument does offer a useful critique of the State, it 
paradoxically reduces the complexity of solutions to a single category. All it seems to 
achieve is to replace one form of governance with the other – in this case, the State with 
the market. True enough that there is a predilection towards such type of argument, but it is 
argued that there are other ways of thinking of these problems and solutions. Though many 
of these problems exist as a consequence of governance, the point is that they also occur 
through circumstances quite unrelated to it. All good governance achieves is to generalise 
the problems and solutions across the Third World to the extent that it excludes 
particularity.   
Foucault‘s concept of governmentality is a useful way of understanding the 
arguments above.
108
  One the one hand, governmentality refers to this power of naming – 
that is, the power of representation or the method of production of knowledge about the 
subject being governed.  In this particular instance – and the point I am really concerned 
about – is governmentality as the power over production of truths – that is, truths about 
seeing and speaking about development.  Foucault also refers to governmentality as the 
techniques of government, such that are not necessarily restricted to the State. 
Governmentality embraces the whole spectrum of society, including the ability of 
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individuals to govern themselves.
109
  It captures the current neoliberal mindset, in which 
governing power is dispersed onto market actors. My point is indeed very similar about 
good governance. It presides over the production and technique of truth or knowledge of 
development in the Third World. Good governance now determines what counts and what 
does not count as development. It is not only a criterion for validating the processes of 
establishing development, but also the manner in which Third World societies perceive it. 
The consequence of this is simple; it seems to exclude other possible ways of speaking and 
thinking about development. Problems of hunger, poverty, illiteracy, disease, democracy, 
human rights, corruption, war or inadequate social services are understood only in terms of 
the absence of good governance.   
 
The good governance fetish can partially be explained through the work of Arturo 
Escobar.
110
  It is a helpful way of showing how good governance – like development – 
functions as the main validating criteria for social reality in the Third World. This can be 
understood from the way Escobar speaks about development.  He depicts it as the 
phenomenon that represents or even obscures all forms of social reality in the Third World. 
A useful way of understanding what Escobar means can be grasped from his use of the 
term ‗discourse‘. Here he develops this from the work of Foucault and conceives it as a 
process where social reality is determined or shaped by expressions of ―knowledge and 
power‖.
111
 What Escobar seems to suggest is that development is a particular kind of 
discourse that only serves the purpose of validating others. For Escobar, development is 
discursive because it has the effect of instantiating discourses or representations that 
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manage or circumscribe social reality, the effect of which is the exclusion of other possible 
representations of reality. Escobar‘s point is quite similar to Edward Said‘s  notion of 
orientalism, which famously describes ―the corporate institution of dealing with the Orient 
– dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, [or even] 
describing it…‖
 112
 amongst other things. 
A further and more empirical illustration of the governance fetish can be developed 
through the work of Jeffery Sacks.
113
  He expresses a similar view quite well, although his 
justification or purpose is quite different from mine. Sacks‘ takes a typical economic 
reading of governance, the absence of which is explained by comparisons between 
economic growth rates and the levels of governance. Looking specifically at Africa, he 
argues quite convincingly that good governance should not be seen as a means, but as the 
result of development. Sacks‘ thesis is developed in response to what I have described as 
the governance fetish.  He confirms that it is a view that holds corruption and poor 
governance as ―Africa‘s venal sin.‖
114
  Most accounts of African poverty are expressed in 
such terms.  And this view has an appeal amongst Africans and non-African social, 
economic and political commentators.    
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Whilst he does acknowledge that the quality of Africa‘s governance is undoubtedly 
lacking, ―the focus on corruption and poor governance‖,
115
 however, exaggerates its effect 
on ―Africa‘s laggard growth‖.
116
 His reasoning is influenced by an economic argument that 
suggests the level of a country‘s income often translates to the quality of its governance.  
According to this view, good governance would ordinarily correlate with improved levels 
of economic growth. This is for two simple but very contestable assumptions. First, the 
watchdog role of society is better enhanced by a literate and affluent populace. In other 
words, he is saying that a more enlightened society is more capable of keeping its 
government honest. Second, affluent societies are capable of making investments that can 
improve the quality of governance, such as a highly professionalised bureaucracy – that is, 
an educated civil service, freedom of information and a specialised public administration. 
 
As plausible as this illustration seems, Sacks‘ argument still needs some unpacking. 
To begin with, Sacks‘ argument seems to misleadingly conflate economic growth with 
development, a point that is now well documented that this is not always the case.  This is 
exactly the point of Amartya Sen‘s
117
  influential thesis on Development as Freedom, 
which is now widely used in international development circles.  Sen‘s work demonstrates 
that growth of gross national product (GNP), industrialisation or personal incomes should 
not to be considered as ends of development; rather they are a means through which people 
enhance the quality of their lives. As such, ―[a]n adequate conception of development must 
go much beyond the accumulation of wealth and the growth of gross national product and 
other income-related variables‖
118
 to embrace the idea of human freedoms.   
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For the sake of argument, if one accepts Sacks‘ view that economic growth will always 
translate into development, it is not clear how improvements in economic growth would in 
turn always translate into good governance. Sacks‘ view seems to be a better explanation 
of how governance will not lead to economic growth than how governance will itself be 
spurred by economic growth. Admittedly, Sacks acknowledges that the relationship 
between ―growth rates and the quality of governance‖ 
119
 is not always precise.  More 
specifically, comparing growth rates and governance in the context of Africa is not always 
helpful. For instance, the average African country grows at a lower rate in comparison with 
other Third World countries, especially those with the same level of income and quality of 
governance. This is even the case with similar countries with comparative levels of 
corruption. Other Third World countries simply do better than those of Africa. A more 
persuasive argument for understanding Africa‘s problems then is possibly its adverse 
geography or deficient infrastructure and these are not exclusively questions of 
governance.     
 
Regardless of these limitations, good governance has come to dominate the legal, 
political and social landscape in much of the Third World.  A question that might be asked 
at this point is how or why has the governance fetish come to be so easily accepted.  Whilst 
it is by far the strongest attempt to establish a relationship between ‗governance and 
development‘ today, such thinking in the Third World is not entirely new. There are very 
striking similarities between good governance and Max Weber‘s ideas about legal 
rationality and the bureaucratisation of development.
120
 In the next part, the aim is to 
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demonstrate how good governance draws its impetus from Weber on the value of law and 
the bureaucracy to development. Although, Weber‘s thought evolved in a distinctive period 
of history and under different social conditions, the argument here is that they are 
inseparable from the current ideas about the role of good governance in development. As 
such, they are best understood as mutually supporting moments of the same discourse. 
What I do next is to provide an account of the historical trajectory of governance in 




3. Max Weber, Legal Rationality, and the Bureaucratisation of  
     Development 
 
One of the defining features of Max Weber‘s
121
 work was his attempt to explain the rise 
and superiority of capitalism in Western societies. For Weber, this was simply because of 
the superiority of European law.   European law possessed formal, structural and rational 
qualities that were superior to other forms of law. Specifically, European law was superior 
to the types of law that evolved from non-Western societies.
122
 This was simply because 
European law was autonomous, differentiated, general and universally applicable. Non-
European law on the other hand was incapable of enabling rational decisions without direct 
interference of religious or cultural influences. Decisions typical of European societies 
were always reached through the application of universal, clear, objective and determinate 
principles. For Weber, it was not that European political societies were not affected by 
other types of influences; rather these factors were always confined by generally acceptable 
legal rules suitable for the governance of society. The crucial point for Weber is that these 
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rules were oriented towards the market economy, and therefore, key to the progress of non-
European societies. 
 
The following ideas about the superiority of European law can be deciphered from 
Weber‘s tripartite classification of centralised forms of legitimate authority. It is clear that 
Weber‘s thesis founded ideas about centralised forms of legal authority within European 
societies.  Authority stemmed from the obedience of commands, which was usually 
motivated by diverse intentions ranging from habit, routine behaviour, or ―purely personal 
devotion of the governed‖. 
123
  For Weber, obedience to commands on such grounds had to 
be questioned since it had the tendency to be unpredictable. As a consequence, Weber 
advocated that the stability of authority of any ruling authority can only be maintained if 
the ―rulers and rules uphold the internalised power structure as ‗legitimate‘ by right‖.
124
 
This view was consistent with his belief in the governance of rules as the only stable 
grounds for authority.  
 
The rational superiority of law was one of the cardinal features of Weber‘s 
classification of pure types of legitimate authority. For Weber, the nature or type of 
governance in any given society was a reflection of one of the following pure types of 
legitimate authority. It was often a reflection of either formal legal rationality, charismatic, 
or traditional forms of authority. To begin with, the formal rationality of law was consistent 
with Weber‘s ideas about European law, especially its influence on the rise of capitalism.  
Here Weber was suggesting that governance was founded on a legal code of rationally 
accepted norms, quite apart from a generalised system of consistent abstract rules. Such 
societies were always governed in accordance to clear, logical, predictable or certain rules. 
                                                 




Weber‘s thought – as might already be obvious – had an inclination towards legal 
positivism in contemporary legal theory. Comparative views of this can be drawn from the 
idea of legalism, as more recently espoused (and criticised) by Judith Sklar.
125
 At the risk 
of undue simplicity, legalism refers to the view that all aspects of our ―social and personal 
conduct‖
126
 are best explained by rule following. It is akin to a fetish over rules, which 
determine everything, including all our ―rights and obligations‖.
127
 This is the point of 
legalism, the aim of which is to make law appear neutral, objective and fixed. It seems that 
Weber holds similar views about development; it can only be realised on the basis of the 
governance of law.  This may appear logical but it also raises some problems. The 
inclination towards the rational and formal equality of the law often masks the social 
differences in society, especially those amongst the rich and poor. Moreover, it has the 
effect of reducing governance to questions of law, whilst excluding other questions of 
moral, ethical, social and political significance.  
 
There was, however, a further argument, that is to say, there was the suggestion that 
for the rational legal order to exist, it had to be supported by a specialised administrative 
body. The body‘s main function was to provide clear and determinate rules for 
development. According to Weber, the bureaucracy represented the purest type of legal 
authority. It was always established in accordance to law which, of course, could be altered 
if the proper procedure was followed.  The bureaucracy was constituted either by election 
or appointment.
128
 Its superiority lay in its technical efficiency – that is, for being the most 
efficient form of organisation in society. Efficiency was usually guaranteed through the 
impersonal and specialised nature of its administration. This, in turn, was sustained by a 
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system of obedience of enacted rules, which in turn prescribed, ―to whom and to what rule 
people owe obedience‖.
129
  This impersonalised form of governance was further 
constituted by subjecting those in authority to the logic of obedience – that is, the 
obedience of law or rules.
130
  Quite apart from that, the impersonality of the bureaucracy 
was always sustained through specialisation:  
The typical official is a trained specialist whose terms of employment are contractual and provide a 
fixed salary scaled by rank of office, not the amount of work, and the right to a pension according to 
fixed rules of advancement. His administration represents vocational work by virtue of impersonal 
duties to office; ideally the administrator proceeds sine ira et studio, not allowing personal motive 
or temper to influence conduct, free of arbitrariness, and unpredictability; especially he proceeds 
―without regard to person‖, following rational rules with strict formality. And where rules fail he 
adheres to functional considerations of expediency. Dutiful obedience is channelled through a 
hierarchy of offices which subordinates lower to higher offices and provides a regular procedure for 
lodging complaints. Technically, operation rests on organizational discipline.
131
   
 
The description above marks the distinction between the legal type of governance from 
others. Ideally, the bureaucrat acts according to a moral code of behaviour, which not only 
implies political neutrality, but also objectivity, professionalism, honesty and partiality. 
The bureaucracy as a pure type of legal authority exercised superiority in carrying out the 
objectives of governance due to its special technical ability. Nonetheless, Weber 
acknowledged that the bureaucracy would not always exclude non-bureaucratic influences. 
There was always a tendency for him or her to be overwhelmed by the dictates of ―self-
government‖. And this permitted other groups to participate in bureaucratic endeavours. 
On the other hand, the management of a bureaucracy was not closed to participation of 
elected presidents or monarchs. As will be seen later, these characteristics are quite similar 
to Weber‘s traditional and charismatic forms of authority.  Whilst the legal type of 
governance was symptomatic of the modern State structure, it could also be found in 
private capitalist enterprise, public corporations and voluntary organisations. This was 
because of the hierarchical and functional nature of staff within these bodies.  What Weber 
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may have been suggesting here is that governance was not always confined to government.  
Even though private enterprises existed, Weber recognised that they were ‗heteronomous‘. 
Their powers were always constrained by the State which exercised authority over private 
enterprise. The only autonomy private entities possessed were the control over the internal 
management of its organisation. One explanation of the following view is that, Weber‘s 
thought evolved in a period where the State exercised control over all forms of economic 
activity. The total bureaucratisation of all forms of economic activity was, however, not 
totally supported by Weber.
132
 He warned against the impending dangers of a ubiquitous 
bureaucracy, that is, the possibilities that unlimited bureaucratic power would lead to 
corruption. Such ubiquitous bureaucracies, he argued, threatened the existence of private 
economic activity, and therefore, were inconsistent with capitalist economic development. 
 
 Given this brief overview, it is pertinent to note that Weber‘s thesis on the rise of 
capitalist economic development is well recognised today. This is that capitalist 
development cannot exist without such centralised coordination, consistency, speed, 
precision, records, objectivity, secrecy and professional expertise. The major limitation of 
his ideas is perhaps its Eurocentric outlook, quite apart from its rigid inclination to legal 
formalism. A lot can also be said in the context of the morality and effectiveness of the 
bureaucracy, and as will be illustrated, many of these assertions have been questioned 
today by public choice theorists and others. In spite of this, the emergence of the 
contemporary governance discourse cannot be understood outside these ideals. The current 
governance discourse draws heavily from Weber‘s concepts and ideas as well as his 
comparative studies on the role of law in the rise of capitalism.  Before drawing attention 
to the relevance and distinction between Weber‘s ideas on contemporary governance 
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discourse, a brief attempt is made to distinguish between legitimate authority from 
charismatic and traditional pure types of authority.  This is indeed useful in understanding 
why Weber viewed legitimate authority as the superior form of governance. 
 
3.1. Charismatic Governance 
 
This form of authority represents the unique qualities of individuality or leadership. It is a 
form of governance that is validated on the leader‘s distinctive motivational qualities. 
There are many examples of this type of governance in various parts of the world today. As 
Weber had put it, charismatic authority ―rests on the affectual and personal devotion of the 
follower to the lord and his gifts of grace (charisma)‖.
133
 In its purest form, charismatic 
authority is expressed through ―the rule of a prophet, the warrior, the hero, the great 
demagogue‖,
134
 who may in turn express these abilities through superior qualities of magic, 
heroism, speech or power.
135
 Furthermore, he suggests that the political community from 
which obedience is expected is usually of the kind of a religious group.  Such obedience 
was usually sustained by the leader‘s personality, and not by his ―non-routine qualities‖, 
―enacted position‖ or ―tradition dignity‖.
136
 For this reason, charismatic authority depends 
on the leader‘s ability to consistently motivate obedience. Once he failed, this type of rule 
also automatically failed.   Weber seemed to point to the existence of a bureaucracy in 
these kinds of systems, the kind of which that was based on charisma.  The main difficulty 
for Weber was that the status of a person prevailed over competency, and more 
importantly, governance was never carried out according to clearly laid down rules or 
regulations. In contrast to legal authority, therefore, decisions were consistently irrational.  
 
                                                 
133 Ibid at 12-14. 
134  Ibid. 




3.1.1. Traditional Governance 
Following on closely from the above is the traditional form of authority. Traditional 
authority is expressed by patriarchal rule in its purest type. The father of a family or chief 
reflected a type of this rule. Like charismatic authority, this involved some form of affinity 
to individual qualities. In this case, however, it was based on tradition or custom, and not 
the exceptional qualities of the leader: 
 
The body politic is based on communal relationships; the man in command is the ―lord‖ ruling over 
obedient ―subjects‖. People obey the lord personally since his dignity is hallowed by tradition; 
obedience rests on piety. Commands are substantially bound by tradition, and the lord‘s 
inconsiderate violation of tradition would endanger the legitimacy of his personal rule, which rests 




One of the effects of the above was that once norms were inconsistent with tradition, they 
were considered illegitimate. The rule of the lord was often characterised by the arbitrary 
application of rules according to pleasure, sympathy and antipathy. The problem for Weber 
was that disputes were settled here are only through unpredictable principles of equity or 
justice. For him, this was not as certain as the determinacy guaranteed by formal law. The 
administrative staff of the lord also functioned this way.  The administration was composed 
of personnel who were relatives, friends or individuals of questionable neutrality. In other 
words, this system of governance lacked the neutrality and specialisation of the modern 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the administration lacked functional and jurisdictional 
competence. Instead, members of staff had to exhibit high standards of personal loyalty 
irrespective of their competence.  
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These arguments by Weber have contemporary significance. Disciples of Weber have used 
such arguments to explain reasons for the lack of economic development in non-Western 
societies such as those of East Asia. It was argued that China, amongst other countries, 
would not achieve the same economic progress as developed societies. The current realities 
of China‘s development indicate how these observations are well off the mark. 
Nonetheless, the ―Asian Values‖
138
 arguments (which emerged later on), only succeeded in 
contradicting Weber and his followers.  To simply recap this argument, it simply suggested 
that Asian countries had distinct set of political and cultural institutions, which owed much 
to the history and cultures of Asian peoples. These values were best suited for Asian people 
and explained the huge rise in development in the 1980s and 90s. These arguments in 
support of Asian values rejected Western liberal ideas that underpinned dominant capitalist 
development models.  But the Asian values arguments lost most of its force during the 
economic crisis of 1997. As a consequence, it led to yet another round of arguments and 
counter-arguments about tradition and Asian values.  
 
Similar arguments have been used to depict Islamic societies, even though 
empirical evidence seems to suggest otherwise. Again, I draw on the work of Jeffery Sacks 
to explain this viewpoint.
139
 Sacks demonstrates that recent evidence from Islamic societies 
suggests that they have ranked amongst the fastest growing economies in the last two 
decades. For instance, countries like Malaysia, Bangladesh or Indonesia grew at an average 
of 2 to 3.9 percent between periods of 1990-2001. This leaves him to conclude that culture-
based predictions of development are too fragile to be relied upon.   Take the case of the 
Iranian revolution as another example. During this period, it was commonly thought that 
girls or women were massively discriminated against consequently causing delays in 
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demographic transition or low fertility rates.  But against conventional wisdom, Iran – 
between 1980-2000 – achieved one of fastest transformations in low fertility. This was 
achieved through female literacy and participation of girls in schools. Quite apart from 
Iran, Islamic countries like Egypt, Jordon, Morocco and Tunisia have also had similar 
experiences.  As such, Weber‘s followers are not convincing on the negative effect of 
tradition on development. Besides, as Sylvester Whitaker‘s 
140
 work in the context of 
traditional politics in Northern Nigeria illustrates, the typical Weberian perspectives on 
traditional forms of authority do not accommodate a balanced relationship between both 
concepts. The case of Northern Nigeria suggests that traditional systems were not opposed 
to imposition of modernity; they did not abandon their traditional or religious values in 
favour of received values of development. 
 
 
3.1.2. The First Law and Development Movement 
 
The first law and development movement (the movement) followed on from Weber‘s 
thought above. The leading premise was not different from Weber; the emphasis was on 
the importance of law to social, economic and political change in the Third World. More 
specifically, the movement focused on the importance of law to the quality of government. 
Governance was synonymous with government, and the movement explored the extent to 
which the State – through the bureaucracy – could administer necessary rules of conduct 
for development. It was concerned with the extent to which law and legal institutions could 
replicate legal and developmental experiences of Western societies. Like Weber, these 
assumptions were premised on the inferiority of non-Western law. And the prescriptions 
were not surprising, they proposed the reform, codification and formalising of law for 
development. Despite the differences in the vast literature on law and development, the 
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common element between these various strands was the recognition of the centrality of the 
State in economic development. The most important influential strand of the movement 
was arguably that pioneered by American legal scholars, most of whom were privileged 
beneficiaries of US foreign assistance to the Third World. The movement profited from 
professors from Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Wisconsin and other leading American law 
schools.  These scholars were driven by perceptions of development that originated from 
Western liberal thought or ―liberal legalism‖
141
 as it was described by the seminal work of 
Trubek and Galanter. Like Weber, the movement emphasised on the role of law in 
replicating capitalist type economic development in the Third World. Liberal legalism was 
premised on the view, ―that development was an inevitable, evolutionary process of 
increasing societal differentiation that would ultimately produce economic political and 
social institutions identical to the West‖.
142
 Law was not only necessary to jump start the 
economy, but also to provide an intellectual class necessary for development.  In this 
process, Third World societies were expected to expunge traditionalism in exchange for 
liberal democracy and capitalist development guided by the rule of law.  In other words, 
the law and development movement sought to substitute the ―localism, irregularity and 
particularism‖
143
 of Non-western law with the ―unity, uniformity and universalism‖
144
 of 
Western law. For the movement, development was not only a question of creating new 
kinds of law, but also institutions as well.  Development was about predictable, rigid, 
generalised and vibrant law as well as the right legal institutions.  
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Quite apart from that, a distinct type of lawyering was also promoted to give impetus to the 
processes of securing development.  Lawyers served as the new bureaucrats typical of 
Weber‘s prescriptions about the exercise of bureaucratic authority. The movement 
espoused a State-directed bureaucratic approach to development with lawyers as the main 
driving force.  Much of the theorising also emphasised on the role of the middle-class, 
which would in turn dominate economic and political spaces in the Third World. This led 
to a careful process of selection and identification of professional elites from Third World 
countries through scholarships and exchange programs. This was to equip them with the 
right skills to implement liberal ideas about the role of law in development. This was 
indeed essential, as the argument goes, to the process of transforming ―the backward, 
impoverished, traditional, and dependent societies into modern, technologically advanced, 




 Quite apart from the above, law and development was also pursued on the basis of 
several important normative arguments. After all, development was also seen as a universal 
moral vision capable of creating a modern egalitarian global community. Many 
protagonists of this approach argued that:  
 
Western and Third World alike applauded this manifestation because it transformed the correctness of 
the growing transcendent belief in humanity‘s capacity and shape for the good physical, moral, and 
political aspects of its environment, and it believed in the potential for a peaceful revolution where 





Barely a decade after the emergence of this moral vision, the movement seemed to lose 
much of its influence. And the fall law and development scholarship cannot be understood 
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outside some of the points that emerged from Trubek and Galanter‘s criticisms above.
147
  
Whilst the demise of the movement was also associated with other factors, it is fair to say 
that Trubek and Galanter‘s criticisms hit the nail on the head. Liberal legalism was 
―ethnocentric and naive‖
148
, quite apart from importantly ignoring the harsh ―social 
stratification and class cleavage in most societies.‖ 
149
 Liberal legalism failed to question 
the purpose of law itself, which seemed to exacerbate rather than mitigate the conditions of 
the poor.
150
  More so, the emphasis on transplanting the Western type law seemed simply 
overzealous.   
 
Apart from the nature of law itself, another source of discontent was arguably the 
huge responsibility placed on bureaucrats to constitute development.  In doing this, theories 
of law and development seemed to exclude everyone, except bureaucrats from the 
processes of constituting development.  Decision-making was undemocratic, quite apart 
from being only open to bureaucrats.  Moreover, bureaucrats remained politically 
unaccountable for economic decisions; they were only indirectly accountable through 
elected political office holders.  Furthermore, it turned out that bureaucrats in many Third 
World countries lacked the morality or competence desired of them.
151
  For circumstances 
related to these and others reasons, the proposals of the first law and development 
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4. Good Governance  
From the early 1980s, markets and the neoliberal economics emerged to dominate debates 
about how to achieve development in the Third World. Since then, proposals for the role 
for law in development have been concerned with restricting the State from intervening in 
the economy.  This shift in approach seems to be presented as a new paradigm, even 
though the importance of law to development is a product of an older discourse. Much of 
this shift has to do with the nature of development itself, and not necessarily the role of 
law. 
152
 There are at least five noticeable points of departure today from Weber and the 
early law and development movement.  These points are illustrated below, but the last 
point is dealt with in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
Firstly, it departs from giving the State a central role over governance or structuring 
the pursuit of development. Good governance departs in the sense that it now places 
emphasis on non-State processes of governance. It is here that it makes a more direct 
connection with the contemporary views about governance described in the early part of 
this chapter. More specifically, emphasis on governance in the Third World now prioritises 
the role of markets. It is fair to say that good governance – and the second generation 
reforms, in general – have been relentlessness in the promotion of ―market friendly legal 
and institutional‖
153
 regimes, which focus on the ―protection of property rights, the 
enforcement of contracts, and the provisions of other rules and institutions required to 
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ensure a stable and attractive investment climate.‖
154
 The International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) argue that the adoption of good governance – described as – ―rules, 
norms and best practices‖
155
 will enable the ―participation [of Third World countries] in the 
global economic order‖.
156
  Quite apart from that, it is also most importantly argued that 
Third World States, cannot achieve ―growth and escape from poverty‖
157
 without 
constituting these reforms.  This has led to sweeping privatisation exercises to give a more 
prominent role to markets, especially in tackling poverty.  Unlike the past where markets 
were considered too weak, the current proposals ironically find centralised economic co-
ordination quite problematic. It constitutes a radical change of approach as the State is now 
surprisingly considered antithetic to development.  
 
Here, Max Weber‘s thesis seems only to apply in relation to the continuing 
emphasis on rule of law in the process of development. The approach is neo-Weberian to 
borrow the term from Trubek
158
, in that the application of precise rules is considered 
necessary to restrict the State from intervening in the economy. One point that needs to be 
emphasised though is it is too often argued of the loss of State‘s hegemony due to the rise 
of market policies.  This is a generalisation that needs to be qualified. A more accurate 
description of these events is that certain functions of the State have been weakened, whilst 
other aspects have been strengthened. There is a shift in pattern in the way the State has 
traditionally participated in the economy. And this has seen the rise of new forms of 
interventions, which have led some observers to speak of the emergence of a ‗new 
developmental State‘. 
159
 Trubek cites Brazil as a good example of the existence of the 
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‗new developmental State‘.  According to Trubek, its characteristics include the promotion 
of the private sector as investors and the role of the State is realigned to steering 
investment. It also consists of public private partnerships, export led trade, the openness to 
import, entrepreneurship, innovation, the promotion of productive foreign direct 
investment and social policies to reduce inequality, amongst other things.  From the 
following characteristics, it is not clear how different the so-called new developmental 
State is from the previous one, especially that of East Asia. Whilst there seems to be a few 
noticeable differences, one can indeed question whether it constitutes a new paradigm or a 
re-invention of the old.  Even if one agrees with Trubek and others that a ‗new 
developmental State‘ is on the horizon, it is not clear if this is a precise reflection of 
developments in all States across the Third World.  For instance, a better way of explaining 
the rise of the State in Brazil and other parts of the Third World is perhaps by noting the 
emergence of New Leftist parties in government.  
 
Secondly, given the general orientation towards markets in good governance 
discourse, it is not surprising that not much emphasis is given to the role of bureaucrats, 
even though it is fair to say that like the State, bureaucrats have not been totally excluded 
from the processes of constituting development. On further qualification, there seems to be 
a new role conceived for a new kind of bureaucrat.  Good governance has facilitated the 
emergence of specialised quangos, which apart from their expertise are also known for 
their insulation from traditional forms of political accountability.160   Quangos seem to have 
emerged in hindsight – that is, as a result of lessons from the failures of initial neoliberal 
development approaches. Until then, there was a slightly less accommodating view of the 
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role of bureaucrats. That approach was influenced by ―public choice‖
161
 theory, which also 
had an impact on the Bank‘s work, and their famous study called ―Bureaucrats in 
Business.”
162
  This study provided theoretical underpinnings for the first wave of 
privatisation exercises in most of the Third World. According to this study, bureaucrats and 
politicians were not just inefficient, but also wasteful in their behaviour.  
 
Such arguments share similarities with a particular strand of public choice theory, 
the homo economicus. It describes the decision-making behaviour of government 
officials.
163
  Homo economicus provides an analytical framework for understanding how to 
maximise utility in both political and economic spheres. As such, public choice theory, 
amongst other things, sheds light on ―the application of economic analysis to political 
decision-making including theories of State, voting rules and voter behaviour, apathy, party 
politics, logrolling, bureaucratic choice, policy analysis, and regulation‖. 
164
 It arrived at 
the conclusion that government officials will always fail to act in public interest. Public 
choice theory sought to explain the economic costs of bureaucratic decision-making, 
among other things. Its main argument was to the effect that bureaucrats would always act 
inimically and devoid of legislation.  This was because, ―[v]arious models of bureaucracy 
postulate that power, prestige, the size of the bureau‘s budget, job security, perquisites, 
future salary, and working conditions enter the utility function of bureaucrats.‖
165
 Apart 
from bureaucrats, politicians would always behave selfishly, quite apart from being over-
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burdened with conflicting demands.
166
 Above all, the following circumstances would 
generally tend to generate ―government failure‖
167
 – that is, the consequence of the 
insufficiency of bureaucratic and political economic decision-making processes. 
 
Good governance seems to depart to a certain extent from the above by now relying 
on insights from ‗new institutional economics.’
168
 This has encouraged the shift of 
attention to formal institutional frameworks to assist secure property rights, and to 
minimise the transactional costs of parties.  There is also a lot of emphasis on regulation in 
light of the emergence of new market processes. This is because the Bank has more 
recently come to terms with the limitations of markets.  This is now acknowledged in the 
second-generation reforms in general, which acknowledges possibilities of market failures 
and externalities in the provisioning of public goods.
169
 Barring such exceptions, the 
emphasis on regulation is to enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of markets.
170
 In 
other words, outside public goods which constitute market failures, State regulation has a 
limited function.   As previously noted, the significance of law departs from the previous 
era because of the current emphasis on enhancing the security of entitlements, quite apart 




Thirdly, the move to de-centralise governance also has an effect on formal legal and 
regulatory institutions. Unlike Weber – where the absence of formal law was symptomatic 
of unpredictability or outright anarchy – good governance is not opposed to non–formal 
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legal institutions.  More specifically, good governance places a lot of emphasis on various 
forms of private law, especially on various forms of commercial regulation. As such, there 
is a strong inclination towards private market actors to create their own normative regimes. 
In the same vein, there is also emphasis on alternative modes of securing compliance, 
through mechanisms like arbitration.   More so, as Kerry Rittich reveals, there is also a 
corresponding attempt to embrace sources of normativity that emerge from ―local practices 
and norms.‖
172
  This is because of at least three motivating factors. First, it is a response to 
anti-formalist critiques of Trubek and Galanter discussed above.  Secondly, the interest 
non-formal sources of law is influenced by the growing appreciation of the concept of legal 
pluralism made popular by many works in anthropology, sociology and philosophy of 
law.
173
 It is only mentioned here since these debates are well known and have importantly 
brought to light the existence of other forms of law. Thirdly, there seems to be a belief that 
culture and society have themselves been transformed, and therefore, informal law may 
also be capable of fostering growth or efficiency.  As such, the move beyond formal law is 
very much a departure from classical Weberian ideals, especially those that took a negative 
view of tradition. 
 
The fourth distinction from Weber and the previous era‘s is that governance not 
only moves beyond law, but also that it is interested in new forms of governance dispersed 
across society.  The emphasis on multiple sites of governance is very much of a departure 
from centralised forms of governance, especially those of State government. As such, the 
current regime is predicated on dispersing governance amongst different sites, including 
different actors.  In achieving this, governance has increasingly been transferred onto 
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alternative spheres, especially those composed of at least two identifiable groups.  First, 
governance is increasingly de-centred onto a wide array of market actors, who – as already 
noted – have not only become a source of governance, but also of law and normativity.
174
 
In this section, the focus is on the second distinguishable actors in the horizontal depiction 
of governance. There is a lot of attention given to a third sector or more specifically on the 
role of civil society. Similar to market actors, civil society groups are not only recognised 
as potential service providers, but also as sources of institutional change, given the wealth 
of social capital that exists within it. This is one of the unique features of the concept of 
civil society, which, for purposes of this thesis, may imply a role for community. Yet, as 
will be distinguished in chapter five, community and civil society are different concepts, 
and the former generally emerges in neoliberal discourse as a weak device.   
 
Comparatively, good governance is replete with references to the term civil society. 
And by civil society, the Bank seems to refer to ―citizen groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, trade unions, business associations, think tanks, academia, religious 
organizations and last but not least media‖.
175
  Civil society has become part of a wider 
initiative for good governance, which has in turn supported the emergence of market 
economies, liberal democracy and expanding political participation.
176
 The interest in civil 
society has encouraged a lot of support for NGOs as one of the agents capable of ensuring 
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good governance.   Of course, the interest in civil society in academic debates about 
politics is very old. Discussions on Habermas‘s public sphere in chapter six of this thesis 
form part of the civil society argument.   It dates back to the period of classical European 
thought, which conceptualised the State as an entity dependent on a vibrant civil society. 
Civil society was in turn considered as a space inhabited by individuals, who would in turn 
interact with one another through free reciprocal exchanges. Their interactions were to help 
minimise the corruptions of the State. 
177
 The neoliberal development discourse seems to 
have embraced these arguments by noting that the minimal State cannot exist without the 
support of a liberal public sphere. As one observer describes it:  
 
[e]ssential to governance is the civic realm, which is maintained by political actors from both the 
state and society, and in which ‗access to participation in the public realm is built on respected and 
legitimate rules‘. Therefore, ‗governance is concerned with the regime which constitutes the set of 
fundamental rules for the organization of the public realm, and not with government….governance 
clearly embraces governments institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental 
institutions operating within the public realm‘.178 
 
 
These developments are encouraging but the difficulty, however, is that there is a strong 
connection made between civil society and the market. Civil society is, in other words, 
vital to the constitution of markets.  These sorts of views can notably be found in the 
Bank‘s private sector development initiatives. Here the Bank seems to conflate the private 
sector with the process of revitalising civil society.  
 
There are other notable factors that have sparked the Bank‘s interest in civil society, 
one of which is the emergence of the CDF.
179
  The CDF has not only provided the umbrella 
for good governance, but has generally sought to encourage participation of the poor in the 
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design of policies. On the general level, the CDF generates a more specific relationship 
between development, human rights and democratic discourse.  It is often argued that the 
CDF is a response to post-Cold war events, which have allegedly brought to the fore 
demands for ―political, social and economic participation… human rights and gender 
equity…by an emerging globalized economy‖.
180
  It is perhaps more adequately described 
as a response to agitations of new social movements as a result of exclusive nature of the 
failed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Participation emerges as a key concept 
here.
181
 The approach relies on Albert Hirschman‘s concept of ―voice‖
182
, which makes a 
case for participatory processes in government decisions, local and provincial councils, 
workplaces, capital markets and corporate governance. Participation in its broadest of 
terms moves beyond narrow liberal democratic perceptions of voting as implied in 
Schumpeter‘s
183
 political development theories. The CDF encourages this wider notion of 
democratic participation to amplify voices of the poor in processes of policy making. As a 
consequence, participation is now a component part of the WB‘s PRSPs and these 
processes seem to have had some effects – though minimal – on increasing country-
ownership and citizen participation in the design of PRSPs.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined central propositions behind the concept, discourse and policy that 
now shapes problems of human rights in the Third World. It was an attempt to understand 
what good governance entails – including its historic and contemporary dimensions – as a 
springboard for subsequent arguments in this thesis.  It entailed looking at its inadequacies, 
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which invited the criticism that good governance doesn‘t accommodate multiple solutions, 
including multiple ways of conceiving governance itself. Most importantly, and as will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the emphasis on markets creates similar 
problems that has overwhelmed the State – that is, the lack of participation, and 
consequently, exclusion. It succeeds in generalising both the problems and solutions in the 
Third World to the extent that it excludes particularity. Whilst it would be naive to suggest 
that a lot of the problems do not arise from a governance question, one must not overlook 
that they may also arise from other problems, not necessarily governance related. Besides, 
governance can be conceived in different ways that might offer different solutions to such 
problems. From the perspective of this thesis, the role of community is one example of 
how it can be conceived differently. Whilst an inference on community can be drawn from 
proposals for civil society, that concept itself has been conceived quite narrowly. The 
arguments in chapter six can be understood as a way of encouraging both a change in 
thinking and practice in ways that embrace community as an alternative. To further lay the 
groundwork for those arguments, what follows is an attempt to understand more 
difficulties with the dominant governance approach, especially in the context of its 
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The IFIs have embraced human rights…because they are now an official end of 
development; because they contribute directly to good economic outcomes; because they 
protect the interest of civil society groups and serve as a counterweight to the power of the 




1. Introduction  
Human rights have become a very pervasive aspect of good governance. They have 
become so for at least two reasons. First, the normative language of human rights can 
arguably be seen as an instrument that nurtures, shapes, determines or validates 
governance, and ultimately, the practice of development. This is also evident from the 
Rights-Based Approaches to Development inspired by the United Nations (UN) system. 
Secondly – and the focus of attention in this chapter– is that the various initiatives and 
practices of governance have themselves sustained the plurality of meanings and values of 
human rights. Good governance is now an important vehicle for human rights, the effect of 
which is that the free-market economy – deregulation, devaluation and privatisation – is 
now considered as a key source of normativity for human rights. As such, the purpose of 
this chapter is to consider and explain how the market-based approach works, including 
reasons for its emergence, its philosophical underpinnings, its limitations, and the role of 
the BWIs in the processes of its diffusion.  
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In doing so, the chapter outlines and defends the general critique of markets in human 
rights discourse. It shows that the contemporary interest in markets – not only in human 
rights discourse – is a product of an older discourse which has similarly considered markets 
as the solution to all of society‘s problems.  Going much further than the dominant critique 
of markets, however, the chapter argues that part of the problem is very much of the kind 
of market involved. The dominant neoliberal market negates the possibility of solidarity, 
collaboration, cooperation and participation, which in turn creates its own questions of 
exclusion quite similar to that provoked by the State. Part of the problem, then, is that little 
attention has been paid to other ways of thinking of markets. The chapter responds to these 
inadequacies by discussing and explaining the potential of social markets in human rights 
discourse.  Two organisational social market models are discussed, the second of which – 
the co-operative – is defended because of the potential it can offer to the problems 
affecting specific economic and social rights, and because it is suited for cooperation 
within and between communities.  This is to lay the groundwork for discussions about the 
potential role of co-operatives in chapter seven, and for the general purposes of the theory 
of community. 
 
 The chapter begins by looking at markets in general philosophical terms by trying 
to understand the case for markets, and proceeds to consider some of its limitations. It 
proceeds to look at contemporary proposals for the use of markets in human rights, 
including the role of the BWIs in the processes of diffusion. It discusses the dominant 
critique of markets and proceeds to make a case for alternatives by looking at the social 
markets in general, and co-operatives, in particular. It defends the co-operative model as a 
more meaningful way of responding to the needs of the poor, especially in ways that can 
encourage participation. The chapter concludes thereafter.  
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2. The case for Markets 
 
Markets are without doubt an important feature of contemporary political societies. It is 
now a commonplace argument that markets impact on the quality of life in such ways that 
other mechanisms (such as the State) are not capable of achieving.  Dominant arguments 
about the significance of markets suggest that they are the best mechanism that can 
enhance individual autonomy, liberty, neutrality and welfare. This is because of their 
distinct epistemic qualities, which assists in seeing and determining the distribution of 
society‘s resources. The epistemic qualities of markets – that is, their ability to see and 
determine such situations – are closely related to their ability to increase freedom, 
autonomy or welfare. It is often said that in preserving individual autonomy, markets 
guarantee the equality of all individuals because they are the only mechanism that know 
best how society‘s resources should be distributed. Markets promote natural liberty as a 
result of spontaneous activities of individuals in society. 
 
The work of Fredrick Hayek
185
 has provided the strongest normative justifications 
for the role of markets. Such arguments are used in ways that continue to influence 
mainstream economic and development discourse. For him (and now his followers), 
markets are important not only because of their efficiency value, but also their morality as 
well as their ability to enhance individual liberty.  Markets expand all sorts of liberties, be 
they political, economic or social. This is primarily because only markets know how best 
society‘s resources should be distributed.  
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Hayek‘s basic claim is premised on the idea that markets are the only mechanism that can 
effectively or sufficiently utilise the dispersed knowledge in society. The construction of 
rational economic orders, he argues, cannot simply imply how to distribute resources in 
society. There is a prior question, which depends on the knowledge of all circumstances 
necessary for the distribution of resources. This is a question of gathering all the 
information necessary for the distribution of resources. Hayek argues that centralised 
planning mechanisms have an epistemic weakness, and therefore, incapable of this 
attribute. The weakness of centralised economic systems is such that it reveals the 
limitations of establishing rational economic orders by conscious design. It is because of 
these limitations that Hayek finds the market – price mechanism and competition – as a 
sufficient framework that can equally distribute resources in society. This is, of course, 
because markets have the ability to co-ordinate spontaneous activities. One can see 
evidence of this from spontaneous ordered societies, which were different from structured 
societies. They were different because they evolved unintentionally through competing 
interactions between diverse social actors. Markets are synonymous with exchanges in 
spontaneous societies, which are geared towards the distribution of particular goods and 
services. These, in turn, would evolve through autonomous interactions between 
individuals. Moreover, unlike constructed orders, spontaneous ordered societies are not 
constituted by conscious design. More importantly, the significance of markets does not lie 
on only their ability to be efficient; it was also due to their ability to generate welfare. 
These values, Hayek argues, are all provoked by the market system, and which are 
communicated or utilised efficiently through the price mechanism.  It follows that the 
market system rewards only productive actors who, in turn, make their commodities 
available at the best available price. The point is that these transactions are inherently 
benevolent in so far as one is party to such exchanges. The welfare attributes of markets is 
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by far the strongest link between markets and human rights. 
186
 One of the most important 
attributes of markets is their ability to maximise individual choices. This is not only 
achieved directly, but also indirectly as well.
187
 The indirect exercise of independent choice 
seems to be the most influential argument about the welfare generating impact of markets. 
The argument is that irrespective of motivations of market actors, their actions have the 
ability to affect the well-being of others. Acts of narcissism or self-love are driven by a 
propensity to produce indirect benefits to others. Such are the type of arguments that have 
featured prominently in arguments for the moral justification of markets in political 
societies today.  
 
The most prominent expression of the argument above originates from the timeless 
work of Adam Smith.
188
  The arguments for markets are best understood in the context of 
Smith‘s ideas about the division of labour. He attached great value to the division of 
labour, which was described as one of the most important reasons for opulence and 
equality in political societies. Smith wrote that not only was the productive capacity of 
labour greatly enhanced by the division of labour, it also improved skill, dexterity and 
judgement. Individual tasks become highly specialised and thereby improved productivity 
since the productive circle benefited from more than one person. Not only was the division 
of labour likely to have an effect on production, it also affected distribution of resources 
within societies.  
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But the division of labour only functioned effectively if parties to it were capable of 
accurately determining what was best for others. Without such knowledge, participants 
would not have the ability to prioritise on specific tasks. The division of labour only 
functioned adequately through the following prior attribute – that is, the ability to ―truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for the other‖.
189
 Markets complement the division of 
labour in a way that increases the spread of commodities by making them available as well 
as affordable.  
 
For Smith, the ability to truck and trade was an attribute only found in mankind, 
even though it was also possible to find other forms of cooperation and exchange amongst 
animals. Co-operation amongst animals was different; an animal sought favour from man 
or his fellow animal, it had no other means of persuasion except through sympathy. He said 
this was not only true with animals, but also the case with humans. Human beings often 
appealed to the sympathy of others when they had no other means of obtaining good will. 
Society cannot exist without  the ―co-operation or assistance of great multitudes‖
190
, except 
for situations when one is mature and independent. But even at such stages of maturity, 
Smith says, ―man always has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren‖.
191
 In 
spite of this, Smith still warned against believing that sympathy alone will always satisfy 
our needs. Such needs are better met if individuals seeking favours simultaneously satisfy 
the benefactor‘s self-interest. It is such kinds of reciprocity that led Smith to make one of 
the most influential moral arguments about the welfare generating effects of markets. This 
is what Smith meant when he said: 
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It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-





No one, argues Smith, except perhaps beggars absolutely depends on the benevolence of 
others for their survival. But even a beggar would sometimes find an instance to truck, 
trade or barter.  Sympathy or compassion can never totally supply his or her need for 
nourishment, the beggar would still need to purchase food, find shelter or clothes through 
the market. The beggar would at times need to exchange his or her old clothes with others 
that suit him or her better, ―or would find the need to exchange something for lodging or 
for food, or for money, with which he can better buy food, clothes, or lodging, as he has 
occasion‖.
193
   
 
These claims above are open to question. One can obviously think of many 
individuals who are incapable of existing without the generosity of others. Without doubt, 
the physically and mentally impaired would always fall into this category. But it would be 
misleading to read these ideas outside Smith‘s early work on the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments.
194
 This would paint a more comprehensive picture of what Smith was trying to 
suggest. He did not preclude sympathy and benevolence from social and economic 
contexts.  This is (as shall be seen later) what more recent followers of his work seem to 
have done. Moving beyond these issues for the moment, it is, however, in relation to the 
importance of the market that Smith‘s famous metaphor of the ―invisible hand‖ becomes 
relevant. His point is this; market relations are not just the best, but also the most 
appropriate mechanism for benevolent exchanges between parties. This is because of the 
epistemic difficulty of impartially determining the consequences of others. The ‗invisible 





194 Smith A. The theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759, reprinted by Cosimo Classics, 2007.  
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hand‘ is the link between individual satisfaction and the distribution of society‘s resources 
on the one hand, and acts of vanity or self-interest, on the other. The ‗invisible hand‘ works 
behind the superstructure to channel our propensities for sympathy, compassion, humanity, 
which are in turn cultivated through the pursuit of self-interest. Markets have an 
extraordinary value not necessarily by its direct consequences, but as the ‗unintended 
consequences‘ of profit, gain or self-love. There is an overriding value of exchange and it 
is not just relevant to satisfy individual needs.   
 
The following views explain why Hayek argued that authorities must at all times be 
restrained from directly intervening in the market. For him, interventions only lead to the 
misrepresentation of the facts of the very circumstances that need to be alleviated.
195
 This 
is simply because attempts at intervening would only alter the information that enables 
markets function. These views, it would seem, were targeted at socialist countries where 
economic planning was either centralised or nationalised. Whilst he acknowledged that the 
complexity of modern industry sometimes justifies some form of centralised co-ordination; 
he, however, argued that the case for monopolies was not often justified on such basis.
196
 
Instead, it was justified on the basis of the complexity of knowledge.
197
 Hayek strongly 
opposed centralisation. For him: 
 
…[i]t is the very complexity of the division of labour under modern conditions which makes 
competition the only method by which such co-ordination can be adequately brought about. There 
would be no difficulty about efficient control or planning were conditions so simple that a simple 
person or board could effectively survey all the relevant facts. It is only as the factors which have to 
be taken into account become so numerous that it is impossible to gain a synoptic view of them, that 
decentralization becomes imperative.198  
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For Hayek, once decentralisation becomes well-established, co-ordination then becomes 
essential. It becomes necessary for the appropriate balance between considerations or 
changes in conditions of demand and supply to be understood. Moreover, it becomes 
essential to understand the best means in which information can be identified, collated or 
disseminated. Again, he argued, no system is quite able to achieve this level of co-
ordination, except the price mechanism in market competition. For him, the price 
mechanism regulates the comparative interaction between various commodities, all of 
which are subject to the prices of other commodities. The price mechanism only thrives in 
the course of competition, which in turn, creates a system of division of labour. The end 
product in this system is that it effectively transmits, regulates and co-ordinates all the 
knowledge in the society. This, of course, stems from the apparent difficulty of attaining 
―differentiation, complexity and flexibility‖
199
 of all the relevant factors necessary for the 
distribution of public goods.  
 
Quite expectedly, the widespread privatisation exercises (in both contexts of the 
First and Third World) have been executed for similar reasons.
200
 The inevitability of 
―government failure‖
201
 has shaped the argument on which privatisation is framed. The 
market – price system, exchange, choices and the interplay of these factors – emerge as 
responses to government failure. In the Third World, in particular, much of the good 
governance philosophy makes exactly this point.  Unsurprisingly, these problems are 
resolved in favour of markets. Predisposed to these sorts of arguments, market enthusiasts 
have gone to the extent of advocating for wholesale privatisations to maximise productive 
use of resources, generate welfare, and more recently, to realise human rights. But, it is on 
the latter question that much of the moral argument for markets seems to lose much of its 
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force. It is arguably the question of access that arguably generates the utmost anxiety about 
markets.  
 
2.1. Selective inclusion of Markets 
The difficulty with markets is not their ability to generate wealth or enhance incomes. 
Neither is it a doubt over their ability to expand freedom or guarantee individual autonomy. 
It is not about efficiency, even though the question of market failures or public goods may 
contest this assumption.  Rather, the most immediate concern is about how markets pose 
challenges to welfare and distribution of resources. This is something that comes out 
strongly in terms of recent history and ideological thinking about markets.  The gap 
between the rich and poor, or between First and Third World, or the recent manifestation of 
the phenomenon of the ‗credit crunch‘ has raised question marks about the continuing 
emphasis on markets.  
 
Taking a rigid view of markets would mean that the poor only benefit if they are 
able to participate, that is, if they offer some services in return. This is because the market 
is a system of mutual reciprocity and only rewarding to its participants. What this means is 
that the poor, children, elderly, deprived or those incapacitated by some sort of disability or 
the other, can only avail themselves with opportunities offered by markets, if they are able 
to participate. The point is, even if markets are not formulated with social exclusion in 
mind, there is a rationale of exclusiveness implicated in them.  In other words, markets 
may include but only selectively. The selective inclusion of markets, as I have described it, 
is not necessarily a new phenomenon. It definitely has its historical antecedents. It is also 
something that cannot properly be appreciated outside Adam Smith‘s founding ideas, 
especially his theory of unintended consequences. This, of course, continues to influence 
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contemporary views (for and against) markets, particularly those that oppose placing limits 
on them.  One example is Hayek above, who frowned at interventions because they would 
distort the facts of the circumstances needed to be alleviated. According to him, only the 
market had the epistemic qualities to know who gets what, why and how. Against this 
argument, it is true that one may not be able to predict all actions, but one can at least 
predict certain consequences of one‘s actions. If so, the questions then becomes should one 
always desist from intervening even when the circumstances of one‘s actions are likely to 
be harmful? Is it accurate to think that unintended consequences are always likely to 
produce good moral outcomes?  A simple answer to these questions is, of course, no. And 
reasons for this can be teased out from the work of Amartya Sen, who apart from being an 
avid follower of Adam Smith, addresses such difficulties.  
 
Amartya Sen engages with these and other questions in his seminal work previously 
mentioned on Development as Freedom.
202
 One might recall from the previous chapter that 
Sen‘s thesis aims to offer a more inclusive or comprehensive account of development, one 
that goes beyond economic growth, Gross National Product (GNP) or technological and 
industrial progress to embrace human freedoms. To briefly recall his words, human 
―freedoms are not only the primary end of development, they are also among its principals 
means‖.
203
 Understandably, markets play an important role in this process of enhancing 
freedoms. This is not because of the importance to income generation, but rather because 
they contribute to the quality of freedoms.  And here Sen seems to be speaking about two 
related dimensions that markets contribute to freedoms.  Firstly, he is speaking of the 
freedom to actually participate or, as it were, enter in the realm of markets. Once market 
entry is possible, there are always benefits that emerge from such admission. It is because 
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of this that he argues that, the inability to participate in the market is a symptom of the lack 
of freedom.  As he puts it, ―[T]o deny that freedom in general would be in itself a major 
failing in society‖.
204
 The second dimension of markets in his thinking is the more 
dominant one – that is, the unmatchable quality of markets to expand people‘s incomes and 
economic opportunity. This is well known and requires no further elaboration. 
 
Admittedly, Sen also notes that in spite of this, there are circumstances in which 
markets are counter-productive. Even where markets work efficiently, they always raise 
concerns about equity and distribution. Markets always raise questions about inequality, 
not only of incomes or even, ―in the distributions of freedoms‖.
205
 Locating this in context 
of his general thesis, markets will always raise questions about how to convert incomes 
into freedoms. For instance, ―a person who is disabled, or ill or old, or otherwise 
handicapped may, one way or the other, also face greater difficulties in converting income 
into capabilities and into living well‖.
206
 Sen goes at length to demonstrate the distinction 
between ―income-earning ability and income-using ability‖ which, for instance, Hayek‘s 
work ignored.  Under such circumstances, the demands of equity cannot be left to markets; 
they have to be substituted by non-market arrangements like government intervention and 
social security systems.  
 
Furthermore, Sen reminds us that even Adam Smith recognised the limitations of 
markets in certain circumstances. To show this, he draws on Smith‘s support for price 
controls on credit or usury as an example. Smith wasn‘t advocating for a general ban on 
usury as such, but rather on the need for fixed maximum interest rates. The rationale 
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behind Smith‘s thinking was the result of the uncertain nature of market signals. Being 
generally malleable, markets were always capable of being overwhelmed by private 
interests. There was always a potential that this could slide into the waste of capital and 
social resources.
207
 Smith used yet another metaphor to illustrate his thoughts in this 
context. The metaphor of ‗prodigal‘ and ‗projector‘ served to demonstrate this point. A 
brief explanation is that, the prodigal and projectors depicted those who manipulated 
capital.  Prodigals and projectors were always driven by personal gain. They would always 
borrow money for their vested interests, even if such loans were at an exorbitant rate. He 
credited them for waste and the loss of productive capital. Smith backed legal restrictions 
on interest rates not because he wanted to proscribe loans, but rather to prevent the 
prodigals and projectors from abusing those loans. Smith‘s main anxiety was driven by the 
unfavourable effect of private gain. Sen reads these arguments in light of Smiths famous 
words on the benevolence of the butcher, brewer and baker.  He reads it as such; whilst the 
butcher, brewer and baker may draw our attention to how self-interest might be beneficial 
– the metaphor of the prodigal and projector shows the danger of unintended consequences. 
He says ―…[I]f the butcher-brewer-baker example points to a very common circumstance 
in which our complementary interests are mutually promoted by exchange, the prodigal-
projector example illustrates the possibility that this may not work in quite that way in 
every case.‖ 
208
 This is obviously a departure from Hayek‘s scepticism towards 
interventions. And there are still other ways of understanding why Hayek was wide of the 
mark.  The famous work of Karl Polanyi, for instance, contests the natural spontaneity of 
markets. The point is that markets are presented as spontaneous institutions to the extent 
that this fails to account for the huge institutional effort to create and sustain it.  For him, 
this is neither conceptually nor historically convincing. What was (and still is) quite 
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That question apart, Sen argues that the idea of unintended consequences should 
not in any way be seen as a defence, but an attack on the morals of the rich. For Sen, no 
philosopher – including Karl Marx – was as critical (as Smith was) of the economic 
activities of the rich, especially in relation to the poor.  Quoting Smith, he argues, that the 
rich are often driven by selfish pursuits of ―their vain and insatiable desires‖.
210
  Regardless 
of this, there was often a paradox generated by much of their actions. The pursuit of self-
interest might sometimes unintentionally benefit others. It was not that these actions were 
not deliberately intended to benefit the poor, but rather that the pursuit of self-gain had an 
effect on them. The actions of the rich accidentally benefitted the poor.  The ‗invisible 
hands‘ of the market is what spurs the actions of the rich to benefit the poor.  In other 
words, it was the market mechanism that channelled the unintentional acts of the rich to 
satisfy the interest of society at large.  Without the market as such, actions of the rich 
would have no effect on the poor.  The metaphor of the butcher, baker and brewer is yet 
again another way of understanding how the market system makes this possible.  
According to him, the butcher, baker and brewer are primarily driven by self-love, and not 
necessarily altruism. But in spite of the narrow motivation for their actions, they can 
indirectly satisfy the needs of others.  This is also a similar way of thinking of how the 
buyer relates to the seller. The buyer is not interested in what good his or her money has to 
the baker or brewer. He or she is only interested in the meat or bread for nourishment.  
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Be that as it may, there is often the tendency to equate unintended consequences with 
favourable consequences. This has to be put into perspective in order to appreciate the 
potentials and limits of the concept. It is true that unintended consequences can sometimes 
lead to favourable circumstances, but there is no reason to suggest that they would not 
produce adverse effects.  Certain actions are likely to have both positive and negative 
consequences. Sen‘s alternative reading of unintended consequences provides a useful 
point of departure. For him, the various dimensions (negative or positive) of unintended 
consequences can be made known by predictable causal analysis. After all, it is not 
difficult to predict that the market exchange will benefit both parties. The outcomes of such 
transactions are not as unpredictable as they are made out to be. This is what Sen means 
when he suggests:   
 
If this is the way the idea of unintended consequences is understood (in terms of anticipation of 
important but unintended consequences), it is in no way hostile to the possibility of rationalist 
reform. In fact, quite to the contrary. Economic social reasoning can take note of consequences that 
may not be intended, but which nevertheless results from institutional arrangements and the case for 
particular institutional arrangements can be better evaluated by noting the likelihood of various 
unintended consequences.211    
 
 
This alternative reading of unintended consequences should begin by some kind of 
rationalisation of predictable consequences of actions as well as non-actions. Accordingly, 
harmful actions can become more predictable through deliberation and causal analysis. It 
contests that unintended consequences – especially unfavourable ones – are by no means 
unpredictable.  It entails a kind of rationalisation that would at least provide some degree of 
insight for purposes of future policy designs. Such attempts should not be rigidly swayed 
(as Hayek was) into thinking that attempts at intervening would always have adverse 
effects. There is, of course, a distinction that has to be made between those circumstances 
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in which we can discern and those we cannot. But the point is that we ought not to refrain 
from intervening if we can at least predict negative outcomes.  
 
Secondly, the assumption that the unintended consequences of markets will always 
be beneficial does not explain how non-parties to the exchange can benefit from markets. It 
should be clear now that the pursuit of vain and insatiable desires does not always translate 
into generosity to the poor.  Such views silence a whole range of participants, such as 
children, the elderly, or disabled. This is perhaps something that the work of Eugene 
Pashukanis 
212
invites us to understand. For him, market exchanges are immoral. They are 
not constrained by social or ethical goals. Not even the use value of goods has any 
important significance. All that matters for markets is the exchange value of goods.  
Markets are only concerned with the actual ‗exchange‘; they are not concerned with the 
intrinsic or ‗use‘ value of the goods implied. This point is well explained by Zenon 
Bankowski‘s interpretation of Pashukanis‘s work. Bankowski says what he meant is that, 
―bread, for example, is not produced because it is ‗the staff of life‘ (its use value) but 
because people want to buy it (its exchange value)‖.
213
  One notable effect of this is that 
persons themselves become understood as commodities. Individuals are not appreciated 
because of their intrinsic value as human beings, but rather because of their ability to own 
and exchange property.  As recalled from the previous chapter, this is what Karl Marx 
meant by commodity fetishism – that is, the reduction of the multiple or vibrant forms of 
human activity into the production and exchange of goods.  In capitalist societies, the 
exchange of good takes precedence over people, and above all, ahead of life itself. The 
market system produces a false or formal system of equality.  Markets are unconcerned 
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with existing asymmetries of ownership of wealth in society. Indeed, this leads one to ask – 
what is the use in suggesting that the market is free for all to participate when it only 
accommodates productive members of society?  
 
These arguments above invite a distinction between market and non-market 
economies.  The exchange value of goods – through money and property rights – is a 
distinguishing feature of market economies.
214
 Decisions and functions of individuals 
within such entities are guided by the exchange of goods and services. The shift in 
exchange value is often the result of unintended consequences, many of which are devoid 
of ethical considerations. Market economies are – to use John O‘Neill words – 
―disembedded economies.‖
215
 They are different from non-market economies, which are 
influenced by social custom, needs and the use value of goods.   
 
Market protagonists reject such views.  They argue that the difficulty is epistemic, 
which is the impossibility of  accurately determining the needs of everyone, and in this 
sense, only the market can neutrally or effectively provide for everyone according to their 
needs. As such, the role of public policy is not to pre-determine the needs of everyone. 
Such stark defence of markets has resulted in the wide expansion of markets beyond 
imaginable limits.
216
 Even human rights are now subject to the expansive influences of 
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markets. A number of questions arise from the embrace of human rights by the market 
logic. For instance, what is the kind of mindset that has been inscribed into the structure of 
human rights? What kind of human rights have been moulded from the contemporary 
practice of market reform?  It seems necessary at this point to consider the debates that 
have sought to reconcile human rights and markets.  
 
3. Marketising Human Rights 
 
Human rights have been no exception to the continuous overwhelming expansion of 
markets. This may be because by their nature, human rights can selectively be deployed in 
ways that are not only compatible, but also supportive of markets.  For instance, in 
neoliberal development discourse, the argument in favour of civil political rights is often 
used to promote different forms of market participation. It is not difficult to see how 
freedom of expression, religion or rights to association, equality, anti-discrimination can 
support market participation. Similarly, property and contractual rights are also a crucial 
element of the market framework and exist as an integral part of what might be called the 
neoliberal human rights discourse.  The BWIs have adopted this type of language, the 
effect of which is the distortion of human rights from its true and proper intentions. This is 
a direct consequence of the malleable language of human rights. Apart from meaning 
different things to different people, it is also because, as already argued that, human rights 
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can serve a variety of interests, not the least the interest of markets.  Because of this, as 
Andrew Williams has put it (though in a different context), human rights are increasingly 
becoming: 
…an absurd collection of arguments deployed by anyone or any institution in pursuit of their own 
(often-monetary) interests, thus creating a dislocation between the language and ‗feel‘ of human 
rights and people‘s experiences of their, apparently, indiscriminate use or abuse in practice.
217
   
 
 
In the context of this chapter, it is possible to see that the malleability of human rights 
explains the co-option of human rights by many activities of the BWIs. Human rights are 
now embraced by everyone or every institution, whether it is in relation to questions of 
global justice, governance or development.  A good illustration of this point can be found 
in the work of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, which attempts to draw a purposive relationship 
between human rights and international trade law.
218
 More specifically, Petersmann has 
problematically made a case for the inclusion of human rights within the mandate of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), as a new global regime of justice. For him, a modern 
theory of justice can benefit from the co-operation between human rights, constitutional 
democracy and the international regime of markets. Accordingly, this should be understood 
as a theory of justice that takes into account the ―globalization of human rights and the 
need for non-discriminatory rule-based market based competition coordinating the global 
division of labour among producers, investors, traders and consumers around the globe‖.
219
 
This can only emerge if the importance of markets to human rights is given much stronger 
recognition than currently the case in existing theories of justice. To ensure this, he argues, 
there is a need to constitutionalise foreign policy relations to provide a framework for 
international economic markets, as a way of enabling the creation of political markets for 
the production of collective goods.  Personal autonomy and the diversity of investors, 
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producers or consumers can only be guaranteed through such economic and political 
markets. Petersmann argues:  
Effective protection of liberty rights, property rights, and other human rights protects also the 
―market forces‖ of individual demand and supply of scarce goods, services and job opportunities 
necessary for the enjoyment of human rights, and gives inevitably rise to spontaneous emergence of 
―equilibrium prices‖ coordinating demand and supply. Like families and other social institutions – 
in their diverse functions (e.g. as information mechanism, social dialogue about values, competition 





Human rights and markets complement each other because they are all concerned with 
protecting individualism, quite apart from guaranteeing freedom of choice and consumer 
satisfaction.  Petersmann argues that there is a link to the protection of dignity – a core 
objective of human rights – with markets.  And conflicts between interests – e.g. between 
utility-maximising producers and consumers – can be prevented by constitutional 
mechanisms that constrain the abuse of power. As noted above, the language of 
constitutionalism here is not restricted to the political realm, but also extends to the 
economic realm.  The protection of human rights and non-discriminatory market based 
competition needs to be established by an economic constitution as much as it needs a 
political constitution.   
 
Petersmann argues that markets are not just important to human rights on the 
domestic sphere, but also on regional and transnational spheres, especially through various 
forms of economic co-operation. These forms of co-operation do not exist outside 
international constitutional rules, which guarantee non-discriminatory international trade 
and competition, amongst other things. Petersmann argues that the WTO ought to, or 
would protect human rights more effectively than other international constitutional-like 
arrangements.  The WTO – through its dispute settlement panels and appellate body – is 
the most significant example of the constitutionalisation of non-discriminatory rules of 
                                                 
220
 Ibid., at 20. 
103 
 
economic competition beyond territorial boundaries.  The WTO, he argues, can follow the 
example of the EU, which has since recognised the relationship between human rights and 
markets through the European Community (EC) Treaty, which promotes free movement of 
goods, services, persons, capital and non-discriminatory competition.   
 
Petersmann‘s thesis on the purported relationship between markets and human 
rights has understandably attracted a number of criticisms, especially from observers inside 
and outside the EU, which served as a basis for illustrating his arguments.  Petersmann is 
both factually and historically incorrect according to Philip Alston‘s criticisms of his 
work.
221
 According to Alston, the EU regime of human rights emerged in retrospect; it did 
not emerge at the same time or with the same objectives as the common European market. 
From the outset, the Treaty of Rome of 1957 made little or no reference to values like 
human rights, given that it emerged as an economic arrangement.  Human rights provisions 
emerged through a gradual process and did not evolve as a comprehensive framework as 
Petersmann seems to suggest. Even when human rights started becoming recognised in a 
few decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), they were referred to quite narrowly, 
either with respect to property rights or to pursue a trade or profession. 
222
 In short, there 
was a selective use of rights, which contributed to economic freedoms.   
 
With respect to Petersmann‘s central claim that the WTO would promote human 
rights more effectively than other international institutions. What he seems to be 
suggesting here is that the EU type of economic and human rights regime can be replicated 
globally through the WTO.  The argument against this is that, whilst it is true that the WTO 
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does deal with some human rights issues, it does not provide a comprehensive range of 
human rights. Alston again helps point out the limits of this argument. Alston begins by 
correcting Petermman‘s misplaced assumption that the agreement establishing the WTO is 
constitutional, one capable of creating an international social and political community. 
Although the current mandate of WTO is much wider than its predecessor (that is, the 
General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs, GATT), it is still primarily an economic 
arrangement, one concerned with production and trade of goods and services. Indeed (with 
exception to inclusion of a regime of intellectual property rights), the whole structure of the 
international trade system remains the same in spite of these changes.  Furthermore, the 
democratic deficit within the WTO makes it hardly the kind of institution suitable for the 




 is more succinct in his criticisms of similar ideas, not necessarily 
Petersmann‘s. He suggests that the purported relationship between international human 
rights and international trade law generates a normative conflict, one hard to reconcile.  
Garcia‘s starting point is that the values of efficiency that underpins international economic 
law are inconsistent with those which constitute international human rights law.  According 
to him, trade law has a distinct theory of justice structured by the exchange of goods and 
services.
224
 Values of human rights seem to fall outside the domain of trade law because 
they are not only inconsistent, but might also impede trade. In other words, efficiency is the 
primary concern for trade and nothing else.  The methodology of economic analysis 
determines trade and non-trade policy as well as its implementation is different from that 
implied in human rights. It tends to leave out other possible ways of analysing trade policy.  
                                                 
223
   See, Garcia F. ‗The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading away the Human Rights Principle‘, 
25(51), Boston Law Journal, 1999. 
224
 Ibid., at 65.  
105 
 
Seen from the point of view of human rights, economic analysis does not offer the most 
suitable methodological approach for grasping the impact of trade on human rights, given 
that it has inconsistent values.    
 
It would seem that the most significant difficulty with economics is its method of 
moral reasoning. Trade implies a different form of moral reasoning from human rights.  Its 
reasoning is consequentialist, and it is only concerned with the outcomes of certain actions.  
What he means is that the normative content of trade law is utilitarian in nature and 
determines the morality of particular actions. This is according to its ability to aggregate 
individual preferences.  
225
 Most arguments for free trade are usually concerned with the 
ability of markets to maximise individual welfare, comparative advantage, lower prices, 
increased consumer choice or economies of scale. Comparatively, human rights have a 
different moral code. They are determined by the concept of human dignity and Western 
liberal theories, which prioritise equality ahead of utility. Human rights are deontological, 
given their concern for the equality of individuals.   
 
A more pertinent question, for purposes of this thesis, is that the critique of trade 
above does not seem to question the ethos underlying markets, and furthermore, the effect 
this may have on human rights. After all, the current international trade system is 
determined by a distorted market framework, which will undoubtedly negatively affect 
human rights. The point is that there is a prior question that needs to be addressed before 
considering whether or not human rights should operate within the international market 
system. In other words, the nature of the market itself has to be called into question. This 
is, of course, something that can be understood through the critique of markets earlier on in 
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this chapter. One can repeat some of those observations onto the global sphere in light of 
the disproportionate nature of the international system of trade. The inequitable nature of 
international markets is exacerbated by the distorted rules of trade, which seem to make the 
market more suitable for some countries than others. The agitations for ‗fair‘ as opposed to 
‗free‘ trade is one example of this difficulty, and a clear indication of the anxieties about 
markets on the transnational level.  To be fair to him, Petersmann does partially 
acknowledge (although without explanation) that human rights need what he calls a ‗social 
market economy,‘ which require ―governments to promote ‗principles of justice‘, like 
solidarity, equal opportunities and promotion of welfare-increasing competition without 
undermining human rights so that also the ‗losers‘ in the market game retain effective 
access to the goods and services necessary for the enjoyment of human rights‖.
226
   Whilst 
this is a position which appeals to me, it is one which seems to contradict his overall thesis. 
Besides, Petersmann fails to expand upon what he actually means by the social market 
economy and whether it should co-exist or replace the capitalist market economy. Some of 
these questions will be considered in the final part of this chapter, but first I consider the 
marketisation of human rights from a more critical standpoint.   
 
 
3.1. Trade-Related Market Friendly   Human Rights 
  
Upendra Baxi has pursued some of the implications of Patermann‘s thesis above more 
vociferously than any scholar today.  Upendra Baxi
227
 describes such views as the evidence 
of an emergent and distinct ‗trade-related, market friendly‘ (TRMF) human rights 
paradigm, which, he argues, is subtly replacing the paradigm of UDHR. It succeeds in the 
promotion and protection of collective rights of global capital in ways which justify their 
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corporate well-being and dignity, but most importantly, against the human rights of 
individuals and communities: 
The paradigm of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is being steadily, but surely, 
supplanted by that of trade-related, market-friendly human rights. This new paradigm seeks to 
reverse the notion that universal human rights are designed for the attainment of the dignity and 
well-being of human beings and for enhancing the security and well-being of socially, 




Economic globalisation is perhaps the most significant factor for the rise of this TRMF 
human rights paradigm. 
229
 The subtle processes of substitution are intricately connected 
with the emergence of a borderless economy made possible by the free flow of finance, 
trade, production, and to some extent labour.
230
  One of the more pervasive dimensions of 
economic globalisation is the emergence of a ―new international division based on the 
globalization of production carried out by transnational corporations (TNCs), which are 
more prominently than ever, the agents of the new world economy.‖
231
  The TNCs have 
increasingly dominated various aspects of the economy.  Human rights have been no 
exception from the influence of the TNCs, and economic globalisation in more general 
terms. The corporate appropriation of human rights arises from the fact that TNCs, not only 
enjoy legal personality, but also the capability to be bear contractual property and in some 
instances, constitutional rights.  Quite apart from that, TNCs increasingly invoke the 
language of human rights in defence of their interests.  Anna Grear‘s
232
 important analysis 
of Baxi‘s work explains that the adoption of human rights by TNCs is similar to the 
invocation of humanity. After all, only humans can fully enjoy human rights. Following on 
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from Baxi, she notes that there is a moral inscription of humanity that lie at the heart of all 
human rights claims.  
 
The processes of the co-option of human rights are also made possible through the 
emergence of a distinct political economy often referred to as the ―neoliberal development 
model‖.
233
 The influential impact of TNCs has a lot to do with this framework. Its 
distinctive features can be summed up as follows: 
 
 
[…]national economies should be open to trade, and domestic prices should conform to 
international market prices; fiscal and monetary policy should be prudently directed to the 
maintenance of price and balance-of-payments stability; private property rights should be clear and 
inviolable; state-owned productive enterprises should be privatized; private decision making, guided 
by undistorted prices, should dictate national patterns of specialization, resource allocation and 
factor returns, with minimal government regulation or sectoral policy; the residual government 





These are familiar prescriptions that those in the Third World have come to know so well. 
In most cases, the embrace of the neoliberal political economy is a direct consequence of 
the influence of the BWIs. And the neoliberal political economy is the link between TNCs, 
the BWIs, and the market-friendly view of human rights.
235
 The entire Bretton framework 
composed of the IFIs – the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  including ( as 
Petersmann above had argued) WTO/ GATT treaty regimes  have served as missionaries of 
this political economy and inevitably, the market view of human rights.  
236
 It is not 
surprising that the BWIs, for instance, have promoted this type of human rights. They are 
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quite sympathetic to the relationship between economic globalisation and human rights. 
They are sympathetic to the view that finds economic globalisation as one of the best 
means in which the conditions of human welfare and poverty can be reduced.
237
 It is 
equally considered as one of the ways human rights can be realised. The Bank, in 
particular, seems to find human rights compatible with the policies associated with the 
political economy of globalisation.
238
 Both discourses have a mutual supporting 
relationship. Human rights provide a framework for the pursuit of development, just as 
neoliberal development policies also provide a framework for the pursuit of human rights.   
 
Economic globalisation and markets are increasingly proposed as a precondition for 
human rights.
239
 As Baxi puts it, ―the promotion and protection of human rights become 
possible only when the order of human rights for global capital is fully recognised‖.
240
 
Human rights typical of the UDHR are not only subordinated, but are recognised as by-
products of both markets and economic globalisation. One cannot help but agree with Baxi 
that the celebration of markets would be dangerous to human rights. Markets would remain 
ubiquitous and determine everything, including the resources for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. This is, of course, a reading of what Baxi describes as the 
emergence of ―human rights markets.‖
241
 This is understood as the need by various 
activists or groups to operate within the market logic. The market metaphor is thus 
deployed to demonstrate how human rights groups compete for scare recourses. He uses 
terms such as human rights investors, producers and consumers in very imaginative ways 
to describe this process.   Indeed, one can defend the arguments for social markets in the 
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final part of this chapter on the basis of this argument. To do this, one would need to take 
the phrase ‗human rights markets‘ seriously, and not –as Baxi meant– as a metaphor.  After 
all, human rights, whether through community, need a form of market to function.  
 
One of the main limitations to the market approach is the exaggeration of its ability 
to deal with the extensive levels of poverty and inequality that has accompanied it. This is 
something that the market protagonists have failed to adequately address given the recent 
poverty indicators, which reveal that nearly three billion individuals worldwide are poor, 
with ―more than one billion people‖ [living] ―on less than one dollar a day. In total, 2.7 
billion struggle to survive on less than two dollars per day‖.
242
 These grim figures 
obviously cast a shadow over the arguments in favour of markets and economic 
globalisation.  
 
To return to human rights, part of the problem is that economic globalisation has 
influenced the rise of many private market actors
243
 and inter-governmental organisations 
(including, the BWIs) who are unaccountable for most of their actions. This is perhaps the 
most critical challenge that economic globalisation and markets present to human rights. 
As Baxi notes, attempts to make these economic actors accountable are often rejected. For 
instance, TNCs have shown their ability to convert ―human rights movements into human 
rights markets‖.
244
 Economic globalisation has presented numerous other challenges to 
human rights, but it is safe to say that the emergence of non-state actors has been one of its 
most pervasive consequences.  The State-centred human rights discourse is rapidly 
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becoming obsolete in the face of economic globalisation, quite apart from the powers of 
the State being outsourced to non-State actors. This is one of the enormous problems that is 
still debated amongst many scholars, and activists, with most of them divided on how to 
deal with the role of non-state actors. TNCs have continued to resist attempts to operate 
within a framework of human rights as notably proposed by the UN.
245
 Instead, TNCs have 
preferred to be bound by limited self-regulatory norms of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), as with the Ruggie framework.  
 
3.1.2. State Failure 
 
The limitations of the State model have had a number of disastrous consequences. One 
such challenge is the inability of States to assert their economic sovereignty over their 
territory. Baxi‘s thesis partly explains the continuing loss of State control over its territorial 
and productive capacities. This is, in part, attributed to the significant powers wielded by 
―regional international economic arrangements, international financial institutions, 
multinational enterprises, and the network of NGOs.‖
246
 These institutions have in various 
ways profoundly impacted on the overall achievement of human rights. Baxi argues that 
the combination of these factors have challenged the State‘s regulatory competence. No 
longer is the State the central organiser of ―…national economic development, the owner 
of capital and other means of production, an active participant in the production of goods 
and services, and the proactive regulator of patterns of corporate behaviour‖,
247
 the State 
now enthusiastically promotes the virtues of the free-market. Whilst the UDHR assigns 
responsibilities on States for the realisation of human rights – that is, ―to construct, 
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progressively and within the community of states, a just social order, national and global, 
that will at least meet the basic needs of human beings‖.
248
  The emerging paradigm, on the 
other hand, departs for the reason that it challenges this redistributive role or ethic of the 
State. Deregulation or again, privatisation facilitates the deliberate assault on the 
distributive capacity of the State.   
 
In spite of the implications of the arguments above, there is perhaps another 
significant problem that seems to have been overlooked. Whilst it cannot be denied that 
markets have presented problems to human rights, it is equally true that human rights 
problems have also been generated by the State.  One cannot deny that many of these 
problems have emerged as a result of the complicity of postcolonial States in the 
production of such harms.  Baxi‘s thesis doesn‘t adequately highlight this problem – at 
least not in this context. Experiences with the State-centred human rights framework 
continue to raise serious doubts about its long term viability as the vanguard of rights.
249
 
These are for reasons for State failure especially in the postcolony where the usual 
stereotypical arguments about corruption, nepotism, poor governance, and elitism are well 
documented, and therefore, need not be restated here. In the African continent, for 
example, one of the most influential explanations of this is that the State emerged as an 
artificial construct, given that it evolved as the natural successor to the colonial State. 
Similar to the way that the colonial State ―lacked any grounding in the expectations or 
concerns of the indigenous societies of the territories whom it imposed its order‖,
250
 the 
postcolonial State has similarly been distant from the lives of ordinary people. Whatever 
the reasons for State failure may be, very few would argue that the postcolonial African 
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State has failed in its role in presiding over economic and political processes. There are, of 
course, differences between States on the extent of these problems. But, the point is that 
one must be cautious arguing in favour of the State-centred solutions.  Like the market, the 
postcolonial State has its vast limitations. There is a danger in over-romanticising with the 
idea of the State and this is something Balakrishan Rajagopal summarises quite well:  
 
… [t]he crises over development in many countries has arisen largely because of the failure of the 
state to ‗do development‘ in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. It would then be 
problematic to return to the state under the rubric of human rights, when it stands thoroughly 
discredited in the eyes of civil society in many developing countries.251  
 
 
This position is unique not just because it lays emphasis on the nature of State failure, but 
also because it demonstrates the similarity between neoliberal protagonists and their critics.  
For protagonists and critics of neoliberalism alike, the State has been the problem for 
development and human rights. For critics of neoliberalism, like Rajagopal, however, quite 
apart from rejecting markets as the alternative, their grievances are structured around the 
way in which the State serves as an instrument of dominant interests, particularly, the way 
in which it reifies interests and values of global capital. The State is articulated as a 
mechanism for protecting the interests of the prevailing global political, economic and 
social climate. A useful explanation, here, is to recall the arguments by Karl Polanyi
252
 
about the significance of the enormous State efforts in the constitution of markets. This is a 
point that market enthusiasts often overlook. They not only ignore the intense institutional 
processes towards setting up market economies, but also the enforcement essential to 
preside and sustain markets.  For Polanyi, markets themselves cannot emerge without 
extensive planning, centralisation and deliberate State action.   
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The role of the State brings to mind an important (but neglected) aspect of the work of 
Adam Smith.
253
  It is not often acknowledged that he also spent a lot of time to write about 
the importance of the State.  Smith believed that the State had an important role to play in 
enforcing tariffs, wage rates, and restrictions on trade. For him, the size of government 
would have to coincide with the growth of the market economy. Maintaining the market 
economy was indeed an expensive task, one that was dependent on ‗big‘ government. The 
government had to continue playing a prominent role for purposes of defence, public 
facilities, civil justice and a functioning tax system. As such, the State was critical to the 
existence of liberty, reason and happiness in society. Though maintaining this State might 
be expensive, the wealth generated from a well-functioning market economy was 
considered capable of providing enough resources to sustain it. Parallels between these 
arguments can be drawn with the emergence of the second generation reforms. The market 
is now not treated with the kind of suspicion that was done in the past.  Moreover, much of 
the mistrust of the State seems to have changed with the recent global financial crisis, 
which has seen the State take a leading role in economic affairs. It would seem that States 
would always step-in where there has been widespread market failure, as with the current 
global economic crisis.   The crisis has provoked calls for a rethink of local and global 
market based economic models.  Whilst we wait for new proposals, I rationalise the 
neoliberal articulation of the State from another school of thought – that is, from the work 
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Santos‘s thesis on the ―weak state consensus‖
255
 may provide a useful explanation here.    
It is premised on the relationship between the ‗state weakness‘ and  ‗neo-liberal economic 
consensus‘, which he argues resides in initiatives in favour                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
of the market, and proposed against the State. Because of this, the State is articulated as an 
oppositional concept. And this is partly because it is held responsible for the regrettable 
condition of affairs. The State is conceived in dichotomous terms and not as a partner to 
civil society. Therefore, weakening of the State‘s functions is considered as the only 
justifiable basis for rejuvenating civil society. This generates a paradox as the task for 
weakening of the State‘s functions is placed within its boundaries. The State, in other 
words, is expected to organise its own demotion.   It is paradoxical because the State must 
not only be weak, but also strong enough to facilitate and regulate the market. The point 
then is that it would be misleading to speak of loss of the centrality of the State. It is still 
possible to speak of the centrality of the State in a different way – that is, from a standpoint 
that suggests that the State is no longer the central agent of social change.
256
   
 
The difficulty in the light of these and other arguments in this chapter is that the 
market pessimist is left with no other alternative but the State, so is the State sceptic left 
with no alternative but the market. One of the greatest fallacies – especially, in human 
rights discourse – has been the assumption that the State and market are the only 
alternatives.  The thesis as such is an attempt to transcend this binary logic. Indeed, the 
case for community in this thesis is a reaction to these sorts of arguments. It is an attempt 
to transcend such dichotomous debates by proposing a different alternative. For purposes 
of this chapter, however, there is also a difficulty with the dominant way in which markets 
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are presented. The problem is not just a question of dichotomy between the State and 
market, but also the way markets are presented. Part of the problem is that markets are 
understood as systems that only allow for the pursuit of profit or self-gain, and leave out 
other understandings of the concept. As a consequence, what follows is an attempt to think 
of markets differently, and in this respect, how they may be a more suitable foundation for  
human rights.   
 
4.De-Marketising Human Rights 
 
As already argued, markets challenge human rights in several ways. Markets only function 
through self-interested persons, without which benevolent exchanges would not be 
possible.  Markets are inclusive to those who participate but exclusive to those who, for 
one reason or the other, cannot benefit from this opportunity. Markets, as were described, 
are amoral and have no social or ethical ethos. If this is the way markets are understood, 
then it is not difficult to recognise that they pose an insurmountable challenge for the 
enjoyment of human rights. This is one of the important implications of the corporate 
capture of human rights by the nascent market friendly human rights discourse.  The 
market friendly discourse creates a framework through which different economic actors 
appeal to the language of human rights, either as beneficiaries or to legitimise their 
activities. Markets prioritise certain human rights, which are directly connected to market 
participation. As a consequence, the promotion and protection of human rights typical of 





To remedy this problem, one alternative is how to think of markets from a different ethical 
standpoint. It is a suggestion that capitalist markets are only one form of market, and they 
are certainly not the only one. One initial doubt about this approach that needs to be 
overcome from the outset is that making a case for a different kind of market (or even the 
possibility of a relationship between this market and human rights) can be misconstrued as 
consenting to market capitalism. It might indeed be safer to discard the role of markets 
altogether. This is – as will be discussed particularly in chapter six – one way of 
interpreting the role of community in this thesis. It is in part a response to the problems 
generated by markets, and can itself be understood as an entirely different (non-market) 
framework.  Even so, a plausible argument can be made that it is still necessary to 
understand that the community – like the State – needs markets or a certain kind of 
economy to function, even if it is proposed as an alternative for human rights.   The point 
in raising this is to illustrate that dichotomous arguments are not particularly useful in this 
context. Indeed, the proposals in this chapter (or thesis in general) are an attempt to move 
away from dichotomous views about the plausibility or non-plausibility of markets. What 
is rejected is the underlying capitalist orientation of markets. The point is that if markets 
are detached from the worldview of profits or self-interest, then perhaps it is possible to 
understand how they might be useful to human rights. One way of achieving this is through 
what I call the ‗social market‘. This is simply an attempt to provide human rights with an 
alternative market to function. The social market is a distinct economic model, one 







4.1. Social Markets 
This section pursues this line of reasoning above; it explains the potential of a type of 
market, which despite existing within the capitalist system, is also quite different.  The 
social market, for want of a better term, is the umbrella phrase, which explains diverse 
models of economic organisation formulated by values of solidarity, democracy, equity 
and co-operation.  The social market is a term used to describe the economic framework 
that allows a wide range of non-profit groupings to operate. One of the best ways of 
understanding the social market is through a range of businesses, which are influenced by 
ethics of solidarity, community, equity and democracy.  There are several business models 
that are consistent with these values, and more so, those that are designed to meet special 
needs of the poor. The first of such considered here is the co-operative business model.
257
  
For most part of this thesis, co-operatives are promoted as a form of social market. There 
are, of course, different types of co-operatives, which vary on the extent to which they 
engage or disengage with the capitalist economy.  It is possible that some co-operatives 
might have a radical agenda that is at odds with capitalism, whilst others might be more 
accommodating to it. Even so, the potential of co-operatives invites the proverbial question 
of whether it is a variation of a capitalist business or something entirely different.  Again, 
for the sake of emphasis, appreciating the potential of co-operatives has to be distanced 
from dichotomous arguments. It requires a less divisive approach, one which Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos suggests when he argues that rejecting co-operatives for lack of purity 
amounts to a kind of fundamentalism.  Following on from Santos
258
, it constitutes a 
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fundamentalism because rejecting co-operatives may silence any potential for 
transformation or even the possibility of creating ―pockets of solidarity within the heart of 
capitalism‖.
259
 A more progressive approach, as Santos suggests, can be influenced by 
Andre Gorz‘s notion of ―non-reformist reforms‖. 
260
 This opens up the possibility of 
constituting reforms which do not necessarily contribute to the status quo, but rather 
disturb and transform it from the inside. They depart from reformist-reforms which 
contribute to upholding the structures of the system.  This is always rather difficult but co-
operatives offer the potential of achieving this.  
It is possible from yet another standpoint to argue that co-operatives constitute a 
radical departure from the capitalist market economy. This is because of the distinctive 
values and principles that underpin both formation and operation. These values are not 
common to capitalist businesses. The uniqueness of the co-operative model is that they are 
democratic, self-help economic organisations. They may be specifically designed or 
formulated for the specific reason of assisting its members and the particular community in 
which they operate. Co-operatives achieve this by aggregating individual market power 
into a collective whole, so as to tackle certain problems in a particular community. Co-
operatives provide a unique example of how specific problems are better resolved 
collectively than through independent action. This explains why co-operatives have not 
only appealed to people across the globe and have also been able to transform millions of 
lives.   
It is no surprise then that even before the recent phenomenon of the credit crunch a 
co-operative-driven economy has featured in several proposals as an alternative to both the 
capitalist market and traditional command control economy.  One good example of this 
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sort of argument comes from the work of David Miller,
261
 whose idea of ‗market 
socialism‘ captures this mindset. It simply refers to an economic model driven by worker 
co-operatives. Given the similarities – but also differences – with the central argument in 
this chapter, it would seem necessary, even if, briefly, to expand a little more on Miller‘s 
thesis.  Beginning with the idea of market socialism; it refers to a distinct economic model, 
which primarily responds to failures of command and control State-socialist economies, 
and subsequently, the neoliberal economic models that now prevail in most countries of the 
world. In doing so, the idea of market socialism does not constitute a complete departure 
from capitalist market economy; rather it thrives on its resources to achieve its objectives. 
They include: 
 (a) to obtain the efficiency advantages of markets in the production of most goods and services; (b) 
to confine the economic role of the state in a way that makes democratic government feasible; (c) to 
protect the autonomy of workers, both as individuals and as members of self-managed enterprises; 
(d) to bring about a much more equal distribution of primary income (rather than relying on 
secondary redistribution)262 
 
In keeping with these aims, the market mechanism is relied upon for purposes of 
provisioning of goods and services. The major difference between market socialism and 
the typical capitalist economy is that ownership of capital is now socialised. Market 
socialism exists both in a pure and impure form. In the pure model, worker co-operatives 
are encouraged to source for capital from investment agencies according to reasonable 
terms and conditions. Such co-operatives will in turn democratically exercise autonomy 
over decisions on production, internal organisation of the business, or how it is generally 
run.  Such co-operatives will operate and compete within a specific market sphere with the 
aim of generating income for its members, which is in turn distributed according to a 
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democratically agreed formula.   The impure version of the market socialist model is 
simply a hybrid of a typical co-operative and capitalist organisation.    
Irrespective of model, Miller allays general fears amongst followers of classical 
economics about the macroeconomic efficiency of co-operative enterprises.  As a better 
alternative to centralised economic models, the co-operative model is capable of replicating 
the same competitive equilibrium, which is not only Pareto-optimal, but also similar to a 
typical capitalist firm
263
.  Given the different orientation of co-operatives, they are always 
likely to react differently to changes in the market. For instance, their reaction to a sharp 
increase in price is predictably one that would lead to the reduction of production. This is 
usually not the same kind of reaction expected of a capitalist firm. Nevertheless, this is not 
a suggestion that all co-operatives will always react the same way to such developments. 
Even if they don‘t, there is always the possibility for new co-operatives to be formed in 
situations where others have failed (or are failing) to maintain the equilibrium of the 
economy.  On the whole, even if these arguments sound speculative, there is really no 
reason why a co-operative business cannot function as efficiently as capitalist firms.  
Looking at questions about the viability of an economic model driven by worker 
co-operatives, it is here that Miller‘s proposals depart from mine, especially in terms of our 
objectives. It is mainly because he places emphasis on workers co-operatives whilst I do 
not. It is not in doubt, as Miller convincingly argues that, worker co-operatives are quite 
capable of running an entire industrial economy. This is, of course, his response to 
questions raised about the suitability of worker co-operatives running an economy 
constituted of large complex businesses, given that cooperatives usually operate on the 
small scale.  Miller rightly dismisses this objection on the grounds that large corporations 
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usually operate through small production units, and therefore, the economy itself is capable 
of being broken up to suit the co-operative structure.  
 It is, however, from this question that a number of reasons why Miller‘s proposals 
on the type of co-operative depart from mine.   The first is that Miller‘s co-operative 
economic model is conceived for countries that have achieved some level of 
industrialisation like First World countries. It doesn‘t seem suitable for Third World 
countries, where such forms of industrial advancement have failed to take place. 
Understandably, Miller is reacting to the failures of State socialist economies, and because 
of this, he falls into the trap of privileging the working class as the primary agents of social 
transformation.  He also doesn‘t acknowledge the questions of exclusion synonymous with 
the working class (industrial labour) concept. That is, it excludes all other labouring 
classes, especially those that do not work under a formal wage structure.  Moreover, it 
automatically excludes the poor who are most likely unemployed from the domain of 
recognition. In some situations where the poor are recognised, they are placed under the 
leadership of the working class.   
A further difficulty with is that Miller doesn‘t seem to appreciate the changing 
nature of working class itself. This has made it even more difficult to achieve this vision of 
a working class co-operative led economy. Traditional notions of working class no longer 
command control over the economy like it was in the past. Because of this, it is hardly 
likely that a proposal such as Miller‘s can provide an alternative.  A new kind of working 
or labour class has emerged with the changes created by the phenomenon of globalisation. 
This has in turn paved way for highly dispersed forms of production.  It is not in any way a 
suggestion that new forms of organisation are not possible today. The point is that Miller‘s 
proposals do not seem to consider how these changes might affect traditional collective 
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forms of organising. This, and the changing nature of the working class concept, is 
something that comes out from the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri on the 
multitude. 
264
 It is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of their work, except to refer 
to their illustration of changes to traditional perceptions of labour for purposes of 
elaborating on the point that Miller doesn‘t consider in his thesis. Here‘s an explanation 
from Hardt and Negri: 
In the final stages of the twentieth century, industrial labor has lost its hegemony and in its stead 
emerged ―immaterial labor‖, that is, labor that creates immaterial products, such as knowledge, 
information, communication, a relationship, or emotional response. Conventional terms such as 
service work, intellectual labor, and cognitive labor all refer to aspects of immaterial labor, but 
none of them captures it generally. 265 
 
Economists have described these transformations as a transition from Fordism to post-
Fordism. This has marked a shift from long-term stable employment typical of the industry 
to more short term flexible and highly mobile work. 
266
   Labour is ―flexible because 
workers have to adapt to the different tasks, mobile because workers to move frequently 
between jobs‖.
267
 It is also produced a degree of instability, given that there are hardly any 
long term jobs anymore.  Miller‘s account pays hardly any attention to these developments 
which, as argued, do not necessarily impede collaboration, but they impede the kind of 
collaboration he envisages.  
There is yet another difficulty with Miller‘s proposals for a worker co-operative led 
economy; it fails to recognise other types of co-operatives in his framework of economic 
participation. Miller‘s proposals seem to leave out scope for the operation of what might be 
called social co-operatives, such as those that might exist in poor remote communities, and 
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which might be more responsive to the particularities of their problems.  The uniqueness 
lies in the fact they are businesses formed for one purpose, that is, to resolve a wide range 
of social problems. This is an important feature of co-operatives, even though it is not 
always visible. As such, it will usually depend on the type of co-operative involved. Even 
so, there is no reason why co-operatives cannot be formulated with a specific community 
with social problems in mind, especially problems in relation to specific human rights. As 
will be considered later, social co-operatives seem to be more suitable for purposes of 
theory of community in this thesis. Given its potential, I shall return to this issue in chapter 
seven, to consider the application of co-operatives.    
What is considered next, however, is another business model that has become 
recently popular, and is another example of the social market. It is Muhammad Yunus‘s 
idea of social businesses, which share some resemblance with co-operatives but yet quite 
different. Whilst the co-operative may itself be considered as a social business, the 
distinction between them lies on the emphasis on the role of the individual above others in 
this model. Of course, there is nothing to prevent a group of individuals from engaging in 
social businesses collectively. This has certainly been the practice as will be illustrated 
below. However, the similarities and differences can only be understood in light of an 
explanation of what the social business entails. The purpose of the social business: 
...is to address and solve social problems, not to make money for its investors. It is a non-loss, non-
dividend-paying company.  The investors can recoup his investment capital, but beyond that, no 
profit is to be taken out as dividends by investors... [I]n effect, social business will represent a third 
economy sector alongside the free markets and government.
268
 
There are several implications from the statement above in light of earlier discussions. 
First, a social business functions within the existing market framework to achieve its 
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objectives. Its conditions of existence as such, do not require a re-design of the existing 
economic architecture. This is similar with co-operatives which do not operate outside the 
market economy. It relies on the unrivalled ability of markets to create wealth and 
opportunity.  Even so, Yunus acknowledges that recent developments – especially the 
phenomenon of economic globalisation, and now the global financial crisis – have called 
this alleged ability of markets into question.  On the global scale, markets seem to have 
exacerbated rather than resolved conditions of poverty, disease, pollution, corruption and 
inequality. Yunus argues (quite persuasively too) that the main reason for the current 
problems is the incomplete nature of the current economic framework. It contains one type 
of market, which is primarily geared to maximise profits. It is the only market or, as it 
were, type of business model available under the current climate, one that is only 
concerned with the pursuit of profits. It is a business model ill-suited and adaptable to the 
diverse conditions of poverty in the world. It is because of this that he argues that what is 
needed therefore are a range of social businesses designed to cope with such problems.  
Yunus finds justification for this reasoning in the work of Adam Smith. The current 
economic framework is incomplete because of a half-way reading of Adam Smith‘s works.  
The Wealth of Nations is usually read apart from The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  
According to him, if these books are read together then perhaps one would find the need 
for a second market or preferably, (in my terms) a social market. Reading Wealth of 
Nations in light of the Theory of Moral Sentiments reveals that Smith did acknowledge the 
narcissistic nature of individuals. This made it important for society to have other forms of 
relations apart from those generated by markets. Societies needed something a lot more, 
and these were acts of compassion and benevolence. Smith argued that although 
individuals are inclined to selfishness, they still have a propensity of compassion for 
misfortunes of others. The important point is that these emotions are expressed without 
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conditions attached. Individuals do not expect anything in return when they show 
compassion towards predicaments of others. For Smith, empathy or compassion for the 
other is a common human sentiment. It is common to either expect compassion or to 
express grief for the pain of others. Even the most hardened criminal is capable of this 
moral comportment; this is not necessarily an attribute for the most compassionate in 
society. For him, all humans have an innate sense of morality and this is because of our 
conscience. The sense of right and wrong together with the comportment towards others is 
the important value that makes human co-existence possible.    
In spite of this, one must not forget that, even though Smith recognised the 
extreme importance for compassion, he was also aware of its limitations. To recall from 
earlier analysis of his work, Smith noted that even a beggar cannot totally depend on 
charity for survival. He or she will sometimes find need to convert his gifts into actual 
functionings. Although, Smith recognised this, he was by no means saying that acts of 
charity had no place in society. Unfortunately, market protagonists (even those who claim 
to be followers of Smith) take the nub of his arguments for markets a bit too far. As earlier 
seen, markets become the all important defining factor of relations in society. It has 
become so to the extent that the exercise of compassion is hardly visible. Such narrow 
perceptions in society ignore that Smith‘s views on the multi-dimensional nature of human 
beings who are ―driven by conscience and sympathy as well as the desire for profit.‖
269
  
Smith seemed to be attaching a condition to the market economy, in that it ought to exist 
only in situations where moral virtues can be called upon to mitigate the hardship of the 
pursuit of self-interest.   
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Because of this, and for other reasons outlined, Yunus sees that the only way of applying 
Smith‘s thesis is by creating ―special types of businesses specifically designed to improve 
the lot of humanity in general.‖
270
 Social businesses are an example of such. They have a 
potential that can be channelled towards resolving many problems, especially those that 
can contribute to cure malnutrition, provide shelter, eradicate disease
271
and such other 
problems that affect particular communities.   The question still remains, how do we push 
this vision a little further to think of proposals or strategies which can specifically help 
realise economic and social rights?    
Yunus provides a number of practical strategies, which point to that direction. Most 
of these examples are accounts of his personal experiences – and successes – as founder of 
the Grameen Bank
272
 and subsequently, other social businesses that have grown from it.  It 
is clear that the conceptual underpinnings of the social business model have their origins in 
the practical experience of the Grameen Bank.  It is possible to think of it as sort of a 
grounded theory that works its way to the top. The Grameen Bank began as a micro-credit 
institution in Bangladesh in response to some of these types of problems, especially the 
inability of the poor to access (formal or informal) credit. It has had a tremendous impact 
of women, who constitute most of its borrowers. Since its emergence, it has disbursed an 
estimated $4 billion with nearly 90% success rates. Because of its significant impact, it has 
not only earned its founder Muhammad Yunus a Nobel Prize for Economics, but has also 
led to the spread of the Grameen Bank to places like the US.   
 








One reason for its appeal – and perhaps success rate – is the ease at which loans are 
accessed by the poor. Unlike commercial lending institutions, it has no requirements for 
collateral or interest. Consider the following arrangements: x amount of money is disbursed 
to x group of women for purposes of setting up a certain micro-business. The women use 
this money to execute their business plan by competing in the same market with the aim of 
paying back loans over a flexible period. The objective is to transform the poor into 
entrepreneurs by giving the right tools or placing them in control of their own 
transformation. As such, the Grameen Bank (or social business) in general has sought to 
―unleash [the poor‘s] energy and creativity‖,
273
 especially in ways that enable them become 
self-sufficient.   
Whilst it has been potentially successful, the main reasons for its high success rate 
are nevertheless questionable. Does its success depend on its ability to transform 
individuals to entrepreneurs, or does it have to do with social capital, or the fact that it 
encourages individuals to build the habit of savings? These are questions that remain 
contestable but Yunus seems to take the first reason above as more significant. As a 
consequence, it seems to ignore the impact of group liability, which has also been a key 
factor to high return rates of such loans. It is not always acknowledged that the success of 
the Grameen Bank can be explained from the perspective of the existence of social capital 
and solidarities generated within many groups.  The standard account of the success of the 
Grameen Bank seems to exaggerate the ability of the individual to be transformed into a 
successful homo economicus. At the same time, it downplays the importance or habit of 
saving and group solidarity.   
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Furthermore, the Grameen Bank may be a good example of a good micro-credit institution 
but it is hardly a perfect illustration of a social business.  It is not clear how a micro-credit 
institution can deal with a wide range of social problems such as access to the basic 
necessities of life like water, healthcare and education. It is not clear how individuals can 
directly provide these economic and social rights through autonomous entrepreneurial 
activity.  A better explanation is perhaps that such other problems have been dealt with by 
an outgrowth of other businesses from the Grameen Bank. It has not been a direct 
responsibility of the bank itself to provide these goods. Of course, its unique ownership 
structure has allowed this to happen. It is owned by the poor, who are both depositors and 
borrowers. It is also structured in a way that its owners get a return on their investments, 
whilst surpluses are re-invested into other pressing areas.
274
 This is a logical explanation 
why other specially designed businesses have emerged from the surpluses generated from 
the Grameen Bank.  Several social businesses have emerged providing very cheap essential 
goods and services for the poor.  These include Grameen Shaki (renewable energy), 
Grameen Health Care, Grameen Fisheries, and Grameen-Danone, a joint venture with the 
French diary giant, which provides cheap yogurt for poor children and families in 
Bangladesh. There is also the Grameen-Viola, a joint venture with a French water company 
to provide clean drinking water to rural villages. 
275
  There is indeed a rich account in 
Yunus recent work on how these social businesses are transforming the lives of many. That 
said, there is still very little knowledge about the potential problems of social business on a 
wider scale.  This is something Yunus‘s account hardly mentions; questions must be asked 
about why social businesses are not more visible across the world.  As such, the jury is still 
out on Yunus‘s social business models. From the standpoint of this thesis, Grameen social 
businesses are not the only way social markets can be conceived. There are obviously other 
                                                 




models that can also perform this job. Co-operatives are one such model, and their 
potential in relation to electricity will be explored in more detail in chapter seven. 
5. Conclusion 
The chapter has generally demonstrated the argument about the dominance of markets in 
human rights discourse. It has discussed the philosophical roots of the market argument 
and explained why they now resonate in the Third World. It showed that quite apart from 
exclusion and participation, the market ironically needs a strong State to function.  The 
chapter has argued that part of the problem has been the kind of market involved. An 
attempt has been made to show another version of markets that lies at the margins of the 
dominant model. Such markets open up more possibility for dealing with some of the 
problems of human rights through forms of cooperation and participation, attributes 
missing from the dominant model. Chapter seven will take these arguments much further 
by sketching out a co-operative model that can encourage such forms of participation. Such 
opportunities would, however, only be effective if they are preceded by opportunities for 
participation within particular communities.  This entails understanding and creating 
structures for participation where they do not exist. Where they do exist, it entails nurturing 
them into more inclusive forms of participation. This entails understanding the constitutive 
role of human rights in enabling and nurturing such forms of participation. Whilst chapter 
six discusses the implications of community involvement, what follows is an attempt to 
understand the kind of role human rights can play. This is pursued by embedding the 
analysis in this and the previous chapters in a case study of the reform proposals for 




Chapter Four   
 
CONTEXTUALISING GOOD GOVERNANCE: ELECTRICITY 




1. Introduction  
The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the good governance inspired reforms 
in Nigeria have translated into practice by offering a case study of the reform proposals for 
electricity. Not only are the reforms carried out at the expense of community participation, 
they are also carried out at the expense of human rights. Leaving questions of community 
for subsequent chapters, the focus here is on understanding the implications of excluding 
human rights from the reform of electricity. The reform, as with other neoliberal inspired 
development approaches, fail to either recognise electricity as a human right or the 
language of human rights as a philosophy that can underpin their objectives, the most 
important of which is enabling access to electricity to all.  As such, the chapter embeds 
human rights in the analysis of the reform proposals for electricity in Nigeria. In particular, 
it builds on discussions in chapter one about the implications of understanding human 
rights as ethical claims. Those discussions have lead to the hypothesis in this chapter that 
an ethical framework of human rights potentially offers a philosophy that can underpin 
current and future designs of institutions, laws or reform policies. Specifically, such an 
ethic can equally help avoid, or bring significant problems encountered by the reform of 
electricity to greater attention. In particular, the relational dimension of privatisation, the 




It is admitted that human rights cannot achieve this task independently; they need to be 
strengthened with other ethical resources, which not only point to problems, but also how 
to avoid and resolve them.  Simone Weil‘s concept of attention is one example of how to 
achieve this. It is potentially an important way of developing what can be called a listening 
ethic to those most affected by such reforms. This ethic, however, can only be nurtured in 
communication, and with their participation. Attention is, after all, how we embrace, and 
participate in the affliction of others. Put this way, this chapter prepares grounds for the 
arguments in subsequent chapters about the significance of encouraging the participation of 
communities affected by such problems. 
 
The chapter begins with a background of the problems of electricity in Nigeria. It 
proceeds to discuss and offer a critique of the current reform approach, particularly the 
legal and regulation framework, as well as other salient aspects, such as access of the poor 
to electricity, rural electrification and consumer rights protection, amongst other features. It 
points to some of the problems with the reform, the most important of which is the neglect 
of human rights – either as a substantive right or philosophy – that underpins the reform. In 
conclusion, the chapter builds on earlier discussions about understanding human rights as 
ethical claims, and how this might meaningfully point to the problems of the lack of access 















2. Electricity in Nigeria  
 
 
I have not known 24 hours of uninterrupted power supply for countless years now. As I 
write this piece, I have not had power for the past three days! Nigerians depend largely on 




The following words describe the familiar sentiment shared amongst millions of Nigerians, 
many of whom survive under constant hardship of lack of electricity. The failure of public 
sector electricity is self-evident and needs very little elaboration. It is well known that the 
only consistent thing about electricity in Nigeria is its inconsistency, as 40 - 70% of 




A brief history of the electricity sector is a helpful 
way of putting this into perspective. Prior to the current reforms, Nigeria‘s electric sector 
operated as a vertically integrated national monopoly with combined elements of 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. At that period, the electric sector 
was not different from others in different parts of the world. Electricity was considered as a 
public good in the classical economic sense, which could only be managed by a centrally 
controlled monopoly. This duty was placed on the now defunct National Electric Power 
Authority (NEPA). 
278
 It operated under the now repealed Electricity Act as well as its 
establishing Act.  Not surprisingly, one notable feature of the law was the exclusion of 
private market participation in the electricity sector.
279
   
 
Reasons for the appalling levels of access to electricity have been credited to lack 
of private participation and the centralised nature of the redundant State-owned enterprise. 
Most observers have blamed the monopolistic nature of the sector for electricity failure in 
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 True enough that centralised electricity may be an outdated system today, but 
rationalising the problems only from this perspective appears to be an over-simplification 
of the multiple causes for electricity failure in Nigeria. Lack of competition may have 
accounted for most of the problems but there are certainly other reasons for such problems. 
Beyond questions of competition several operational problems have a causal relationship 
with the lack of electricity. Despite huge amounts of hydro, oil and gas resources, the 
generation capacity of the electricity sector has never peaked beyond 3500- 4000 MW of 
an installed capacity of 6000 MW.
281
 Transmission has equally been very poor; it has 
either been unreliable or not capable of transmitting to various destinations. Transmission 
losses of 30-35 % have also been commonly reported. Distribution has not been very 
different in a clearly malfunctioning system.
282
  A considerable amount of these problems 
can be attributed to neglect or a long history of the failure to perform maintenance 
operations. For example: 
 
 No new power stations were built between 1990 and 1999. 
 No major overhaul of plants was carried out between 1990 and 1999. 
 Only 19 out of 79 generating units were in operation in 1999.  
 Actual daily generating units fell less than 200 megawatts (MW) in 1999. 




Other factors include rising consumer debts, inadequate gas supply, devaluation of the 
local currency, low tariffs,
284
 funding and Nigeria‘s typical problem of corruption can also 
be attributed to such problems.  Corruption has been widespread both within the electricity 
sector and even in recent efforts at reform. For instance, a recent Parliamentary 
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 has revealed the misappropriation of an estimated sum of $10 – 15 billion 
during the current process of reform. The Nigerian Parliamentary hearings have also 
disclosed that the money was allegedly disbursed to fund new (fictitious) power stations. 
This was proposed to augment the existing power stations prior to privatisation.
286
 The 
outrageous sums involved call the processes leading up to privatisation into question. Apart 
from being corrupt, there seems to be some sense in measuring the comparative cost of 
establishing privatisation on the one hand, and the operational costs of the failed State 
electricity sector, on the other. A further similarity between the old and new processes is 
their inability to deliver electricity, the effect of which is the perverse effects it has had on 
the poor. Unlike the rich, the poor can ill-afford to provide other means of electricity. They 
cannot afford what has become the general practice of relying on small stand-by generators 
for electricity.
287
  As already noted, the importance of electricity has consequences that 
make the questions of access even more important for Nigerians. Lack of electricity 
aggravates their ability to access the already poor conditions of water, sanitation, 
healthcare, education and other essential social services.  It is perhaps on the strength of 
these problems, and of course, due to other external factors that have encouraged the 
Nigerian government to concretise a legal and regulatory framework for electric sector 
reform.
288
  The reforms are modelled on core elements of the BWIs policy on electricity 
reform – that is, unbundling and privatisation of the State electricity company as well as a 
new law to accelerate transformation of the electricity sector.   
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287 Ariyo A and Jerome A. ‗Utility Privatisation and the Poor: Nigeria in Focus‘, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 
2004, at 2, accessed online at http://www.boell.de/downloads/global/GIP%2012%20Nigeria_Engl.pdf  10th 
February 2009. 
288 See, generally, EPSR Act above n 279. 
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3. The Electric Sector Reform Policy  
Electric sector reforms can be understood in light of the climate above, and also, in light of 
the Bank‘s CDF and Nigeria‘s PRSP, NEEDS.
289
 Access to electricity emerges within this 
broad agenda for poverty reduction with the reform public goods being a focal point, given 
its relationship with the persistence of poverty.  A valuable background into the profound 
nature of the problems can be understood from a glimpse at Nigeria‘s the latest Human 
Development Index (HDI) prepared by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). For instance, Nigeria has an adult literacy rate of 72.0.1%.
290
 The combined gross 
enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools is estimated at 53.0%. Life 
expectancy currently averages at about 47. 7 years. Similarly, the infant mortality rate is 
quite high, and ranks between 107 - 269 deaths (per 1,000 live births).
291
The reasons for 
this are vast, not the least because of lack of access to facilities, medicines and doctors. 
Other recent estimates suggest that only an average of about 30 doctors is available to 
100,000 citizens.
292
 As many as 67% Nigerians depend on private healthcare providers for 
their medical needs, given the failure of the public healthcare system.
293
  Even in doing so, 
only about 10% of Nigerians have access to essential drugs – a figure that presumably 
includes the over 2.7 million people living with HIVAIDS. Lack of access to water is also 
quite perverse with as much as 40 -70% of Nigerians without any healthy alternatives. 
294




                                                 
289  National Planning Commission above n 15.  
290 Nigeria‘s Human Development Index, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009, accessed 
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291 Del Mar and Onazi 0 above n  41, at 364. 
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Lack of access to electricity is equally puzzling, apart from also being an important source 
of poverty, even though it is not recognised in the index as a human development question.  
As noted in chapter one, as many as 40-70% Nigerians survive without access to public 
electricity. The reform of the sector emerges at the backdrop of such negative public sector 
record and the nature or shape of the reform is structured by several policy initiates of the 
BWIs.   For example, quite apart from the Bank‘s CDF or good governance, the choice of 
reform has also been shaped by Nigeria‘s adoption of the International Monetary Fund‘s 
(IMF) policy support instrument (PSI).  This is simply a non lending instrument, which 
prescribes the conditions attached to the country‘s attainment of debt relief.
296
 Such 
commitments have made the deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation of the power 
sector the only reform alternatives to follow.  But the most significant influential factor is 
Nigeria‘s PRSP, NEEDS, which is itself developed under auspices of the CDF.  NEEDS is 
driven by four main objectives: ―poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment 
generation and value orientation‖. 
297
 It has as its main objective the empowerment of 
people, improvement of social service delivery; encouraging private sector participation, 
and changing the way government works. Not surprisingly, it seeks to achieve these 
objectives through the market friendly language of good governance.
298
   
 
It would appear that the language of good governance is significant in at least two 
related contexts. The first is, of course, the relationship between governance and 
government.  NEEDS offers a number of proposals on how to reform government activity, 
through standard neoliberal prescriptions of ―restructuring, right-sizing, re-
                                                 
296  Bretton Woods Project above n 285. On the IMF‘s PSI, see;  European Network for Debt and 
Development, ‗Nigeria‘s Debt Deal Close UP‘, 2005, accessed online at  
http://www.eurodad.org/debt/article.aspx?id=0&item=370 10th February 2009. See also, Odiadi A. ‗Paris 
Club and Debt Relief‘, Social Science Research Network, Working Paper Series, 2008. 




professionalizing and strengthening government and public institutions.‖
299
 At the same 
time, it also seeks to tackle ―corruption‖, promote ―transparency, rule of law‖ and eliminate 
―rent seeking‖
300
 within government realms through the introduction of a broad regime of 
privatisation.  This brings to mind the second dimension of good governance here. NEEDS 
aims to free up some responsibilities traditionally held by the State, and in this respect, 
transfer them onto the private sector. The role of market-based, self regulatory forms of 
governance earlier discussed is also constitutive of this agenda.
301
 Without question, the 
importance of markets and private sector is something distinct about NEEDS such that its 
concerns for empowerment and poverty-reduction, amongst others, are dependent on these 
institutions. NEEDS is, in no uncertain terms, celebrated as a market-based development 
policy. 
 
The resort to markets can be questioned for several reasons, one of which is the 
extent to which the ethos of the private sector can inspire hard-work, reduce corruption, or 
invest in education, as it claims. These are beliefs that are proposed simplistically with a lot 
taken for granted. The point in raising this is to show that similar permutations lie behind 
the choice, nature and shape of the electric sector reforms.  NEEDS is succinct about this; 
its introductory remarks begin with the assertion of the significance of electricity to the 
private sector. It even goes further to note that ensuring access for the poor is predicated on 
private sector participation.   
 
 
                                                 
299 Ibid., at 214.   
300 Ibid. See, Gradstein, M. ‗Rent Seeking and the Provisioning of Public Goods‘, 103 (420), The Economic 
Journal, 1993, at 1236-1243.  
301 National Planning Commission, above n 15, at 214.  
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Regardless of this, the choice of market reform in Nigeria can be justified for other reasons 
– that is, it is the result of the proverbial nature of State failure.   Without doubt, State 
failure has been a major factor for the nature of reform, since government capital has 
continued to dwindle over a period of time.  Because of this, stimulating private 
participation in the electricity sector has been considered as an alternative means of 
generating investment. Private sector participation is regarded as the only way of freeing 
up large amounts of public funds for other priorities, or the promotion of accountability, 
better customer service, or perhaps, it is seen as just a way of reducing government deficits 
or debts. Each of these presuppositions can, of course, be contested but this is not the 
objective here. Rather, the point in raising it is to show the priorities of dominant thinking 
in this context.  Like most Third World countries, electric sector reforms in Nigeria have 
concentrated on attracting private investment to address the critical challenges of the 
sector.  Generation, transmission and distribution of electricity through the private sector 
have been an integral part of electricity reforms.  It is then no surprise that electricity 
liberalisation is the underlying philosophy behind the reform of Nigerian electricity.   It is 
true that the arguments for privatisation have their merits given the reality of the near or 
total collapse of the State-led electric sector.  But, resolving these problems in favour of 
privatisation still has its problems. Specifically, it is not clear how privatisation will expand 
access to electricity to the poor, especially those in the rural areas.  It is not clear how 
markets would resolve this without any special mechanism to ensure affordability.   One 
must not forget that the ethos of the private sector is about profits and not social welfare.   
 
These observations and anxieties aside, privatisation has become a regrettable 
necessity in light of the exceptional Nigerian circumstances, the legal and institutional 
framework of which is set out by the National Electric Power Policy, the National Energy 
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Policy and the Electric Power Sector Reform (EPSR) Act of 2005.
302
 In terms of its 
content, the core proposals for reform include unbundling and the subsequent privatisation 
of the electricity national monopoly. The legal framework now enables private companies 
to participate in the generation, distribution and transmission of electricity in Nigeria. 
Other features of the bourgeoning electric sector include the creation of a regulatory 
commission, power consumer assistance and rural electrification agency.  
 
At present, almost a decade of part-privatisation in Nigeria 
303
the results are far 
from convincing.  Blackouts still are the norm rather than the exception. Electricity has 
been increasingly expensive, if and when it is available.  There is no remarkable difference 
with the period when electricity operated as a State monopoly and the current era of part 
privatisation.  A plausible defence is often given that the privatisation process is still at a 
premature stage but it is fair to argue that this is far from convincing. There seems to be 
some partial acknowledgement by the current Nigerian government that the electric sector 
reform has failed to attract the kind of foreign direct investment (FDI) anticipated. Such 
arguments have attributed reasons for such failure to the Nigerian question of corruption. 
They seem to overlook the unprofitable nature of the dilapidated electric infrastructure as 
the main causal factor.  Firms have always been known to selectively choose successful 
entities, whilst ignoring the more depleted ones.  Apart from that, the global climate for 
electricity investments seems to be unfavourable to privatisation at present.  Historically, 
on the global scale, electricity has transited from nationalisation to private ownership and 
now re-nationalisation, given the extent of global economic crisis.
304
 Without in any way 
                                                 
302 See, Energy Commission of Nigeria, National Energy Policy, Nigeria, 2003. See, EPSR Act 2005 above 
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 See, Beder S. Power Play: the fight for control of the world’s electricity, Sribe Publications, 2003.  See 
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acknowledging these possible causal factors, the Nigerian government
305
 has recently 
admitted the failure of privatisation for other reasons mentioned above – that is, the failure 
of privatisation is simply rationalised by corruption.
306
 Be that as it may, the government 
seems to be committed to the reform of the sector, but the strategy of privatisation remains 
unchanged, as with the reform law and policy. The prevalence of the reform agenda only 
underscores the advantages of the critique here. It might provide a helpful foundation for 
rethinking the reform strategy. As a result, the critique of the EPSR Act in the next part 
cannot be more timely. It is important to note that certain observations here may be a bit 
speculative, given the incomplete nature of the electricity sector reforms. 
 
4. Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The role of law and institutions is also pivotal to the electric sector reform, as it generally is 
the case with law and development-type reforms.  In keeping with this tradition, Nigeria‘s 
electric sector reform law, the EPSR Act creates an environment for a wholesale and retail 
competitive market by vertically and horizontally separating elements of generation, 
transmission and distribution.  Other key aspects of the reform law consist of the creation 
of the following: an electricity market, electricity regulatory commission, power consumer 
assistance, rural electrification agency and the protection of consumer rights.   As already 
suggested, the process of reform has already been initiated with the formation of an initial 
holding company, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). Part of the preliminary 
processes also includes the formation of a new market structure, which consists of 6 
generating companies, 1 transmission company and 11 distribution companies. As noted in 
                                                 
305 President Musa Yar‘adua (now deceased) succeeded President Olusegun Obasanjo as President of Nigeria 
for a term of four years which began on the 29th of May 2007.  His deputy Jonathan Goodluck has since been 
sworn-in as President. At present, it is still unclear if, or what changes he seeks to make to the reform.   
306 See, BBC Report, ‗Nigeria power shortage persists‘, accessed online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/7426593.stm  25th February 2009.  
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the previous section, a partial privatisation process is now in place; it is expected to be 
concluded by the full divesture of all component firms.  
 
Generally speaking, electric sector reforms have embraced different designs and 
models across the globe, with the Nigerian approach above being a reflection of one of 
them.  Electric sector reforms have varied on the degree of competition either permitted or 
prohibited in the process, or by the sale of the sector to single, or different buyers.
307
 
Whilst the choice of reform model has comparatively been different in Europe and the 
United States (US), in Nigeria, as with other Third World countries, electric reform has 
been a replica of the model indicated above. This is, of course, as a result of the influence 
of the BWIs.
308
  But, a further reason for the model of reform is that privatisation is 
considered as the only way of reducing costs of production as well as the only means of 
generating finance for new power stations, through a division of labour between the 
various components of the electric sector. The starting point for such reforms is usually the 
break-up of the State-owned monopoly into component units of generation, transmission 
and supply.  The predictable end-point is an electricity market in which electricity is 
expected to be procured from the wholesale market and supplied to end-users. The supply 
aspect usually consists of customer services of billing, collection and maintenance. These 
new privately owned firms usually function autonomously with power of budgets, 
borrowing, procurement and employment. They are required to pay taxes on the basis of 
markets interest rates and with the hope of receiving returns on equity capital.  To achieve 
this objective, it becomes necessary to create an environment for competition to thrive.  
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4.1. Electricity Market  
The creation of an electricity market – through the introduction of competition – is 
undoubtedly the most important aspect of the budding electric sector. The responsibility of 
ensuring competition is almost exclusively placed in the market, which is in turn 
complemented by the creation of the National Electric Regulatory Authority (NERC), the 
aim of which is to ensure the effective functioning of the market framework.
309
 Expectedly, 
its primary responsibilities consist of creating, promoting and preserving efficient market 
structures; it also includes maximising resources for the provision of electricity services.
310
   
Its other functions consist of ensuring access to electricity in rural and urban areas. 
311
 To 
perform all these tasks, its duties include ascertaining reasonable pricing of electricity, 
safety, security and ensuring the quality of service.
312
  The regulatory commission is a 
crucial part of the objective dealing with the potential difficulties of promoting and 
regulating the competitive electricity market.
313
 In an ideal situation NERC ought to be an 
independent body, autonomous from government, electricity suppliers and consumers. This 
is partially the case, as NERC only seems independent of electricity suppliers and 
consumers. It is not so autonomous from government, which inevitably determines the 
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313 Ibid., at S. 32(2) a. 
314 Ibid., at S.32(1). 
144 
 
The most daunting responsibility of the regulatory commission is undoubtedly to contrive 
an electricity market by stimulating competition,
315
 a task no doubt difficult given the 
inherent monopolistic nature of electricity.  The competitive market framework seems 
compatible with certain retail aspects of electricity, but not quite suitable for elements of 
the sector. To explain further, competition is only achievable in the ―generation – and 
supply service-segments‖
316
 of electricity, but it is difficult to achieve in the ―network 
segments‖
317
 of electricity – that is, ―transmission, distribution and system control‖.
318
  
Furthermore, electric sector competition is more suitable for large users, but not as suitable 
for small users.  This is because the demands or cost of competition for large users is 
usually minimal. 
319
 Because of this, retail suppliers have been known to target large 
consumers. On the other hand, small consumers are better served by a regulated monopoly, 
and not a competitive market. 
320
 Electricity supply to small consumers is usually a 
monopoly practice partly ―because the profits per customer are too small to stimulate 
competition‖.
321
 Due to economies of scale supply activities are better served by a single 
firm.
322
 This perceived problem can, of course, be overcome by the vertical integration of 
elements of distribution and supply. Those problems apart, other special qualities of 
electricity that make it unsuitable for the competitive market include, amongst other things, 
it‘s unsuitability for storage, which may expose consumers to the precariousness of the 
market. Given this development, a well know fact with electricity is that its supply must 
always match demand otherwise the system will totally collapse.  Questions have equally 
been raised about the plausibility of wholesale electricity competition. The point is that, if 
                                                 
315 Ibid., at part II.  




  See, Thomas S. ‗Why Retail Electricity Competition is Bad for Small Consumers: British Experience‘, 
Public Services International Unit Publication, 2002, at 2, accessed online at 
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markets are efficient or regulated properly, the price of electricity would not differ much, 
since costs of generation to distribution of firms are likely to be similar. The only 
predictable disparity of costs is likely to emerge from retail services, that is, meter reading, 
data processing and billing.   In spite of these anxieties, wholesale and retail competition 
are important components of the electric sector reform in Nigeria. The practice – as 
promoted by the Bank – is usually to prevent the purchase of the monopolistic aspects of 
the electricity market by a single firm by placing limits on ownership or regulating the 
activities of generators and distributors.
323
  Such market framework ought to be composed 
of independent electricity suppliers and distributors who compete for patronage from large 
consumers.  The Bank, however, recommends that the competitive process could be 
postponed in countries where distribution and supply systems are so run down that new 
owners need time or certainty to recover their investment.  
 
Given the above, it would seem imperative to protect the monopoly aspects of 
electricity through specific legal mechanisms and initiatives, such as restricting the kinds 
of ownership in the market.  Surprisingly, the provision of EPSR Act on licensing does not 
prohibit the transfer of licenses.
324
  It only contains a caveat that any sale, mortgage, lease 
or exchange must be authorised by the regulatory commission. This calls several 
presumptions about competition into question and it is obvious that not much attention has 
been given to these anxieties. On a more positive note, however, it seems the ESPR Act 
does take the plight of the poor seriously with specific proposals for a Power Consumer 
Assistance Fund (PCAF).  
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4.1.1. Electricity for the Poor 
One of the novelties of the reform law is the directive given to the regulatory commission 
to establish a special fund specifically for the needs of the poor. 
325
  NERC is responsible 
for managing both money and assets of the fund, quite apart from setting up procedures for 
disbursement of such funds by the PCAF.  According to the reform law, the fund will be 
financed through contributions of all liable consumers, who are differentiated by the fact 
that they are not underprivileged consumers. Similarly, funds will also be sourced from 
eligible customers and the Nigerian government.
326
The creation of this fund is 
commendable, given its attempts to take the plight of the poor into equation.  Nonetheless, 
a few anxieties may be raised about it, especially the decision not to give the NERC direct 
responsibility over affairs of the poor. This is, of course, a task delegated to PCAF.  There 
are positive and negative implications of this development. To start with the negative side 
of things, it could simply mean a lack of concern for the poor by not directly seeing to their 
needs, given that such needs are left to a less influential body with very limited strengths or 
funding.  One a more positive note, however, although the PCAF may not be as powerful; 
the needs of the poor seem to be prioritised, given that the poor have been given attention 
by a specialist body.  
 
An argument can still be made that, although NERC is not directly responsible for 
the poor, it still has the ability to take a more proactive role in favour of the poor. It can 
achieve this either through its oversight functions or by adopting a pro-poor approach to 
regulation.
327
 There are indeed several ways in which regulation can be designed to meet 
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the needs of the poor. This is either by encouraging competent governance regimes or other 
initiatives that might assist in stimulating poverty reduction. More specifically, it can 
ensure affordability as a way of guaranteeing access of electricity for the poor. Because 
competition is no guarantee for low electricity prices, regulation is vital to ensure 
affordable prices for the poor. Regulatory mechanisms can specifically be directed at 
promoting social objectives as well as human rights. Such activities could range from 
promoting services in deprived areas to reducing risks to public health and safety. This can 
only be achieved if the regulators have deep insights into the conditions and special needs 
of the poor. The ethical framework of human rights (and the role of public institutions in 
paying attention to human suffering) discussed in the concluding parts of this chapter is 
one way of making this possible. As will also be seen in the subsequent chapters, concerns 
of the poor can be taken into account by decentring regulation onto communities.  
 
The commission can also play a forceful role in reducing poverty by the choice of 
tariff system it proposes. One main function of NERC is to balance the interests of both 
electricity consumers and producers by ensuring reasonable pricing.
328
 Recent evidence of 
how the commission has carried out this function seems to suggest that it is more interested 
in ensuring the attractiveness of the industry to the private sector than anything else. This is 
one interpretation of its choice the Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) – the new tariff 
regime.
329
 The MYTO is a way of calculating electricity prices on the basis of the 
cumulative revenue requirements of the entire sector. This approach in no uncertain terms 
is an attempt to make the sector commercially viable for private firms, quite apart from 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cranfield Centre for Competition and Regulation Research, School of Management, Cranfield University, 
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328 See, EPSR Act above n 279, at S. 32(1).  
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creating enough revenue for such businesses to recover the operating costs. This 
observation is legitimate given that the current tariffs paid by customers are not true 
reflections of the cost of production. The commission concedes, however, that in order to 
balance the needs of private investors and ordinary citizens, government must subsidise 
electricity needs of Nigerians.
330
  This claim seems to contradict commonly held myths 
about the benefits of privatisation. These are arguments that have often suggested that 
privatisation will reduce the burden on government, so as to enable it to channel its funds 
to other pressing needs, like healthcare and education.  As the current circumstances attest, 
this is not the case in practice. Apart from that, there is usually a degree to which a 
government can subsidise. What this means is that there is always a danger that electricity 
prices cannot be kept affordable. After all, privatisation can only succeed if the prices are 
kept right for the so-called investors. Most often, the primary way of achieving this is by 
increasing the tariffs. In the case of Nigeria, a sharp increase of electricity prices has 
already been experienced. 
 
These concerns apart, it is important to look more closely at the responsibilities of 
PCAF. The importance of the fund cannot be over-emphasised in light of the relational 
effect of electricity pricing on poverty. There are perhaps two notable difficulties with the 
way its objectives are spelt out by the reform law.  First, in dealing with the so-called 
underprivileged consumers, the EPSR Act fails to specifically identify or point to sources 
where beneficiaries of such interventions can be identified.  A definition of poverty or 
more specifically, ‗electricity poverty‘ is conspicuously absent, even though this is crucial 
in determining the level of electricity consumption which ought to be allocated to different 
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persons. The inability to include such a definition is not surprising, given that this is 
uncharacteristic of legal documents. Yet, this seems important for allocating or enforcing 
amounts of electricity to the poor. This is also important for other reasons, such as the 
contestable nature of resource allocation, which is arguably one of the main functions of 
the fund. Such kinds of activities are always bound to be riddled with controversy, that is to 
say, debates surrounding why certain individuals should or should not benefit from such 
mechanism.  The best way of making such difficult determinations is by providing a 
certain criteria to guide such judgements.  
 
An understanding of the general situation of poverty is an inescapable starting point 
for determining the minimum levels of electricity which should be distributed.  There are 
different ways of understanding poverty, the dominant of which are both income based 
analysis of poverty and the ―HDI‖
331
 of the UNDP. For present purposes, the economic 
indicators seem more useful in determining how electricity should be distributed, even if 
they fail to comprehensively capture the wider social factors of poverty. The tragic fact that 
nearly 70 % of Nigerians currently live beneath one dollar (US$) a day gives some 





In the same vein, a definition of electricity poverty is also important in this context. 
There is really no standard definition of poverty for present purposes, and it is likely to 
vary in different circumstances. An understanding of electricity poverty will depend on 
how the quantity of electricity supplies corresponds with national poverty levels.   A 
minimum threshold can be drawn when the amount of electricity consumption falls below 
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an acceptable level or a certain criteria of one‘s basic needs. In Brazil, for instance, a 
minimum threshold of (80 kilowatt per hour (kWh) per month) was fixed to give an 
indication of electricity poverty.
333
 As such, consumers faced with those conditions are 
permitted to consume up to 220 kWh per month.  Furthermore, there are other ways to 
stimulate access of the poor which fall out of the contemplation of the EPSR Act. For 
instance, community participation or the involvement of poor through co-operatives or 
some other similar mechanisms to enable participation in electricity is something that can 
prove quite useful.
334
 Furthermore, the fund can also extend lifeline rates to marginalised 
consumers. It can also cross-subsidise prices or, abandon upfront connection fees. 
Unfortunately, none of these options seem to be considered by the EPSR Act. One specific 
policy though, which can indeed enhance access to electricity for the poor is a rural 
electrification strategy. Experts have often argued that rural electrification should coincide 
or where possible, precede privatisation.
335
 Rural electrification is, of course, part of the 
Nigerian reform, but it is fair to say its sequencing is questionable. 
 
4.1.2. Rural Electrification  
At present – a decade after the commencement of the law and policy – a comprehensive 
rural electrification programme is still being expected. This has made commenting on this 
aspect of the reform rather difficult. In spite of this, some indication of the overall direction 
of the rural electrification drive can still be deciphered from the National Energy Policy, 
National Electric Power Policy and the EPSR Act.  Broadly speaking, rural electrification 
is partly connected with poverty reduction and economic development objectives of 
NEEDS, which encourages grid and off-grid, as well as thermal and renewable energy 
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technologies. The potentials renewable energy sources like solar, wind, biomass and 
moving water have to poverty alleviation and the environment are also taken into 
consideration. Apart from being sustainable, they are not subject to price fluctuations that 
occur with non-renewable sources.  
 
In keeping with the broad objectives of Nigeria‘s electricity and energy policy, a 
Rural Electrification Agency and Fund (REAF) is proposed to facilitate electrification in 
the rural areas. 
336
 The REAF is mandated to promote, support and provide rural 
electrification through public and private sector participation for at least three distinct but 
related purposes. Its first aim is to increase universal and equitable access of electricity and 
secondly, to maximise the economic, social and environmental benefits of rural 
electrification subsidies. Thirdly, it is specifically created for purposes of expansion of off-
grid electrification and to encourage new approaches to rural electrification.  So far, the 
Nigerian government is yet to make its rural electrification strategy public, even though it 
has designated the responsibility for designing one to a committee of experts.  Part of its 
mandate is the specific design of the REAF as well as a low cost distribution system.  
 
Uniquely, the reform law makes provisions for both grid and off grid 
electrification,
337
 which includes the generation of electricity from renewable sources.
338
 
Despite what can be regarded as positive developments, there appear to be some 
predictable anxieties with the proposals for rural electrification. These can be summarised 
as follows: First, the market orientation of the entire reform calls the ability to perform 
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these functions into question.
339
 Secondly, funding – a crucial aspect of rural electrification 
– seems insufficient addressed, if not unsustainable from the proposals contained in the 





 from the regulatory commission, donations, gifts, loans from  institutions, 
342
 and 
furthermore, contributions from consumers and eligible consumers.
343
  The potential 
impact of rural electrification needs a more certain source of funding to make any 
meaningful impact in Nigeria.  For example, a well thought out micro-credit strategy may 
be a more sustainable way of achieving the goals of rural electrification. Off-grid 
technologies, for instance, are more suitable for dispersed forms of governance like village 
or community-based cooperatives as discussed in chapter seven.  In spite of premises about 
dispersed governance or participatory development in the Bretton Woods agenda, it 
appears that the role of ‗community‘ (as opposed to the private sector) is still not 
completely accepted in practice in electricity– at least not in the case of Nigeria. As already 
noted, this specific issue will be addressed in chapters five, six and seven.  Before 
considering this, I consider other innovations of the reform law. 
 
4.1.3. Consumer Rights  
The need to protect Nigerians – especially the poor – from exploitative effects of the 
electricity market is further guaranteed by creating a regime of consumer rights.
344
  This is 
consistent with market reform strategies, which depend on consumer rights to ensure that 
products always satisfy the needs of consumers. These are needs that can obviously have 
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effects on the quality of life, the effect of which is that consumer rights can be understood 
as a basic step for enjoying of human rights, including the right to life. Even so, a claim 
can be made that consumer rights are not the most appropriate mechanism to perform this 
task. Consumer rights, after all, seem to draw their inference from the ideology of 
consumerism, the implication of which is that it promotes the instrumental value of 
electricity. In other words, electricity is promoted as a material good and not as a 
prerequisite for the quality of life.   
 
Looking more specifically at the proposals for consumer rights contained in the 
EPSR Act; NERC is empowered with the responsibility of protecting the rights of 
consumers,
345
 who are in turn defined as end-users of electricity. They are consumers of 
either the distribution licensee or such other entity that NERC deems as appropriate. NERC 
is to secure the rights of consumers by specifically ensuring the availability and adequate 
supply of electricity to consumers.
346
 It is to ensure fair pricing by licensees as long as it 
takes their operating costs into account.
347
 NERC is generally responsible for ensuring 
safety, security, reliability and the quality of service to consumers.
348
 In protecting the 
rights of consumers, NERC has already developed several industry codes – the Grid Code, 
Distribution Code, Metering Code and Health and Safety standards– to ensure compliance 
to its mandate.
349
  Similarly, NERC has duly established customer safety standards and 
customer complaint and handling procedures in compliance with section 80 (1) of the 
EPSR Act. It is also responsible for establishing codes of practice to attend to special 
customers, such as the blind or disabled, the elderly or severely ill
350
, and it also has 
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procedures for dealing with customers who have difficulties paying their bills,
351
amongst 
other things.   
 
NERC spells out the consumer rights as the ‗right to electric service,‘
352
 amongst 
other rights, which also consist of billing, metering and rights to file complaints. These 
rights seem to be developed from what NERC calls individual consumer rights, which 
include the right to safety, basic needs, information, choice or rights to be heard, seek 
redress, consumer education and the right to a healthy environment.  To ensure compliance 
with the following rights, private electricity companies are required to set up costumer 
complaints units within their premises and other locations of their operations.  In addition, 
NERC has established what it calls ‗Forums‘ in all operational areas of all distribution 
companies. Membership of such Forums comprise of representatives of business and 
NGOs of different persuasions.  The Forums functions as Ombudspersons, part of the 
objective being the enforcement of consumer rights with the responsibility of final appeals 
from such Forums placed in NERC.   
 
The emergence of Ombudsperson Forums is consistent with the Bank‘s source 
book on the good governance of the electric sector. 
353
 Drawing reform experiences of 
various countries, the Bank recommends that electricity governance can be enhanced by 
creating  mechanisms for access to information and accountability, such as consumer 
welfare desks, surveys, consumer meetings, and as in this case, ensuring the role of the 
Ombudsperson in maintaining consumer rights. It specifically draws on the experience of 
Latin American counties like Peru, Argentina and El-Salvador, where the introduction of 
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Ombudspersons has proved successful. In the case of Nigeria, it is still rather early to 
assess the impact of such Forums since they have only recently been proposed.  One usual 
way of ensuring consumer rights but conspicuously missing from the Nigerian reforms is 
consumer participation in regulatory decision-making.
354
 This can obviously prove a useful 
resource for improving the quality of services or reducing costs through the review of 
tariffs. It seems that the Nigerian authorities are not quite enthused by this prospect.   
 
Regardless of this short-coming, the inclusion of consumer rights or more 
specifically, the ‗right to electric service‘ is significant to ensure access of electricity to the 
poor. It can be argued that consumer rights can serve as a basis for the satisfaction of a 
range of human rights. It is not difficult to see that the breach of consumer rights can 
inevitably affect the quality of life. But the question remains, do consumer rights 
adequately protect such aspects of life? A simple answer is no. They might be a step 
towards achieving certain human rights, but they are not the best language to achieve this 
objective.  Besides, consumer rights seem to instinctively draw some inference from the 
ideology consumerism, a term which may imply an instrumental or material nature of 
electricity.  It has the effect of making electricity an object of material desires and not in 
any way connected to our natural needs.
355
 There have been several effects of the ideology 
of consumerism, the most significant of which is the recognition of human beings as 
consumers, and overlooking their attributes of humanity.  The point is that this could very 
well mean that we consume electricity not because of our characteristics of humanity but 
because of our artificial desires.  It is true that one cannot avoid thinking of electricity in 
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such instrumental terms, but the point in raising this is that there are other more important 
ways of the use value of electricity. It is because of this and for other reasons that I propose 
in the next part that the language of human rights needs to play a central role in reforms of 
this nature.  
 
5.  What is hidden from view?  
Consumer rights may be a regrettable necessity (especially in the absence of an alternative 
means of protection), but they are ill-equipped to embody the kind of values that might 
orient the necessary behaviour capable of meaningfully connecting to the needs of the 
poor. Besides, there is also an implication that consumer rights only apply to those that can 
afford the status of consumers – sadly, the vast majority of Nigerians can ill-afford this 
position. 
356
 Another difficulty is that consumer rights assume a false equality of access to 
electricity, since one can only enjoy protection as a consumer. Those that fail to achieve 
this are automatically excluded from the domain of recognition. Consumer rights are not 
the best way to deal with other pressing problems that arise from the reform. For instance, 
they cannot deal with the huge loss of jobs as a result privatising the defunct State-owned 
electricity service. Whilst the EPSR Act makes provisions for the movement of employees 
from the defunct State monopoly onto the transitional private electric companies, it is silent 
on what happens when those firms are fully privatised.
357
 Are these private firms obliged to 
keep the services of these employees?  While privatisation is expected to create a number 
of new jobs, it is quite apparent that old jobs will be lost.  
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What is lacking from the proposals on the whole is an overarching philosophy, which 
underpins the electric sector reform, and which would trigger responses appropriate to the 
needs of the poor. This is something (in light of arguments in the previous and present 
chapter) that cannot be left to markets. Without a stronger ethical or moral code, such as 
human rights, it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to sufficiently achieve the social 
objectives of these kinds of reform. And such reforms would be meaningless if they are not 
able to affect those at the bottom of society.  
 
The question then becomes how exactly can human rights contribute to increase 
access to electricity in Nigeria?  Possible answers to this question can best be understood 
by expanding on earlier arguments about the significance of an ethic of human rights  that 
can see and respond to human suffering as discussed in chapter one.  It is argued that this 
sort of language of human rights ought to be inscribed as a central element of the Nigerian 
electric sector reform law and policy. In order to understand the value of argument, some 
more justification is needed to show why human rights need to embrace human suffering. 
After all, sceptics might say that invoking human rights should be sufficient enough to deal 
with those sorts of problems. Human rights are, after all, the most dominant theory of 
justice, and they do not need a deeper understanding of human suffering to perform this 
task, since this is the role they already play in society. These sorts of arguments imply that 
simply invoking the language of human rights is sufficient on its own. Human rights are 
invoked as if they are perfect or the best way of alleviating the cries of the poor. But, a 
counter-argument here is that they are not and these sorts of arguments only run the risk of 
leading to complacency. And the only way of understanding the limitations of rights is by 





  This is perhaps, as discussed in chapter one, the scepticism Simone Weil 
maintained about human rights. She was drawing our attention to the fact that human rights 
suffer from a profound epistemic weakness, which prevent them from sufficiently grasping 
silent cries of injustice.   It was not really an argument against human rights; rather it was 
against prioritising them ahead of other moral languages, especially the language of love 
and compassion.   
 
Putting Weil‘s arguments about the epistemic weakness of rights into the context of 
some of the arguments in this thesis only goes to validate that human rights discourse 
seems to have missed some of the anxieties that have been raised. The question of 
electricity and its relationship to human suffering and human rights is only one example of 
this point. The question then becomes – in light of the value attached to human rights here 
– how can human rights be rescued from such weaknesses?  As already indicated in this 
thesis, these sorts of problems can only be made more visible if human suffering serves as 
a way of drawing obligations to human rights.   
 
Possible answers can be found in Andrew Williams‘ important essay, which is one 
of the more recent attempts to recover the moral dimension of human rights by equipping 
them with the tools to become more responsive.  Part of what a deepened engagement with 
human suffering achieves is that it increases our capacity to embrace responsibility, even if 
suffering itself is not easy to define. It is a relative concept, one that varies from individual, 
place and culture. Regardless of this, it is still possible to understand what might constitute 
human suffering in certain situations. Following on from Emmanuel Levinas, who argues 
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that ―[s]uffering is surely a given in consciousness‖,
359
 Williams shows that suffering 
might be understood in two related dimensions – that is, the subjective (psychological) and 
objective dimension.  Both aspects of suffering are intricately linked; it is not always 
possible to distinguish them, quite apart from their being vague or open to various cultural 
readings.  The psychological dimension can be understood in the sense of personal pain 
and suffering. It refers to emotional feelings which are universal but obviously experienced 
differently amongst different individuals. There are many examples of this, which range 
from the experience of physical to mental violence to experiences of oppression, exclusion, 
discrimination or experiences of repression of individual humanity.
360
 This sort of pain 
invites us to understand what the sufferer experiences.  It is only by psychologically 
imagining the scope of such pain that we draw near – though not exhaustively – to its 
effects. According to Williams, no concept of human rights that seeks to transform lives 
can succeed without at least trying to connect with such type of suffering.  
 
The second aspect of suffering is what Williams‘ calls the objectivist dimension.  It 
is the type of suffering occasioned by very visible catastrophic acts, which are often 
difficult to disguise. He says it is what Luc Boltanski has called ―distant suffering‖
361
 to 
illustrate this objectivist dimension of suffering. This is indeed, as was also considered, 
similar to Weil‘s idea of attention. It simply refers to manifestations of actual physical or 
psychological pain that are easily (or not so easily) noticeable by others. ―Death, injury, 
disease, malnutrition, torture‖,
362
 are some useful examples, which may where possible 
provoke an urgent response. The fact is that such kinds of suffering are recognised because 
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we can easily identify with such, even if we don‘t experience it ourselves. Williams argues 
that these elements of suffering have over the years been built-into human rights discourse 
through the concept of human dignity.
363
 For instance, dignity (which includes individual 
and collective rights) is pivotal to transcending suffering.
364
  Williams argues that the 
alleviation of suffering features amongst more recent theoretical and practical proposals to 
deal with questions of poverty in society. For instance, the alleviation of suffering 
underpins currents approaches to human flourishing as depicted more recently in the 
capability approach of both Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.
365
  Williams is correct; 
take Nussbaum‘s more recent writings on the relationship between capability and disability 
as a good example.  Nussbaum‘s approach is far too complex to discuss in detail, except to 
say that it concerns the question of disability in light of the failure of social contractual 
theories to adequately deal with it. Theories of justice are modelled on the social contract, 
which tie the distribution of resources to cooperation amongst free, able-bodied and equal 
citizens.  Societies organised around this model only seem to recognise productive 
individuals. The social contract does not conceive those who cannot participate for 
whatever reason. For instance, individuals with disabilities are automatically excluded 
from contractual definitions of citizenship.
366
 For Nussbaum, it is important that we 
understand the obligations we owe to our children, future generations, the elderly, non-
humans, the environment, and most importantly, the physical or mentally disabled.  She 
notes rather controversially that we owe obligations to those who suffer from a range of 
disability to the degree that it might constitute a loss of humanity.  These are those that 
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suffer extreme cases of mental illness or those that are in vegetative condition that they no 
longer have the ability to think, reason or express emotional comportment. Regardless of 
this, we are obliged to assist them. 
 
Nussbaum‘s point is that the obligations that society owes such individuals can 
only be understood by appreciating the concept of human dignity. This is because human 
dignity is not tied to an instrumental value or productive capacity of the individual; rather it 
is places human need at the core of its objective. 
367
 It is through the concept of human 
dignity that unites the capability approach with human rights.  The rationale behind 
Nussbaum‘s list of capabilities
368
 is that it seeks to provide an indication of what it means 
to live a life worthy of human dignity, and this is also what human rights are all about. This 
is what Nussbaum means when she suggests that the capability approach is ―one species of 
a human rights approach and human rights are often linked in a similar way to the idea of 
human dignity‖.
369
  Like human rights, it is possible to generate cross-cultural agreement 
on what these capabilities ought to be, and the processes of definition should always be left 
to open-ended processes that will always be subjected to constant revision 
 
It is the link between human rights and human dignity that provides a further link to 
human suffering. According to Williams, it is this vital need to improve the quality of life 
and alleviate human suffering – through the protection of human dignity. And this is what 
underpins the three generations of human rights – that is, the civil and political rights, 
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social, economic and cultural rights and solidarity or group rights. The alleviation of 
suffering from the loss of human dignity is, for him, the rationale behind the various 
discourses that make up human rights. Beginning with the first generation of human rights 
(civil and political rights); the need to alleviate human suffering was the key rationale 
behind the emergence of the current human rights discourse, as it was provoked by the 
French and American revolutions.   Even so, these revolutions were founded on a weak 
conception of humanity, in that it was not inclusive to all human beings. In response to 
this, Williams insists that the failure to embrace all human beings is not the same with the 
failure to understand suffering as constitutive of human rights.  As exclusive as the concept 
of humanity may have been, the recognition of suffering was still one of the founding 
ideals of human rights.  
 
Even if one accepts Williams‘ argument, it is difficult to understand the distinction 
between the denials of humanity from denials of suffering. The implication is that the 
misery of slaves, ex-colonies or those one considers not fully human today does not 
amount to suffering because their humanity was, or is questionable.
370
  A more plausible 
defence of the first generation of human rights is perhaps considered when Williams 
suggests that it is usually the application, ―or lack of it, of those human rights that betrayed 
the connection (to suffering) not the conception or its widespread allure‖.  
371
  Human 
rights are simply not human rights, says Williams, if they are conceptualised with the aim 
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of endorsing suffering.  Although certain human beings were not capable of bearing human 
rights, this should not deter us from understanding that human suffering was the core 
theme behind the birth of human rights.  
 
A much easier connection between human rights and human suffering can be seen 
from the second generation of rights (economic, social and cultural rights). Williams 
develops much of his arguments here from the work of Upendra Baxi, 
372
 who has for long 
been a passionate advocate of the importance of human suffering in human rights 
discourse. Picking up from Baxi, Williams argues that second generation rights were 
designed to address multiple forms of ―deliberate cruelty to ‗indirect‘ oppression of both 
individuals and communities‖.
373
 This, of course, includes the deprivation of food or 
housing, which ought to be given utmost priority or great urgency. It also includes the third 
generation (collective or group rights) human rights, which have been defined by the need 
to alleviate human suffering. It consists of the elimination of different kinds of harms from 
groups who lack development or those who suffer from one form of discrimination or the 
other. The protection of the environment is also implicit here, quite apart from suffering or 
poverty occasioned by the world economic order. 
 
Such arguments are all good, but this perspective to human rights is not really 
appreciated in mainstream discourse. This anxiety is perhaps what underpins Baxi‘s 
seminal critique of human rights discourse for not taking human suffering seriously.  It is 
what Baxi‘s critique brings to light, that is, human suffering is what human rights discourse 
importantly misses today. In fact he even goes further in showing how human suffering is 
sometimes entrenched in human rights discourse.  This is facilitated by international law, 
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which is not only complicit, but also disavows the significance of human suffering. Baxi 
says international law achieves this through distinctions between law of war and law of 
peace, the effect of which is that they restrict the language of suffering to war times. 
Obligations to ameliorate suffering are by far stronger in conditions of war than they are in 
peacetime situations, even in situations which may bear a family resemblance.  Similarly, 
whilst the notion ‗violation‘ is implicit in human rights, the consequences of violations, 
however, are not the same in times of peace-times as they are in times of war.  Yet, 
―conditions of extreme impoverishment, forced labour, systematically organised rape 
through sex trafficking, child labour, planned displacement of peoples in the name of 
development‖
374
, are all grave enough to warrant war-like obligations and penalties for 
their breach. This is not helped by notions of ―sovereign self-determination‖
375
, which at 
times fail to guarantee people‘s rights to self-determination by ―shielding acts of fraud, 
force, tyranny and terror‖.
376
   
 
As a more specific example of how international law is complicit in this respect is 
how international human rights law has itself contributed to the disavowal of human 
suffering. This is, of course, a huge claim, which can only be understood from Baxi‘s 
distinction between modern and contemporary human rights discourse. What he means is 
that there are two distinct human rights discourses – that is, the modern and contemporary 
human rights discourse. For Baxi, it is the modern human rights discourse that has failed to 
take suffering seriously. And modern human rights discourse is rooted in the ―modern 
liberal ideology‖ 
377
 which not only justified but sustained the invisibility of human pain 
and suffering. Except for the strong prohibition of suffering in situations of war, modern 
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human rights discourse permitted the imposition of great dimensions of suffering as ―just 
and right in the pursuit of a Eurocentric notion of human progress.‖ 
378
 At the heart of this 
logic was the exclusion of millions from human rights at the stages of its formation: 
 
Making human suffering invisible was the hallmark of modern human rights formations. Suffering 
was invisible because of the large masses of colonised peoples were not regarded as human or 
because a considerable number of human beings were regarded as not fully human, the need of 
tutelage. Although sentient objects of conquest and subjects of European property rights regimes, 
the colonial subject was closer to the order of things or beasts whose suffering was not sufficiently 
important to trump the career of the Enlightenment project. Indeed their suffering had no voice, no 




Fortunately, there is a more recent and inclusive human rights discourse. Contemporary 
human rights discourse emerges from different sources; it is not restricted to articulations 
of domestic or international law.  It privileges lived experiences of ‗communities in 
struggle and resistance‘ as its main authors. It does not deny the juridical origins of human 
rights, but at the same time, challenges dominant State centred human rights discourse as 
being the only source of authorship. Human rights, in his formulation are conceived as 
articulations of the ‗voices of the suffering‘, which are variegated and to say the least, not 
―gifts of the West to the Rest.‖ 
380
  Pivotal to this vision of human rights are ways an ethic 




But moving back to Williams, he suggests further that, not only is the alleviation of 
suffering a necessity, it is also something implicit in the human rights texts.  It is however 
not something that is always grasped through law. This is why Williams suggests that texts 
can only tell us so much, and because of this, we must endeavour to look beyond text into 
actual practices to see how they can take suffering seriously. He is saying that we must also 
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not relent from subjecting human rights practice to critical scrutiny, especially when 
actions are taken in the name of suffering.
382
  After all, it is the actual practices of 
alleviating suffering, not simply the language in human rights texts that establish the 
connection between human rights and suffering. The ability of human rights texts can only 
be determined by the way in which they concretely respond in practice. This is the only 




These insights are undoubtedly a useful way of understanding how the role of 
human rights can facilitate recognition and responses to various kinds of suffering.   The 
following analysis illustrates just how human rights thinking might come to broaden its 
concerns to suffering. It demonstrates how this ought to be taken into account if human 
rights are to provide the moral authority for the reform of electricity in the Third World. 
The attention paid to the relief of suffering as the central theme of human rights is likely to 
be more effective in connecting to the lives of the poor. If suffering is taken seriously then 
human rights might help draw attention to the value of electricity due to our distinct 
characteristics of humanity.  
 
If we accept that the nature and content of the reforms are a regrettable necessity, it 
is then difficult to imagine how the post-reform matters of regulation and consumer 
protection can be performed without an ethical language of human rights to underpin such 
activities. It is implausible to think of how decisions on ensuring affordability of electricity 
can be sensitively taken without the goal of alleviating suffering in mind, especially 
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because of its relational effect on poverty.   It is only then that regulatory mechanisms can 
improve the provision of electricity to the poor as well as address other social objectives, 
such as reducing risks to public health and safety.   
 
One does not require a distinct right to electricity to appreciate the value of this 
argument, even if – as discussed in chapter one – there is a plausible argument of the 
existence of such right.
384
 Even in the absence of such right, it is still possible to make a 
claim for electricity through human rights. This is from the understanding of human rights 
as a moral language that presides over electric sector or other reforms.  Seen this way, 
electricity might not just be understood as a material good, but as a precondition for human 
survival. It is not something that we gain when we qualify as consumers.  As such, human 
suffering provides the virtuous link with how thinking about human rights can be much 
more rewarding if it serves as the cause for action. 
 
5.1. Human Suffering 
Proposing a deeper engagement with the concept of human suffering is only the first step 
towards understanding how human rights can enable electricity, and other essential 
economic and social rights. A further approach that orients and directs either our moral 
vision or behavioural capacity needs to be introduced to support the arguments above. This 
is both important and difficult if one is to understand how human suffering can better be 
appreciated in human rights discourse. As noted from the outset of this thesis, it especially 
requires something that assists us to recognise what is not readily obvious. It is true that 
cases of extreme suffering can easily become aware to us, but there are many situations 
that we often fail to see.  It is perhaps what Williams‘ has called sufferance – conditions of 
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suffering which are permissible or not visible to the keen observer. As such, it is not 
enough to say that human rights should pay attention to human suffering without at least 
equipping them with the proper tools to achieve this.  There is a hint of this possibility 
from the work of Simone Weil, even though she attached ethical importance to the 
language of love and compassion in dealing with such questions. For her, the power of love 
possessed superior epistemic qualities to help us see and respond to different forms of 
human suffering.  This superiority of love is uniquely demonstrated by her concept of 
attention – that is, the act of embracing the pain of the afflicted. Her concept of attention is 
something that helps us remain detached, not preconceiving a particular situation, so as to 
understand it on its own terms. In doing so, it encourages us to understand our obligations 
to the afflicted in ways that are unmatched by other moral discourses.   
 
To recall, Weil does not reject human rights per se, but placed them in a secondary 
place. Human rights, for her, had less significance than compassion and love.  The main 
point of departure from Weil is that the approach here does not prioritise one of these 
concepts over the other; rather it makes a case for a more balanced relationship between 
human rights and love. Most importantly, it makes a case for love in human rights. My 
reasoning for this is simple. It is misleading to think that a framework of justice founded on 
love alone is sufficient enough to deal with many of the current problems in the world 
today. It is fair to say that love or compassion does not in any way challenge or upset the 
system that creates poverty or suffering, even though it might importantly assist provide 
relief to those affected by such deprivations. But it is fair to say that the nature of certain 
problems is such that they also need be challenged through a language of resistance. 





A similar point about the limitations of ethical languages in general is made by Emilios 
Christodoulidis in his provocative essay entitled, Strategies of Rapture.
385
 Without 
engaging a detailed analysis of this essay, this related point – in rather simplistic terms – is 
made through his attempt to grapple with how critical legal and political strategies can defy 
that which they are against in ways that resist co-option. In doing so, he challenges certain 
so-called contemporary legal and political theorists for their tendency to reify dominant 
positions through strategies proposed. One specific criticism he addresses is the use of 
‗ethics, mysticism and escapism‘ in certain strands of critical legal and political thought.  
Sally Wheeler‘s
386
 article on the ‗Ethics in the Workplace‘ is a case in point for 
Christodoulidis. Wheeler focuses on creating a purposive relationship between employee 
and management in such a way that the individuality of the employee assumes priority. 
Wheeler‘s article is developed in light of the contradictions of post-Fordism and changes in 
the workplace, some of which – considered in the previous chapter – have affected 
traditional collective bargaining structures and ways of organising. To resolve this 
shortcoming, Wheeler proposes ‗ethically constructed dialogues‘ between the employees 
and management, which in her view will help recognise the value of the employee‘s 
individuality.  As such, Wheeler develops the idea of ethical dialogues from the philosophy 
of Levinas. This ethical turn, Christodoulidis argues, not only weakens the ability of 
workers to protect the dignity of their labour, but it also implies conformity to the violence 
of market capitalism: 
In responding to the main sources of private vulnerability under market conditions, the insecurity of 
everyday life, the precariousness of employment, the hazards of flexible labour markets, the abuses of 
managerial discretion, there is nothing the ethics of the ‗other‘ can offer to refuse the market, except 
offer up association to accumulation. Just as there is nothing that the language of ‗apora‘, ‗diremptia‘ or 
the ‗broken middle‘ can offer legal strategy. Nothing except humility and humility is perhaps not the 
appropriate response to global wretchedness; to a capitalism that, in Negri‘s terms, ‗reigns idiotic and 
triumphant‘ corrupt, arrogant and incapable of self-criticism.387 
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Provocative words, without doubt, but what does he propose as the alternative?  First, 
Christodoulidis sees more potential for law to address these questions in light of what he 
suggests as its potential for emancipation. Christodoulidis seems to be suggesting that there 
is something paradoxical about law. It is multi-dimensional, and this is what 
Christodoulidis means when he suggests, ―what law has silenced will return in the 
modalities of responsiveness and questionability‖. 
388
 It leaves a remainder which offers 
potential for emancipation, especially from other possible but harmful interpretations. 
What he is speaking about is also a feature of human rights.  There is always a multiple 
dimension to human rights, so, whilst they may function as part of a hegemonic discourse, 
they also offer scope for inclusion by providing the tools to challenge exclusions. This is 
because human rights ―cannot be contained or exhausted in one determinate content‖.
389
 
Again, this is what Christodoulidis means when he suggests:  
 
...even in the most successful co-option of human rights, and impetus in the aspiration – to protect 
dignity, personality, speech, whatever – that disturbs every actualisation and thus, intriguingly, leaves 
the right standing above (beyond) and against its institutionalisation.390 
 
 
The point is that, even if human rights create determinate effects, those determinations can 
never be complete.  They leave something open to be inferred, which in turn provoke other 
potential responses. What Christodoulidis is saying is well-known. In rather simple terms, 
he is speaking about the counter-hegemonic character of human rights. It is how they serve 
to empower vulnerable individual, groups or communities, in ways that assist them resist 
violations, as well as enable dialogues about future claims. It is this appeal that makes 
                                                                                                                                                        






human rights give legitimacy to our moral, political or legal claims in the strongest 
possible terms today.   
 
It must be emphasised though that both authors seem to target different problems, 
in different time frames, and it would be wrong, as a consequence, to juxtapose their 
positions as if they were in opposition to each other. Weil‘s criticisms are quite profound in 
this respect, as they question the ability of human rights to adequately recognise what is 
ordinarily invisible. Christodoulidis‘s concerns are quite different on the other hand; they 
are concerned with strategies – including rights – that can confront or disturb deprivations 
in the world. It is a different concern from Weil and perhaps the one in this chapter as a 
whole – that is, of the epistemic and ethical quality of human rights.  
 
The question from the point of view of this thesis then becomes; are human rights 
inclusive enough – either as a strategic or moral language – to speak for communities of 
suffering?
391
 Do human rights have sufficient resources to recognise all forms of exclusion 
or invisibility in society? This is, of course, a prior question to the one Christodoulidis is 
concerned about – that is, the question of strategy. Put this way, then recognising the value 
of human rights does not necessarily preclude the importance of love, compassion or 
charity or other ethical resources.  Human rights and love can indeed have a mutually 
supporting relationship. The point is that there might be a place for love in human rights. A 
useful way of bringing this possibility can be illustrated from the work of Raimond Gaita, 
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particularly his attempt to understand the commonality of humanity.
392
 Broadly speaking, 
Gaita seeks to offer a theory of justice based on what he calls equality of respect. Gaita is 
responding to common practices that render human beings ―invisible, or partially visible, to 
one another‖
393
, the consequence of which is that they fall out of our moral radar. It is 
because of this that he insists that questions of justice cannot be addressed outside deep 
insight into the value of humanity. Individuals cannot get their just deserts or opportunities 
if the value of their humanity is not recognised. Equality of respect as such is a claim that 
exists in all struggles for justice; it underlies all struggles by women, men, blacks or whites 
against different forms of inequity. Equality of respect is an appeal that all victims of 
discrimination either make or seek to make.  And the struggle for social justice is no more 
than a struggle for the equal recognition of the preciousness of one‘s humanity. It is a 
―struggle to make our institutions reveal rather than obscure, and then enhance rather than 
diminish, the full humanity of our fellow citizens‖
394
 It is only in the background of 
equality of respect that one‘s humanity can fully be recognised. It is only then that appeals 
for equal access of goods can be equally and sufficiently recognised.  
 
If almost all injustices in society are rooted in the lack of respect of one‘s humanity, 
then the question that follows on from this is how can we strive to achieve such standards 
of equality or recognise the fullness of individual humanity? This is a difficult question, 
one Gaita dedicates the entire book to address. Not surprisingly, Gaita turns to the work of 
Simone Weil in developing this thesis – that is, her emphasis on love as the ultimate source 
of grasping the preciousness of humanity. This is the point of powerful story of the nun 
working in a mental hospital, a narrative in which the book began.  The nun demonstrated 
what Weil meant by attention in the most inspiring way. She embraced the affliction of the 
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patients in ways that recognised the fullness of their humanity. This was because of the 
kind of love she expressed towards the afflicted. It was the type of love: 
 
[…] of saints, which builds on and transforms that sense of individuality, and in doing so, deepening 
the language of love which compels us to affirm that even those who suffer affliction so severe that 
they have irrecoverably lost everything that gives sense to our lives, and the most radical evil-doers, 





There are obviously different ways of understanding this type of love, one of which is 
parental love, for it is usually – but not always – defined by its unconditionality.
396
  The 
love that parents have for their children is certainly one that cannot rationally be explained. 
Gaita describes it as such, but this can apply to other forms of love:  
The power of human beings to affect one another in ways beyond reason and beyond merit has 
offended rationalists and moralists since the dawn of thought, but it is partly what yields to us that 
sense of human individuality which we express when we say that human beings are unique and 
irreplaceable. Such attachments, and the joy and the grief which they may cause, condition our 
sense of preciousness of human beings. Love is the most important of them.397   
  
As Gaita goes on to argue, even human rights, as with the social and political institutions in 
our societies, are (or should be) founded on such notions of love.  The point is that we can‘t 
appreciate what humanity really is, that is, the preciousness of individuals, without such 
language of love. Gaita is suggesting that if we lose the ability to love, through our 
inability to cultivate it, then it is only likely that we would fail to value human rights. 
Human rights are, after all, about the sanctity of humanity. Gaita‘s argument is importantly 
that love powerfully draws our attention to the richness of human rights:  
...On credit, so [to] speak, from this language of love, we have built a more tractable structure of 
rights and obligations. If the language of love goes dead on us, however, if there are no examples to 
nourish it, either because they do not exist or because they are no longer visible to us, then talk of 
inalienable natural rights or of the unconditional respect owed to rational human beings will seem 
lame and improbable to us. 398   
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It is easy to see that the principle of reciprocity implied in human rights would only make 
sense if we are able to grasp the preciousness of individuals.  If we are unable to then it 
would be difficult to understand why we should refrain from breaching others rights. This 
is only possible through the type of love Gaita speaks about. It not only makes this 
possible, but also our obligations to those outside this circle of reciprocity. This is, of 
course, an explanation of why we are obliged to assist children, the elderly or disabled or 
such others incapable of reciprocating. This possibility would only arise if love is 
interpreted in the sense that Weil herself meant it – that is, as something impersonal, and 
includes strangers. Gaita, however, offers a different explanation. This is indeed the most 
important but yet difficult aspects of Gaita‗s argument. The difficulty is this; how does one 
understand his or her obligations to those one does not love? After all, we cannot be expected 
to love everyone or even if we do, we do not have the ability to love everyone equally. Gaita 
does acknowledges this point when he refers to Kant‘s insistence on having obligations to 
people we do not love. But Gaita demonstrates that even in such situations love is central to 
obligations to those we do not love. The point is that such obligations cannot be appreciated 
directly but indirectly through someone else‘s affection. Those whom we do not love can 
readily become objects of our love if we see them through the eyes of their loved ones. There is 
no better way of understanding this than through referring to parental love again. It is the way 
our emotions are – positively or negatively – provoked at the sight of a parent, who laughs or 
cries as a result of the fortunes or misfortunes of her child. Once again, although Gaita‘s point 
is to show how love is the ultimate source of our moral obligations in which the language of 
rights themselves are built upon, his thesis is used here to emphasise the relationship between 







In considering the challenges presented by the electricity reform in Nigeria, the chapter has 
argued for the inclusion of human rights within the proposals for reform.  This should not 
be misunderstood as a suggestion that human rights would solve all the problems 
encountered by the reform. Rather, human rights can reframe, or better still, shift the 
attention of the reformers to more pertinent questions of exclusion. They can assist to draw 
attention to the relational effect of the lack of electricity, poverty and human suffering. 
From the perspective of this thesis, human rights can – with the help of Simone Weil‘s 
work – encourage reformers to listen – with love – to those most affected, and to develop 
solutions in cooperation, and with their participation. In the subsequent chapters, I would 
state the case for community participation as a way of building more understanding and 
solutions to such problems. This is, after all, an ethos behind community. Gaita‘s work 
above is important for another reason here. It can be used to demonstrate that the ethos of 





































































The main objective of this chapter is to examine and consider how the concept of 
community has featured in human rights discourse. In particular, it explains the 
inadequacies of references to community in both the traditional and more recent market-
based human rights approach. The chapter is a step towards distinguishing and clarifying 
the use of community in this thesis, including how it can contribute to resolving problems 
of electricity and possibly other economic and social rights.  
 
This chapter explains that part of the reason for the inadequate use of community is 
the dichotomy that both concepts invite in attempts to propose them together. This may 
explain the general apathy towards community in human rights discourse,
399
 even though 
certain exceptions exist as indicated above. The use of community – however minimal it 
might be – implies that a relationship with human rights exists, even if it seems to exist 
without proper conceptual justification. It is perhaps best to explain this relationship in 
ontological and sociological terms. Ontologically, the relationship is now self-evident and 
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doesn‘t need further justification. Both concepts should be embraced and not questioned 
about their origins, or which value should be prioritised over the other. On the other-hand, 
the relationship can be established empirically, for instance, through sociological analysis 
of every instantiation of the Rights-Based Approaches to Development to explore the 
extent to which it exists in practice, and how it might be improved. Similarly, where it does 
not exist, empirical studies can reveal the possibility of knowing how and when to propose 
it from scratch. Having said that, and also discussed in this chapter, not everyone has 
considered human rights and community in such opposing terms. There is indeed a middle 
ground approach which can provide sufficient conceptual justification for a relationship 
between human rights and community.  
 
The chapter begins with a critique of the existing use of community in human rights 
discourse. It follows on with a discussion of the conceptual differences that have prevented 
more meaningful interaction between both concepts. What follows is a discussion of the 
less dichotomous ways in which both concepts have been proposed. It concludes by noting 
that whilst it may be impossible to eliminate the tension surrounding both concepts, they 
can be reduced by creating avenues for dialogue, such as the proposals for Community 




2. Tales of invisibility   
Human rights (have and continue to) operate as a State-oriented discourse, which 
privileges the rational capacity of individuals to construct and re-construct their reality 
through claims against the State. Human rights are built on a relationship between the State 
as primary duty-holder, and individuals as rights-holders. What this has meant is that the 
possibilities of realising human rights are placed within the potential and limits of State 
179 
 
action.  Consider the debate on economic and social rights as an example.  Such 
discussions are exclusively structured or determined by questions of justiciability.  Most 
discussions are preoccupied with attempts to clarify the content of economic and social 
rights, and furthermore, the role of the judiciary in holding the State accountable for those 
rights.
400
 The focus on economic and social rights has almost exclusively been on formal 
legal sources, judicial opinions and treaties in the attempt to determine the particular levels 
of access, and in this respect, individual entitlement to them. Such discussions have almost 
exclusively focused on litigation, some of which have celebrated the judiciary or judicial 
activism as champions or the only hope for the poor.   
 
Other discussions about economic and social rights raise questions about 
democratic legitimacy, in other words, they question the legitimacy of the judiciary in 
dealing with such problems.  Closely related to this are questions of the technical 
competence of the judiciary in carrying out these objectives, such as the allocation of 
resources, setting priorities, or initiating policies to enable access to economic and social 
rights. These debates have different variations; nevertheless, they concentrate on the role of 
law in enforcing economic and social rights against the State.  Law and the State are the 
only avenues available for the impoverished and vulnerable.  The debate neglects other 
possible ways of achieving economic and social rights, especially those that fall out of such 
formal institutional arenas.   There is a failure to constitute other avenues in which these 
rights can be achieved. In circumstances where economic and social rights are non-
justiciable (like the case of Nigeria, for instance) the obvious agitations have been the need 
to legally formalise these rights through various domestic constitutional and legal 
initiatives. It is often argued that the fact that there are numerous problems with enforcing 
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economic and social rights (as in the case of India, South Africa and Brazil) should not be a 
detraction from realising that making such rights justiciable may provide the only hope for 
the poor to enable them enjoy basic standards of life.  
 
More recently, markets are now considered as alternative means of transformation 
in human rights discourse. Economic-globalisation – and the challenges it has mounted on 
the State-oriented human rights system – has been key to this development. The effects are 
well-known and globalisation has contested the centrality of the State in providing 
economic and social rights. These developments are mainly facilitated through the set of 
policy formulations owing to the financial or economic obligations of States arising from 
the Bretton Woods framework. Whilst the BWIs are outside the authority of the current 
human rights normative order, they, nevertheless, programmatically structure human rights 
through their role over development.    The Rights-Based Approaches – as will be seen in 
the next section – now normatively structure this relationship by integrating norms and 
principles of human rights in plans, policies and processes of development.   
 
The BWIs on their own part have increasingly encouraged the privatisation of 
economic and social rights or, as it were, public goods.  As already seen from earlier 
chapters, neoliberal policies like the concept of good governance have continued to 
reconcile roles for markets and human rights, the effect of which is that markets are often 
considered as an alternative means through which certain economic and social rights can 
be realised.  The market is considered as a legitimate alternative framework, given that 
human rights discourse generally takes a neutral view of markets.
401
 To recall, the most 
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visible threat to human rights in this respect emerges from the advent of national and 
transnational private actors, i.e., TNCs. TNCs have continued to profit from the absence of 
any meaningful legal means to hold them accountable for human rights violations. It is 
obvious that the current State oriented human rights system is no longer sufficient to 
grapple with the threats to the system. Such distortions have taken many forms and 
provoked calls to re-think the contemporary human rights obligations systems. Even the 
more recent trend towards the privatisation of human rights has not altered its State-centred 
outlook.  It fails to impose duties and obligations on private or non-State actors for the 
breach of human rights. Instead, it places obligations on the part of States to prevent 
private actors from committing such harms.    
 
2.2. Development’s turn to human rights 
As stated from the outset, the foremost attempt to establish a role for community within the 
human rights normative framework emerges from the protracted declaration of the Right to 
Development (DRD).
402
  The DRD emerged from a view that equates the lack of 
development to a violation of human rights, and more so, as a contravention of the 
universality of human rights. The DRD is considered as both an individual and collective 
right, which seeks to facilitate equal access to natural resources, goods and services in 
different Third World societies.  The Right to Development affirms the indivisibility of 
human rights, as it recognises the importance of civil and political rights in simultaneous 
terms with economic and social rights. The DRD emerged, in part, as an attempt to assert a 
right of all to participate and contribute to their own development. At the period it 
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emerged, it was considered ground-breaking, given its unique attempt to assert a right of 
peoples to self-determination, which also implied peoples‘ entitlements to their natural 
wealth and resources. Rajagopal captures the optimism that greeted the emergence of the 
DRD: 
…[I]t powerfully introduced the right of communities into the human rights-corpus, which remained 
focused on individuals. This had an immediate resonance among grassroots movements in the Third 
World, as it enabled them to use the language of human rights to protest against violence against their 
communities….it opened up the entire meaning of development, which had heretofore meant 
economic growth, national development, and individual entitlements. Now, communities would 




As enthusiastic as these words may sound, they remain at best an aspiration, given that the 
Right to Development has never really materialised beyond its declaratory status.   
Moreover, beyond mentioning the right of peoples over their natural resources, the notion 
of community itself has not really been expanded upon.  Beyond occasional references to 
community, the right does not articulate any definition, scope, nature or the level of 
community involvement implied.
404
 Whilst the DRD can be considered as a foundation for 
the role of community in human rights discourse, it still does not go far enough to properly 
establish this.  
 
Quite apart from that, the emergence of the Right to Development raised more 
questions than answers. It excluded questions of the enforcement of this right, given that 
the obligations for ‗rights of peoples‘ are vested in the international community. The 
controversial issue of rights vis-à-vis duty-holders also re-emerges in this context, which 
still remain unsettled today. In other-words, who is the right-holder or duty-bearer of the 
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Right to Development? The right has been open to several other criticisms, 
405
including 
from the Third World where it received the greatest support.  For example, Issa Shivji
406
 
has questioned the conceptual basis of this right – that is, its failure to clarify what is 
actually meant by development.   At the risk of simplifying Shivji‘s position, he argues that 
the Right to Development reinforces the traditional State centred approach to human rights, 
and thereby reinforcing the hegemony of the State.   
 
Much of the principles that underpin the DRD have now been accommodated under 
the framework of the Rights Based Approaches to Development. As earlier mentioned, the 
Rights Based Approaches provide the legal framework to operationalise development by 
integrating it with norms and principles of human rights.  In other words, it has been 
proposed to provide a ―conceptual framework for the process of human development that is 
normatively based on the international human rights standards and operationally directed to 
promoting and protecting human rights‖.
407
 The Rights-Based Approaches draw from the 
wide array of international human rights treaties and declarations, as a way 
operationalising, planning and programming development.  It is underpinned by principles 
of equality, equity, accountability, empowerment and participation. The last two principles 
give some indication of the recognition of the role of community. Even so, the Rights-
Based Approaches do not clearly articulate a theory of community. Like the Right to 
Development, the Right-Based Approaches are at best an inspiration for, and not an actual 
theory of community.  Nevertheless, there is more implicit acceptance of community when 
the Rights-Based Approaches propose that they seek to empower people with the 
―capacities, capabilities and access needed to own lives, improve their own communities 
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and influence their own destinies‖.
408
  Furthermore, the Rights-Based Approaches suggest 
that empowerment is only possible in an atmosphere where ―communities, civil society, 
minorities, indigenous peoples, women and others‖ 
409
can participate in an ―active, free 
and meaningful‖
410





 it must be substantive.  
 
In terms of the application of these principles, international development 
institutions (including the Bank), have interpreted the Rights-Based Approaches quite 
differently.   Given that much of this thesis has been concerned with the role of the Bank, 
the focus here is on how it has embraced the Rights-Based Approaches.  Not surprisingly, 
the Bank has interpreted this through its market-friendly approach to human rights.  With 
particular reference to community, it has only recently been recognised by the emergence 
of the CDF. To briefly recall its emergence, it features as part of the broad approach to 
civil society. Grievances for inclusion and participation were part of the reasons for the 
emergence of the CDF.  It emerged as a result of the effects of the SAPs, which were quite 
diverse and also well-documented today.  Participation in its broadest of senses became the 
main grievance, especially as a means of bringing the main decision-making processes 
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The Bank‘s CDF or the second-generation reforms are all part of the response to these 
questions. With the introduction of ideas about dispersed forms of governance, the BWIs 
have attempted to create a new order which includes the State, market and civil society. It 
is an attempt to create a non-hierarchical ordered society, which entails the participation of 
all.   Regardless of this, the approach – as discussed in chapter two – can be criticised for 
constraining claims for inclusive participation by privileging market oriented forms of 
participation, particularly through a narrow conceptualisation of civil society. The 
neoliberal concept of civil society is quite distinct from other ways of thinking of the 
concept, for instance, like the republication concept of civil society.  Unsurprisingly, 
participation is selective as opposed to inclusive.
414
 It is based on a principle of selection, 
which selects certain actors, interests or voices, and leaves out the most excluded of voices. 
It is to say the least an instrumentalised version of participation; it is not far-reaching in its 
articulation.  
 
The role – and definition – of community in the Bank‘s development framework is 
best understood within the climate described above. Not surprisingly, the neoliberal 
argument almost exclusively draws compatibility between community and the market 
economy.
415
  The primary objective for the promotion of community is to draw upon its 
normative resources to achieve economic growth and profit. The values of community are 
not promoted on their own merit; they are promoted because they add value to the market. 
For the Bank, markets do not impede but complement community.  Whilst it is impossible 
to rule out instrumental relationships in community, there is obviously a difference 
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between instrumental and exploitative relationships. The problem with the neoliberal view 
is the danger that instrumental relationships of the market would overwhelm members of 
community and thus, translate into exploitative relationships. This explains why the 
community is not merely an association.  A community is distinct from an association 
because it is not formulated to pursue an instrumental agenda.
416
 Most common interest 
associations are defined by instrumental gain and exclusive to those who are allowed to 
participate. Membership of an association is never open to all and participation is tied to a 
precondition. It is in certain cases tied to the payment of a membership fee. For the idea of 
community promoted in chapter six, the only condition for participation is being resident in 
a given local neighbourhood. The organising principle for this community is not 
determined by instrumentality nor race, religion, ethnicity, colour or gender.  It starts from 
exactly opposite premise; it is not (and should not) be about the pursuit of profit.  
 
The origins of this instrumental view of community can be traced to Robert 
Putman‘s ideas about social capital. This refers to the networks of trust and co-operation 
within and between communities, which might have an effect on improving societal 
problems. 
417
 It refers to the ability of individuals to create relationships both within and 
between other communities.  In neoliberal development discourse, social capital is the 
bundle of values from which people can draw to improve their incomes, and which can be 
‗built‘ to facilitate economic growth and development.  The work of Francis Fukuyama
418
 
has expanded on these perspectives by trying to show how social capital can be a source 
for building trust in society, a prerequisite, in turn, for economic growth.  Social capital 
                                                 
416 For a distinction between community and association, see, Little A. The Politics of Community: Theory 
and Practice, Edinburgh University Press, 2002, at 61-62.  
417  Putman R. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 1993, 
at 167. Putman R. ‗Bowling Alone: America‘s Declining Social Capital‘, 6, Journal of Democracy, 1995, at 
65-78. See, Putman R (ed.), Democracy in Flux; The evolution of social capital in Contemporary Society, 
Oxford University Press, 2002.  
418 Fukuyama F. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Penguin, 1996.  
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and trust are defined by the traditional values of cooperation, integrity, and reciprocity that 
exists within community.  Social capital depends on trust in a society and is created 
through cultural mechanisms like religion, culture or tradition. These are indeed very 
persuasive arguments that cannot simply be dismissed. The problem however begins with 
the unproblematic conflation of social capital, trust and the market economy, on the other 
hand.  In doing this, Fukuyama succeeds in instrumentalising community by recognising it 
only as a means to achieve economic growth.  The market becomes compatible and not a 
source of distortion of communal values. This view doesn‘t seem to recognise any 
problems between the ethos of market and community.  It even goes to the extent to 
suggest that markets can extend community values. The market economy is considered a 
source for trust and social capital in community. There is something normative about 
markets, which extends beyond its traditional function of the distribution and redistribution 
of goods.   
 
The unhealthy market-friendly conceptualisation of community is not the only 
difficulty with the Bretton Woods approach. A different but equally important difficulty is 
that very little has been done to expand what the community really means. The concept of 
community is arguably the most weakly defined concept within the agenda; it has certainly 
not received the same attention as the market or State. This is perhaps because the role for 
community has not been thought out in a programmatic way and circumscribed to projects, 
which are not only limited in scope, but also in time scale. The only attempt to define 
community in the entire Bretton framework emerges from the series of Community–Based 
Development (CDB) and Community Driven Development (CDD)
419
 projects, the aim of 
                                                 
419  The CBD are projects that involve the beneficiaries at the stages of design, whilst the CDD are projects 
that beneficiaries have control more control over key decisions, such as the management and investment of  
funds. For more details, see; Masuri G and Rao V. Community-Based and Driven- Development: A critical 
Review, World Bank Policy Research Paper 3209, 2004.  
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which is allegedly to give the poor more control over their aspirations for development.  As 
the Bank has claimed, the CDD and CBD projects are underpinned by ―principles of local 
empowerment, participatory governance, demand-responsiveness, administrative 
autonomy, greater downward accountability, and enhanced local capacity‖.
420
  In terms of 
its definition, the community is described as a culturally or politically homogeneous entity 
– a village or urban neighbourhood – or an administratively defined territory.  Quite apart 
from that, the Bank also recognises ―specific common interest group, such as herder‘s 
associations, irrigation associations, or associations of street vendors‖
421
 as community.  
An initial difficulty with the above is that it seems to conflate the understanding of 
association with community, which (as already discussed) are quite distinct concepts.  
Associations can, of course, become communities constituted of groups unaffected by 
instrumentality.
422
 But this is not the case with all associations and it is difficult to see how 
associations would be constituted by the same sort of virtues that exist in community.  
Individuals are often members of associations to pursue their parochial interests. For 
purposes of the broad objective of this thesis (and as will become clearer in the next 
chapter), it is problematic to conceive a regime of ownership or management of public 
goods on the basis of common interest groups, and more specifically, outside a given 
locality.  Without appreciating this, the sphere of participation would itself be characterised 
by groups who are driven by their parochial interests, quite apart from strong bonds of 
association which have the tendency to exclude others.   
 
                                                 
420 Ibid. 
421 See, Binswanger-Mkhize H.P et al (eds.) Scaling up Local and Community Driven Development: A real 
world guide to its theory and practice, World Bank Group, 2009, at 3. 
422 Paul Hirst‘s thesis on ‗communities of choice‘ is an illustration of how an association can become of a 
community. See, Hirst P. Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance, Polity 
Press, 1994, at 49-59. 
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This difficulty highlighted above leads to a further problem with the Bank‘s view of 
community. There is quite a visible attempt to describe the community in terms of 
homogeneity. Apart from common interest associations, the community is defined as an 
internally cohesive administrative unit in a village or urban community. It is true that a 
village may be constituted by groups with very similar identities – that is, ethnicity, tribe, 
language or culture. A metropolitan neighbourhood or community, however, cannot be 
understood as such. On the contrary, it is constituted by members with multiple or 
overlapping communal identities. A more detailed discussion of this is provided in chapter 
six.
423
 The internally cohesive community the Bank imagines does not make sense where 
relationships within such boundaries do not reflect homogeneity. The point in raising this is 
not to suggest that rural communities are not important. Far from it, the point is to show 
that the Bank‘s practice of community development creates a cleavage between rural and 
urban communities. The difficulty is that it has an effect of excluding the poor in urban 
communities from egalitarian solutions. There is a further point about metropolitan 
communities, which will be emphasised in the next chapter. It is that the complexity and 
multiplicity of identities within metropolitan communities is a useful way of moving away 
from problematic single based definitions of community.  Be that as it may, there may be a 
logical explanation why the Bank defends this view. This seems implicit in the Banks 
application and practice of community development, even though it is stated otherwise at 
the policy level. Most references to community in a recent review of the Bank‘s the 
CBD/CDD projects seem to give emphasis to villages or rural communities.
424
 The Bank‘s 
practice of community is best understood through the famous distinction between 
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 Etzioni describes these as contemporary communities, not only composed by a network of communities, 
but also where membership is not restricted to one type of community. See, Etzioni A. ‗Old Chestnuts and 
New Spurs‘ in Etzioni A. (ed.) New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, Virtues, Institutions, and 
Communities, University of Virginia Press, 1995.  
424 See Binswanger above n 422.  
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Gemeinschaft (community) and Gessellschaft (society).
425
 Gemeinschaft refers to a rural or 
village community defined by its specific of tradition or family values. This is distinct from 
Gessellshchaft, which offers a broader spectrum for a wider range of relationships typical 
of  urbanisation and modernisation. Modernisation is often criticised because it is believed 
to destroy the values of kinship and co-operation that makes Gemeinschaft distinct.  The 
advent of modernity and the accompanying processes of urbanisation are considered as a 
threat to community.  
 
In theory, whilst the Bank‘s good governance reforms are purportedly shaped by 
the Rights-Based Approaches to Development, this is, however, not very visible at the 
level of practice.  This leads to a more profound problem from the perspective of this thesis 
– that is, there are no concerted attempts to make a connection with community within 
debates about human rights. This difficulty can be traced from the origins of human rights 
as none of the foundational documents, declarations, treaties or theories that underpin 
human rights, formulate or propose a role for community. As noted from the outset, other 
disciplines have paid more attention to the potential of community, one of which is 
development discourse. Given its continuing overlap with human rights, it is possible to 
argue that it applies to the former. Even then, questions of inadequacies of definition of 
what the community in development discourse still have to be addressed, as this seems to 
have been taken for granted.  
 
It is argued that no approach, either in human rights or development discourse, that 
seeks to transform lives in the Third World, can successfully achieve their objectives, 
without properly addressing what goes on in spaces that constitute part of everyday life. At 
                                                 




the risk of generalisation, a great range of problems are connected to the lack of a 
comprehensive approach to community. The need for theoretical and practical 
reconsideration of community is more urgent than it ever has been before. In Nigeria, for 
instance, the current violence in the Niger-delta region or the over 10,000 deaths since 
1999 due ethno-religious and communal violence, or the poor service delivery due to the 
undemocratic nature of the country‘s social, economic and political institutions are all 
indications of the need for, or the break-down of community.  A large number of these 
problems can be dealt with if the State loosens its grip on society.  Before looking at the 
conditions of possibility in chapter six, it is important to understand the debates that have 
prevented a balanced understanding of community and human rights.  These debates help 




Although the main objective of this thesis is to show how community can strengthen the 
pursuit of human rights, it is equally necessary to understand the constitutive role human 
rights can have on community.  It is fair to say that, without some form of basic rights, it 
would seem impossible to maximise diverse opinions within or between individuals in 
community. Minority voices need access to a broad range of rights to articulate their 
positions without fear of intimidation. Without being exhaustive, these rights would 
include the classical civil and political rights like political participation, freedoms of 
expression, association or rights against discrimination in order to achieve socio-economic 
rights.  The difficulty with this proposal is the dichotomy between both concepts. These 
observations are succinct with regards international human rights legal discourse.  
Comparatively speaking, this situation is quite different from the human rights literature in 
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other disciplines like in sociology
426
 and political theory, 
427
 where the importance of 
community – either for or against human rights – has received some attention.  This apathy 
towards community is indeed not surprising in light of debates which have traditionally 
conceived these concepts in oppositional terms.  On the one hand, human rights, thanks to 
liberalism, are often said to be at odds with community. This is because they increasingly 
instrumentalise relationships by fuelling vested interests, narcissism or separating 
individuals from all social ties – be it family, community or the society as a whole.
428
  
Rights presuppose conflict since they encourage selfish competition amongst individuals in 
society.
429
  The point is that if rights are constitutive of individual interests, it only follows 
that it not only distorts the values of community, but also the reciprocal moral 
responsibility that makes community distinct.    
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428 These views originate from criticisms of John Rawls Theory of Justice by Michael Sandel, Alasdair 
McIntyre and Charles Taylor.  Such criticisms have become a reference point for communitarian thought in 
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individualism in the context of terrorism laws and security. The proposed British Bill of Rights and 
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that it seeks to ―end the me society in which an unbridled focus on our individual rights and liberties 
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British law, but they are usually never emphasised. The effect of this is that it has led to ―a selfish and 
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in raising the UK bill of rights and responsibilities runs much deeper than pointing out the compatibility of 
rights and responsibility. It is also useful in showing the compatibility between rights and community. The 
green paper traces this relationship between both concepts to a number of sources, including ideas of 
Aristotle in ancient Greek philosophy on individual responsibility, virtue, community and civic friendship.  
The green paper also makes references to contemporary political communitarian thought, especially the work 
of Amitai Etzioni who characterises individual responsibility to community as a civic virtue. Interestingly, it 
makes passing reference to African philosophy, where the fulfilment of duties to community is not only a 
condition of membership, but also critical to the attainment of human dignity. For details, see; Ministry of 
Justice. Rights and Responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework, Ministry of Justice, 2009, at 
14-15.  See also, The Guardian, 24th March 2009.   
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Community can also be criticised for being at odds with individual rights.  Whilst there are 
many ways of defining community – either as a political, ethnic, religious or cultural 
community – individual rights are inexplicable from communal values.  As such, 
community and its social institutions often take precedence over the individual.  With 
values of trust, reciprocity, solidarity and tradition, it is often said that individual rights 
have less importance in community. This is because the emphasis on individual rights can 
detract individuals from recognising reciprocal duties one owes others in community.  
There are, of course, dangerous consequences of the undeniable tension between individual 
and collective autonomy, especially profound implications of the lack of differentiation 
within community. One of the profound limitations of the concept of community is that it 
tends to exclude plurality, amongst other things. It tends to totalise differences, and reduce 
them into some form of unconditional homogeneity.
430
 It is a commonplace theme that the 
individual within such communities is more often unintelligible from outside this 
framework; individuals are only recognisable as a constitutive part of the group. This, of 
course, has far reaching implications on the plurality and diversity of our humanity itself. 
Moreover, these implications seem even further reaching as individuals are not only 
capable of becoming invisible, but also of the reverse effect. It is indeed very often the 
experience that community tends to collapse into the individual.
431
  This is often witnessed 
in patriarchal societies, religious sects or political parties, where the plurality within the 
community is reduced into the leader‘s individuality and charismatic qualities. A further 
anxiety over community is that it is often characterised by extremely closed bonds of unity 
such that it fails to be open itself to inclusion. There is a great deal that can be said in this 
context about the difficulty of ethnic, tribal, kinship or religious tribal affiliations in  
                                                 
430
  Hardt and Negri‘s concept of the multitude is also a partial reaction to the limitations of community as 
well as concepts of people, which generally often connote moral homogeneity. As such, the multitude is 
different from these because it comprises of multiplicity, which individuality or singularities cannot be 
reduced to a single identity. See, Hardt and Negri above n 67, at 204. 
431  See; Bankowski above n 213, at 18-22. 
194 
 
various  Third and  non-Third World country contexts. Community is celebrated in ways 
that understates the sense of complexity that lies within it, which often makes it vulnerable 
to exclusion.  Quite apart from that, communities have not been able to disassociate 
themselves from unhealthy class structures, which inevitably thwart possibilities of 
substantive equality.  
 
One must understand that both arguments above are correct; human rights and 
community are concepts that will always contradict each other. At the same time, it is also 
true that social intercourse is not possible without human rights or some form of 
community. If this is the case, then it seems to present a paradox, as neither concepts (nor 
the institutions that represent them) can exist in society without each other.  Unfortunately, 
too often in discussions about these concepts is it assumed that each of these values can 
exist independently. It must be understood that human rights are as important to 
community as community is to human rights.   As such, compartmentalising these concepts 
– that is, either human rights or community – ought to be rejected.  A more productive 
approach is thinking of rights and community as mutually supporting and interdependent 
concepts. There is a considerable amount of work along these lines, some of the most 
important of these will be considered in the next part.  But before considering them, it will 
be important to emphasise that the recognition of the limits of community should not be a 
diversion from acknowledging the potential it offers to human rights. The community and 
values it represents can create social harmony to encourage the most deprived in society 
face up to their difficulties.   These are, of course, as a result of the constitutive values of 
common interests, co-operation, friendship, trust and mutual sympathy found in 
community.  This may explain why questions of human rights are not prioritised in 





  Duties of care for the less privileged always serve as the organising principle of 
community. These duties may be understood as the services, conducts or functions that we 
are morally obligated to perform to others.  Duties and responsibility to others arise from 
an appreciation of our shared humanity, which enables us recognise our responsibility to 
assist others in misery. In other words, we have an obligation not to harm them.  It is not 
difficult to see how the proposals for a human rights framework with the alleviation of 
suffering at its core can benefit from community, given the centrality of love to how we see 
and recognise human suffering. Love is indeed one way of recognising the solidarities and 
relationships in community.  But, to understand this further, a stronger case for integrating 
human rights and community needs to be made.  
 
3.1. Bridging the divide 
An inescapable step towards understanding the interdependence of values of human rights 
and community is achieved by rejecting traditional arguments which have obscured the 
possibility of such a relationship.  It is a rejection of arguments that have historically 
considered both concepts in contradictory terms. It is not difficult to understand the 
limitations of such arguments even from this rather simplistic argument. Human rights and 
community are both constitutive of everyday life in any given society.  Whilst societies 
vary on the degree to which they are influenced by these concepts, individuals are in one 
way or the other affected by either community or rights. Community – especially as it is 
used in this thesis – exists in every society, whether it is liberal or non-liberal, Third World 
or First World societies.  The definition of community will obviously vary in every society, 
so will the degree to which individuals are affected by community. Some individuals are 
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more likely to be affected by communal ties or relationships than others. But this is not to 
suggest that they are not affected at all by community. 
 
The same point can be made about human rights. They are also an inescapable 
reality in most societies of the world, even if a noticeable gap may exist between their 
rhetoric and reality.  The point is that like community, human rights are constitutive of 
everyday life.  They affect us, even if the degree to which they do so may be relative. Once 
this point is appreciated, it is possible to recognise why both concepts should be embraced 
rather than rejected.  After all, many commentators rather innocently make references to 
community in speaking about human rights. It is common place to speak about the 
‗international‘ or ‗national‘ or ‗local‘ human rights community.
433
 Yet, the use of the term 
community or its relationship with human rights remains largely unanalysed. 
 
From the above, it is wrong to imagine the individual as an isolated rational being, 
disconnected from family, community and society.  The autonomous liberal individual 
with formal rights cannot deal with social, economic and cultural structures of power, 
inequality or dominance in society. Protagonists of liberalism fail to recognise structurally 
constructed hierarchies and divisions, which in turn prevent the enjoyment of human rights. 
Furthermore, the distinction between private and public spheres made popular by feminist 
theory
434
 illustrates another difficulty with liberal individualism. Specifically, it de-
politicises and de-moralises personal or social relationships by hiding them from the public 
sphere.    
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 One exception here can be found in an article by Maxwell Chibundu, which argues that we cannot 
understand the significance of the international legal order without the notion of community. See, Chibundu 
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  For more insights into these issues, see; Frazer E. The problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and 
Conflict, Oxford University Press, 1999. See also, Frazer E and Lacey N. The Politics of Community: A 
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On the other-hand, as the famous feminist slogan – the ‗personal is political‘ – also helps 
point to the limitations of the communitarian alternative. The dichotomy between public 
and private conceals the political nature of oppression in the private sphere. This, for many 
feminist, takes place in the realms defended by communitarians. Kinship and social 
structures also constitute sites of oppression. It is equally wrong to imagine individual as 
wholly defined by community. This is a point that advocates of community fail to 
recognise. They fail to see the multiple ways in which individuals are socially constructed 
which includes overlapping forms of communal identity, or as Frazer puts it, the transition 
from one community to the other. More so, very little recognition is given by 
communitarians of the importance of power in constructing and reconstructing conditions 
of domination.  
 
3.2. Conceptual and Practical Interdependence 
Beyond rejecting those debates that reinforce differences between community and human 
rights, it is also necessary to understand how the relationship between these concepts can 
also be constituted. As such, an affirmative statement of reconciliation between human 
rights and community needs to be established by showing how both concepts can be 
theoretically and practically interdependent.  Beginning with questions of conceptual 
interdependence; there are perhaps several ways of seeing this but, in this context, the 
focus is on seeing how this might exist through a mutual relationship between rights and 
duties. One must be aware that the right versus duties argument opens up a number of other 
questions, the most notable of which is the extent to which non-human entities, children or 
future generations are capable of bearing rights, since they have no ability to bear duties.  
Regardless of this limitation, it is argued that it is still an important way of establishing the 
conceptual link between human rights and community.  One of the most influential ways of 
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showing this is through Alan Gewirth‘s thesis on the ―community of rights‖.
435
  Amongst 
other things, Gewirth shares the same optimism here that the relationship between rights 
and duties can provide a foundation for a similar relationship between rights and 
community. The community of rights not only aims to reconcile rights and community, but 
also show how this relationship would lead to assisting the poor to satisfy their basic 
economic and social rights. 
436
 The idea of community and values of reciprocity are used to 
emphasise the need for strong governmental intervention to assist the deprived in society.  
What Gewirth is concerned about is exclusively placing such rights within the boundaries 
of the market.  The community of rights is framed to provide the ―moral justification of 
economic and social policies, and institutions, as they help alleviate human suffering‖.
437
 It 
is such policies and institutions embodied in the State that in turn constitute what he calls 
the community of rights.  Gewirth argues that human rights (either positive or negative) are 
held by all individuals by virtue of their humanity. Positive rights require strong 
governmental intervention to remove such harms like poverty or disease. The 
interventionist government does not preclude the possibility of individual action and it 
must also facilitate the creation of what he calls productive individuals with agency.  After 
all, many individuals lack this ability, or the conditions in society do not allow individuals 
to act for themselves.  The community of rights refers to the role of the State in assisting 
the poor or vulnerable to attain a certain degree of well-being.  State action in this context 
is justified on the basis of human rights.  Since rights have positive and negative 
components, this will mean that governments must refrain from executing certain acts that 
cause harm. It may very well mean that positive action on the part of governments in social 
and economic contexts is justified.  The community of rights justifies State intervention not 
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only to remove suffering, but also to increase the abilities of individuals to develop 
capacities of agency.  
 
Whilst he argues that human rights are primarily targeted at protecting individual 
interests, there is a perquisite that in the process of enjoying their rights individuals must 
also act in consideration of others. Although rights are essentially framed with the 
protection of individuals in mind, they also entail certain responsibility towards others.  
Each human being is considered as both a rights-holder and duty-bearer. All human beings 
must be able to claim their rights against others.  An individual must respect the rights of 
others to earn the respect of his or her rights from others.  A principle of social solidarity 
based on a further requirement for mutual respect is inscribed in human rights. Human 
rights are – not as often regarded – merely concerned with personal interests. It is this 
element of mutuality that establishes the link between human rights and community. 
Moreover, the adherence to the principle of mutuality has a transformative effect on 
society; it converts society into a community of individuals whose relationships are defined 
by the mutual recognition of the rights of others. This principle of solidarity inscribed in 
human rights is what constitutes the moral structure of the community of rights. 
 
 There is however a further dimension to this principle of solidarity in human rights 
discourse. It implies the need to create institutions through which individuals can attain 
higher standards of equality. For Gewirth, human rights are primarily moral rights and it is 
this principle of reciprocity that helps individuals build amity with others.  To have human 
rights means that we are inclined to act in certain ways and this only means that we must 
be virtuous to others. Given that all humans are primarily prospective agents, the purpose 
of human rights ought to be to strengthen the capacity of individual agency. What Gewirth 
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means here is that all individuals, including the underprivileged need a supportive 
community to fulfil their human potentials, and this is a further argument for a stronger 
reconciliation between human rights and community. 
 
There is a lot of value in Gewirth‘s arguments, especially on the importance of 
community to attain standards of reciprocity or compassion towards others. This is indeed 
consistent with the arguments in this thesis for institutional frameworks like community 
that can potentially see and respond to human suffering. Aspects of Gewirth‘s points about 
the importance of encouraging self-sufficiency are, of course, very relevant for purposes of 
proposals about the role of community in claiming economic and social rights or, as it 
were, public goods. It must be noted, however, that the reasons for community 
participation that I am concerned about has to be distinguished from the one Gewirth 
himself makes. In no uncertain terms, Gewirth suggests that community is primarily a 
place where the pursuit of self-interest should be achieved. This is perhaps a contradiction 
of his position about the role of community in developing capacities of altruism and 
reciprocity. It begs the question of how mutual recognition can be achieved when the 
starting point of relations are instrumental.  This seems to undo the purpose of articulating 
community in the first place, since all it seems to reassert is the primacy of the individual 
above everything else.  
 
 Looking more generally at the community of rights thesis, although it speaks of the 
importance of enhancing the human agency of the poor in improving the quality of life, it 
seems to exaggerate the role of the State in making this possible. It seems to achieve this to 
the extent that it fails to espouse a theory of community, what it does rather paradoxically 
is that is provides a theory of State.  Of course, Gewirth is referring to a political 
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community, which is indeed descriptive of a State or national community.  Gewirth does 
not offer a vision for small units within the State, i.e., local communities, which can play a 
role in their own self-definition. Apart from being an important means through which the 
dichotomy between human rights and community can be reconciled, the community of 
rights is only a partial resource for the objective of this chapter and furthermore, the thesis 
as a whole.  
 
Alan Gewirth has not been the only one to attempt to bridge the divide between 
human rights and community. Similar attempts have been made to establish this from 
societies with histories and realities outside liberalism. To take one specific example; 
African societies are commonly described as those in which duties to community are the 
only thing that matter.
438
 This view is a partial depiction of the African worldview, if the 
work of African philosopher, Kwame Gyekye
439
 is taken into consideration. Gyekye‘s 
main aim is to respond to views that present African communalism in hostile terms to 
human rights. For him, communal values do not preclude the importance of rights for three 
related reasons.  First, human rights are the only tools in which individuals can assess their 
status and challenge practices of community. These evaluations no doubt entail rights for 
self-determination, which allow individuals to make determinations of what is favourable 
or harmful from the perspective of human potential. More recent arguments have been 
made along these lines that human rights are ways through which communities can 
preserve their common heritage, language, culture or their own visions of development.  
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Secondly, Gyekye argues that the importance of human rights in the African community 
can be established from the concept of human dignity.  This is framed against views that 
suggest that human dignity is something to be earned after the performance of certain 
duties. For Gyekye, human dignity is not solely dependent on the communal structure; it is 
something intrinsically embedded in every individual, and not something that can be taken 
away by community.  Whilst it is true that duties to community are salient aspects of 
African societies, it does not necessarily mean that the attainment of dignity is conditional 
on the performance of duties. Accordingly, human dignity is something that can be 
established in a theistic and non-theistic sense – and this is not constrained by duties.  In 
the theistic sense, human dignity is derived from God as the creator of all humankind. He 
illustrates this point from an Akan maxim from Ghana; ―[A]ll persons are children of God; 
no person is a child of the earth‖.
440
 If all are created by God, it then follows that they are 
worthy of dignity and respect.  Parallels of this theistic view of human dignity can be 
drawn with preamble of the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which in 
similar terms holds that.... ―all men are created equal, they are endowed by their creator 
with certain inalienable rights...‖
441
   The non-theistic conception of dignity is similar to the 
natural rights thesis; it is dependent on human nature, reason and the individual qualities of 
rational judgement, which in turn makes it possible for individuals to flourish.  In other 
words, they are not dependent on duties to community.  
 
Gyekye‘s third point shows that human rights and community are not really 
conflicting concepts.  Similar to the view expressed in this thesis, Gyekye argues that this 
is something that can be established conceptually and practically. Conceptual analysis, he 
argues, can help show the dual nature of individuality. Individuals are both self-
                                                 




autonomous and communal beings. In the same way, individuals must be allowed to freely 
express their rights, which may include their talents and dispositions, and which enable 
them contribute to their cultural development and values of community. In defending this 
view, Gyekye importantly notes that too much emphasis on rights would only promote 
possessive individualism, and the lack of concern for others. He says, ―if I insist on my 
right to all my possessions or to all that has resulted from the exercise of my endowments, I 
may not be able to show sensitivity to the needs and welfare of others, even though 
showing sensitivity to the needs of others is an important plank in the ethical platform of 
communitarianism‖.
442
   As such, one must be aware of the danger of transcending into 
self-centredness as a negative consequence of rights. Placing too much emphasis on human 
rights can detract us from correlating duties we owe to others.  Although he doesn‘t go as 
far as suggesting this, he is not saying that rights are not important. He seems to allude to 
the need to understand the proper balance between both concepts. It is not a question of 
choosing one value over the other. Instead, rights and duties should be appreciated as 
mutually interdependent concepts.   
 
At the level of practice – or moving onto questions of practical interdependence – 
the work of Thomas Spragens Jr.
443
 is a useful way of showing how human rights and 
community can mutually support each other. His work is generally framed within the 
liberalism versus communitarianism debate, to which he offers a middle ground solution. It 
is a view that recognises the importance of community without excluding insights or 
contributions from liberalism. Spragens Jr. articulates what is called ‗communitarian 
liberalism‘ or rather a ‗communitarian version of liberalism‘. It is a view both committed 
to values of liberalism but at the same time sympathetic with communitarianism. Spragens 
                                                 
442 Ibid. 
443 Spragens, Jr, T. ‗Communitarian Liberalism‘ in Etzioni above n 424. 
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Jr.  is not the only one with this view. It is now widely accepted that the divisions between 
the so called liberals and communitarians have largely been embellished. This is a 
sympathetic view of many communitarians like McIntyre, Sandel and Taylor, who are, 
after all, liberals of sorts.  
 
To reconcile the values of liberalism and communitarianism, Spragens, Jr. starts by 
reinstating the normative ideals of liberalism.  These include liberty, equality and most 
importantly, fraternity, which have their origins in the period of the Enlightenment. With 
regards to fraternity, Spragens, Jr.  notes the most difficult problem with contemporary 
liberalism is that it tends to ignore this value. To use his words contemporary liberalism 
ignores the importance of ―civic friendship within a flourishing community‖
444
 in society. 
This is what fraternity makes possible; it makes it possible to look beyond the morally 
autonomous individual, which is prioritised by liberalism. Rather, fraternity helps the 
individual live a more fulfilled life, especially as a social being actively participating in 
society along with others. It is from an appreciation of the value of fraternity that the 
distance between liberalism and communitarianism can be narrowed.  As Spragens Jr. 
suggests: 
 For that reason, my preferred version of liberalism is quite properly characterizable as 
communitarian. But what makes this normative theory genuinely liberal at the same time is the 
insistence that civic friendship cannot be attained without extensive equality and those communities 





Seen in this way, it is not difficult to understand how human rights and community can 
exist as mutually reinforcing discourses.  This is something that can easily be established at 
the level of practice by a framework in which vigorous institutions of civil society can be 
                                                 
444  Ibid, at 47. 
445  Ibid.  Chantal Moufe offers a similar but slightly different view. She looks at this from the point of view 
of the dichotomy of liberal and republican ideals of citizenship. She argues that the task is not to replace one 
concept with the other but to draw on their strengths, whilst discarding their weaknesses in building a new 
concept of the citizen.  Mouffe C. ‗Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community‘, in Mouffe C (ed.) 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, Verso Books, 1992.   
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nurtured within the wider body politic. In contrast with views that insist on institutions of 
State and market, civil society is the most important sphere for this idea of ‗communitarian 
liberalism‘. It seeks to empower ―local communities, families, neighbourhoods, churches, 
educational institutions, and civic associations‖
446
 to participate for the common good of 
society.  Whilst not being opposed to the market and State, communitarian liberalism 
acknowledges the detrimental effects they can have on the health of society.  This is why 
the design of social institutions to nurture civic friendship and common purpose is 
pertinent here. Finally and also important, for present purposes, communitarian liberalism 
recognises the importance of individual rights, especially for the protection of minorities in 
society. For Spragens Jr., the design of institutions alone is not sufficient enough to protect 
individuals from the possibilities of domination. As such, subjective rights are needed to a 
large extent in event of such circumstances. Moreover, communitarian liberalism seeks to 
avoid the possible acrimony, which might emerge from the juridification of society by 
creating alternative mechanisms for mediation and reconciliation.  Seen this way, there is a 
strong affinity between communitarian liberalism and theories of deliberative democracy. 
Indeed, protagonists of deliberative democracy, such as Habermas emphasise the 
complementary nature of concepts of human rights and community, even if this is not the 
original aim of his theory. Without really going in to detail here, Habermas‘s
447
 theory of 
deliberative democracy succeeds in reconciling the liberal ideals of rights and popular 
sovereignty, which by implication points to some notion of community. For this purpose, it 
presupposes a constitutional State at the hierarchy of society to guarantee rights of 
individuals to participate in political decision making processes. Some of these insights 
                                                 
446 Ibid. Most communitarians like Etzioni hold a similar view. For him, communities must be empowered 
constitutionally to deal with problems within their neighbourhoods. See, also, Etzioni A. The Spirit of 
Community; Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda, Crown Publishers, 1993.  
447   See, Habermas J. Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press, 1984; Habermas J. Between Facts and 
Norms, MA MIT Press, 1995. 
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will be explored in the next chapter, especially the relationship between theories of human 
rights, deliberative democracy and community.  
 
3.3. Beyond Paternalism  
Let there be no doubt that reconciling differences of values between human rights and 
community will not be easy to achieve.  Conflicts between rights and community are 
expected and there is certainly a need for trade-offs about what values should prevail. This 
requires an atmosphere of negotiation, re-negotiation and compromise, given that it cannot 
be achieved paternalistically. No compromise can be achieved by insisting that one value 
should conform to the other.  There are definitely several ways of understanding how this 
is possible, but the focus here is on Boaventura de Sousa Santos‘s
448
 idea of translation or 
dialogues amongst those with opposing values or between antagonistic viewpoints. Whilst 
it is framed for a very different objective, it is, nonetheless, one of the most helpful ways 
the differences within values that underpin human rights and community can be reconciled.    
 
Santos‘s objective is to understand the plurality of groups and perspectives within 
the World Social Forum (WSF) often composed of local movements and organisations 
from First and Third World countries, with different orientations, practices and objectives.  
Santos begins by asking – what are the possibilities of sustaining truly authentic global 
coalitions, given the multiplicity within the WSF? In Santos‘s well-known work, these 
movements are what he calls subaltern cosmopolitanism, a normative framework proposed 
to capture the diversity of the movements of globalisation from below. Analytically, this 
cannot be understood through a general theory. A general theory cannot capture the 
richness and diversity of the groups or practices that constitutes the WSF. A general theory 
                                                 
448 Sousa Santos BDS. ‗The Future of the World Social Forum: The work of Translation‘, 48(2), 
Development, 2005, at 15-22.  For a similar formulation, see; Santos above n 218, at 132-139. 
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presupposes the existence of universality or homogeneity between the diversity of 
movements.
449
 The multiplicity or heterogeneity of groups within the WSF has to be taken 
into consideration. And this calls for new epistemological categories to try to understand 
the pluralism that defines such relationships.  The only way a general theory can respond to 
this problem is if it is a ―general theory on the impossibility of a general theory‖.
450
 He 
calls this ―negative universalism‖
451
 , which he finds a more realistic way of understanding 
the nature of this question.  Instead of a general theory, Santos proposes the idea of 
translation.  This is:  
… a process of mutual intelligibility among the experiences of the world, both available and 
possible, as revealed by the sociology of absences and sociology of emergences, without 





Powerful words no doubt, but they can also profit from further explanation.  The groups 
within the WSF are not only motivated by different goals, but also have different sources 
of identity, which distinguish one group from the other.  Hypothetically, feminists have a 
different agenda from labour movements, which in turn have a different agenda from the 
indigenous peoples‘ movements.  Speculatively, these differences would no doubt translate 
into practical differences, some of which may provoke disagreement, factions and 
acrimonious relationships within the WSF itself.  Failure to address this particular issue 
might have adverse effects on the WSF, especially in pursuing its basic founding principles 
– that is, to formulate alternatives to globalisation.  This is something that can only be 
achieved by mutual recognition or what he calls the translation of differences. It is a way of 
understanding what divides and unites groups at the same time. It is from such processes 
that coalitions can be fostered on the basis of what they share in common. It is not difficult 
                                                 
449
 Santos offered a similar view in a presentation entitled ‗Towards a Legal Theory of the Global South‘, at 
a Workshop on Legal Theory and the Third World, School of Law, University of Edinburgh, 2009.  
450 Ibid. 




to see how this idea of translation can assist in reconciling similarities and differences 
between human rights and community.  Protagonists of each view can hold onto their 
principles by translating them through processes of mutual intelligibility.  It is a process of 
identifying common values, whilst discarding inconsistent values.  It is the celebration of 
diversity and not understanding it as a source of conflict or division.  This is something that 
must be done at the abstract level, but also at the level of practice.   
 
To see how this can work, a more abstract example of Santos‘s ‗translation of 
knowledges‘ is used here.  In rather simple terms, it refers to how different groups have 
different interpretations on a particular concept. The concept of human dignity is an ideal 
example of how the translation of knowledges can work, given that it is a concept open to 
different cultural interpretations.  This is an important example for another reason since 
human dignity is often at the centre of debates about the universality of human rights.  It is 
not possible to exhaustively deal with debates about the universality of human rights, 
except to say that this debate is a different way of understanding the controversy between 
human rights and community.  For this reason, Santos‘s theory of translation of 
knowledges is even more important from the perspective of this thesis.  The controversy 
has always been that human rights are expressed only through western (liberal) 
interpretations of human dignity.  It is different from other concepts of human dignity like 
the Islamic concept of umma (community) or Hindu concept of dharma (cosmic harmony 
between all beings). 
453
  The different concepts of human dignity are perhaps reasons why 
human rights are usually not emphasised within the WSF, since the groups within it have 
different understandings of human dignity.    
 
                                                 
453 Ibid at17. 
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How does the idea of translations help reduce differences without reinforcing conflict 
between parties? This is, of course, difficult but the purpose of translation is that it points 
to shortcomings of the concept of human dignity from the perspective of other 
interpretations of the concept.  Consider this example; by showing the superiority of my 
concept of human dignity, I in turn point to the weakness of yours.  Translation opens-up 
spaces for critical dialogue by pointing out the limitations of internal viewpoints. At the 
same time, it also has the effect of creating a better understanding between competing view 
points.   Take the concept of dharma as an example.  Human rights would be a weak 
concept because it fails to establish a link between the individual and his or her cosmic 
world. This is usually not a concern for human rights. For dharma, the conceptual 
relationship between rights and duties is not sufficient enough to achieve this. Perhaps, as 
already seen, it leaves out many from its scope of application. In the same way, looking at 
dharma through the lens of human rights will reveal its weaknesses from its own point of 
view or standards.  The fundamental weakness of dharma lies in the neglect for injustice in 
the pursuit of religious and social status. In pursuing social harmony, dharma neglects that 
plausibility of conflict towards achieving agreement. Moreover, dharma pays little 
attention to values of democracy, individual freedom and autonomy.  Dharma is 
unconcerned with the fact that ―without primordial rights, the individual is too fragile an 
entity to avoid being overrun by powerful economic and political institutions‖. 
454
 It fails to 
recognise the irreducible nature of suffering, which is unique to the individual. Santos 
draws another example from the Islamic concept of umma, but it is possible to understand 
the value of translation without expanding on this concept.
455
 The point of translations is 
that the success of any kind of dialogue must begin from the acknowledgment of reciprocal 
                                                 
454 Ibid at 18.  
455 For a good insight into the debate about human rights and Islam, see; An Naim A. ‗Human Rights in the 
Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives‘, 3, Harvard International Law 
Journal, 1990, at  13-52. 
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incompleteness.  The enormous potentials of human rights and human dignity in any given 
context rest on the ability of these concepts to be appropriated in local cultural contexts. 
Framed as such, the attempts to reconcile human rights and community can no doubt 
benefit from the idea of translation. What is certain is that compromise cannot be achieved 
by insisting on replacing one value with the other.  If this is appreciated then it is possible 
to see how community might play a role in human rights discourse. Santos‘s ideas in 
general points to the indispensability of dialogue in resolving such tensions, and this is 
something, in the context of this thesis,  that can be achieved through the discussions about 




This chapter has mainly been concerned about the relationship between human rights and 
community. This chapter, as with the thesis in general, is an important part of 
understanding how to increase the role of community in human rights discourse, for it 
involves mutually understanding how the values of each concept can contribute to each 
other. Whilst it is impossible to eliminate tensions that may arise from the need to maintain 
individual autonomy and the pursuit of the collective good, such tensions can be reduced 
by creating opportunities for open public dialogues about the strengths and limitations of 
the values that each concept represents. Most importantly, understanding human rights as 
ethical claims – discussed in earlier chapters – opens up the possibility of subjecting them 
– along with other ethical values – to processes of dialogue. From the perspective of this 
thesis, such dialogues can provide an opportunity to show that the benefit of having a 
human right can actually transcend the individual. It is also important to see that the 
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How should community be defined, operationalised or programmed, particularly in ways 
that contribute to the pursuit of particular human rights? How exactly would community 
make human rights more effective in their task of shaping the pursuit of development in 
normative terms? Is community participation possible under existing social and political 
institutions or do new spaces have to be created to give more scope for participation? What 
sort of problems can be predicted with the introduction of community participation, and 
how can they be addressed? These are among the underlying concerns that motivate the 
analysis in this chapter. The chapter seeks to expand on the substantive aspects of the 
theory of community, which it is argued can enable individuals to take part in processes 
that determine their human rights.
456
 It outlines the philosophical, structural and procedural 
requirements for community participation. This is, after all, because the substantive aspects 
of participation can only succeed if the structural framework is clear and right from the 
outset. Community participation as such, cannot succeed or precede philosophical and 
structural underpinning.  This is in essence what the theory of community outlined in this 
chapter seeks to achieve. In doing so, the chapter expands on the three comprehensive 
components of the theory, which include what community is, or what it ought to be, the 
                                                 
456 It is recognised that such questions are better dealt with in specific national and local contexts, even 
though general principles of community are anticipated on the normative level of human rights discourse. It 




actual spaces of participation, and thirdly, a theory of deliberation for community 
participation.  
 
The discussions in this chapter proceed as follows. It begins by offering a definition 
of community and proceeds to justify why it is unique for present purposes. It stresses the 
importance of harnessing the ethical and social resources within local residential 
communities in townships or villages, as a way of encouraging supporting relationships, 
and furthermore, assisting the most deprived in society to develop abilities of democratic 
organisation, ownership and autonomy over the processes of securing their human rights. 
The chapter then proceeds to discuss how participation can be institutionalised. It proposes 
the actual spaces of participation as a further component of the theory. This is in 
anticipation that such forms of participation may have to be created by institutional design, 
since it is not expected that participation or community will always exists spontaneously. 
In particular, Community Forums are proposed as a new space from which decisions 
relating to particular human rights can be reached. But the work of Community Forums 
requires a third component, one that anticipates the kind of problems which participation 
may create. Participation can be divisive even in the most egalitarian or democratic 
societies. But as troublesome as these problems may be, it is argued that they are still 
reducible, even if they cannot totally be eliminated. What this requires is a component that 
understands the value of dialogue and compromise. To understand this possibility, a theory 
of deliberation is proposed to support the work of Community Forums, as the third 







2. Setting the Scene  
 
I begin with a story to help analogise what I mean by community, and in this respect, how 
it might function through the kind of values that might exist within it. The story is about a 
residential community in a metropolitan Nigerian city.  It is the city of Jos, the capital of 
one of Nigeria‘s 36 states.  The city is known for its beautiful scenery and moderate 
temperatures, and it is made up of an estimated population of about one million. Its 
moderate temperatures and scenery have been an attraction to many from across the world, 
who now consider Jos their home.  Over the years, the city has witnessed a lot of 
migration, which has included members of Nigeria‘s dominant ethnic groups
457
 and also, 
Europeans and Americans, who constitute part of the population of the city. As such, the 
city is well known for its pluralism of race, gender, ethnicity and religion, thus making it 
one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Nigeria. More recently, and since 2001, violent 
conflicts have threatened the peaceful coexistence and appeal of this city, as it has divided 
the population along ethnic and religious lines. A recent conflict between indigenous 
Christians and Muslims occurred in 2008, and more recently in 2010, respectively 
provoked by democratic elections into one of the local city councils, and later on for 
unknown reasons.  Sceptics would argue that this points to the weakness of any proposals 
that prioritise community, but it is as argued here that the recent conflicts in Jos are really a 
manifestation of a breakdown of community.  As such, more and not less community is 
needed in this context. 
 
 
                                                 
457
 Nigeria has an estimated number of three hundred ethnic groups, three of which the Hausa, Yoruba and 
Igbo are the largest. The city of Jos is also composed of a host of indigenous tribes from the surrounding 
villages. Plateau State, of which Jos is the capital is composed of over 60 ethno-linguistic groups, two of 
which, the Berom and Angas constitute the largest in number.  
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The conflicts have not necessarily changed the living patterns in the city, which have 
usually had ethnic, multi-ethnic, religious or multi-religious dimensions to it.  Historically, 
living patterns have been mixed, even though there have been a few noticeable changes as 
a result of the conflicts.  Two dominant trends are quite evident; first, residential 
communities have often been inhabited by groups of virtually the same ethnic or religious 
background and second, it is possible to find residential communities (like the one 
described below) composed of different primordial or religious identities. Similar living 
patterns are usually found in densely populated inner-city and suburban residential areas.  
 
The experience of this particular community in Jos in dealing with a particular 
problem is used here as a point of entry into some of the main arguments in this chapter. It 
is a community that I have lived in, experienced, apart from being a problem that I have 
also participated in trying to resolve. The community itself is unique and not representative 
of all communities around the city or Nigeria. But, the problem is not unique to this 
community; it is one that exists across Nigeria as a whole.  It is the question of robbery, 
and other forms of crime that threaten the security of lives across the country.  The high 
rate of crime is a reflection of the breakdown of institutions of the State in the country, a 
similar reason for the concerns here – the lack of access to water, electricity or healthcare 
and education. Members of this community (as elsewhere in Nigeria) have continued to 
spend anxious days and nights in fear of impending robbery attacks. This is further 
exacerbated by the level of policing in the country, and not surprisingly, the inability of the 
police to contain the situation.  At a certain period in the life of this community, especially 
after exhausting all possible options, something drastic had to be done.  Such alternatives 
ranged from appeals to the State for more policing to private security solutions (i.e. barbed 
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wired fences, gates and guard dogs) offered by the market, which all eventually proved 
insufficient.  
 
Before looking at what was done to address this problem, it will be important to 
pause for a moment to understand the internal composition of the community. It consisted 
then, as it does now, of a wide range of people from different ethnic, religious backgrounds 
– Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike. This community is a mix of individuals and families 
with different levels of wealth and occupation.  The community also mirrors the wicked 
social stratification which exists in Nigeria as a whole. It reflects the perverse gap between 
the poor, extremely poor, working class, rich and extremely rich.   It is common to find that 
members of relatively poor families providing domestic services in the homes of the rich or 
extremely rich.  In terms of age composition; the community is composed of young and 
old; retired and upwardly mobile professional individuals. Intra-communal relations are 
quite cordial, even if not everyone knows, or even cares about, or speaks to each other. It is 
common to find close-knit friendships with families that live closest to each other.  Apart 
from such situations, friendships are only built by those who go out of their way to do so. 
Apart from this, there are very little opportunities to build fledging friendships in 
community. Very little communal or public spaces exist for such kind of interactions. 
Friendships only seem to be built through the nature of interactions among children, which 
in turn determine the relationships of their parents. As a consequence, friendships are 
sometimes built amongst rich and poor families according to the level of interaction 
between their children.   The most common way of building friendships outside family 
circles have been forged in times of turmoil, such as the ethno-religious conflicts 
mentioned in the beginning. The ethno-religious conflicts reinforced rather than divided the 
spirit of togetherness however minimal it may have been in the past.  This experience, of 
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course, was not the same for other communities in the city.  This community was an 
exception rather than the rule. There were certainly communities where neighbours of 
considerable history turned against each other in the most appalling and barbaric ways. 
Similar to the ethno-religious conflict, the question of crime at a certain period of life of 
this community was definitely a source of solidarity and friendship. After consistent 
attacks on several homes, it became apparent that this was a problem that could only be 
tackled collectively, even if there was an undeniable individual dimension to it.  This was, 
and is a problem that households experience alone – that is, the pain, sorrow, tears and 
other psychological dimensions of such attacks, or the fear of impending attacks. 
Interestingly, these isolated individual experiences did however mobilise a collective 
effort.  
 
In an attempt to deal with this problem, series of meetings were called by several 
well-respected members of community. The meetings were arranged, and took place on 
Saturdays. They were open to everyone, but not everyone attended. Many failed to attend 
for different reasons, which are only open to speculation.  For instance, only a handful of 
women attended the meetings, and this was perhaps because the dates and times for 
meetings conflicted with their typical domestic and family related chores. There was a very 
limited presence of the poor, and extremely poor.  Again to speculate, their failure to 
participate may simply be because of inferior social and economic status, or that their 
contributions might not be considered rational enough to influence an audience composed 
of individuals with greater wealth, education and intellect.  Besides, the poor were often 
treated with suspicion by the more privileged in community to the extent that they were 
often regarded as suspects for the crimes.  
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At the meetings, victims spoke about their experiences; especially how help failed to come 
from the police even when it was sought. Representatives of the police were present at 
initial meetings, explaining their difficulties and soliciting for better understanding and 
cooperation from the community.  Several solutions were proposed and considered, one of 
which was to seek the services of private security firms. This proposal was rejected by the 
majority present, given that these services were too expensive and also equally ineffective.  
The proposal which appealed the most – after been discussed and voted upon – was for the 
formation of a neighbourhood security association, and security watch group.  The 
association was formed, and its mandate was to work in collaboration with the police over 
matters of security in the community. Membership of the association was open to all 
residents of community, but on the condition of a payment of a monthly subscription fee. 
This was for administrative purposes, and for the running of neighbourhood security watch 
group, which was one of the main proposals and decisions that emerged from initial 
meetings. Articles of association were drafted and agreed upon at subsequent meetings. 
Provisions were made for a chairperson, management structure, officials, decision-making 
and accounting procedures, and procedures for meetings, including their dates. The 
organisational structure was no surprise given the background of members of the 
community in the public service or private business.  The structure of the main decision 
making organ of the association was quite similar to a board of directors.  Unlike the 
deliberative nature in the events leading to the formation of the association; debates or 
discussions hardly existed after it was created.  There was a lot of emphasis placed on 
voting as opposed to deliberation by eligible members of the association. 
 
The association succeeded in forming a neighbourhood security watch group to 
patrol parts of the community at the vulnerable periods of the night. This was, and still is, a 
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well-known practice in many residential communities within and outside the city. There is, 
of course, a dark side to these neighbourhood watch groups – that is, the inhumane or 
brutal treatment given to perpetuators of such crimes.
458
 Fortunately, such nasty incidents 
were never reported in this community.
 
The association and neighbourhood security watch 
group operated for a year at the most after it was formed.  Its presence was short lived, 
after it was rocked by allegations of corruption on the part of its chairperson. Whilst the 
association and group lasted, however, there was a remarkable difference in the rate of 
crime, even though it did not totally eliminate crime. But, the negative turn of events 
leading to the failure of the association stifled any motivation for future community 
organising in this context.  It has now left members of this community with little or no 
choice but to provide their own security through the market, or to depend on unreliable the 
State police force.  
 
2.1. Community as Locality 
 
The narrative above raises a number of issues of importance to the general purposes of this 
thesis.  On the positive side, the narrative reveals how a problem that threatened collective 
security promoted wider discussion on the problem, and of ways to address it. Importantly, 
it discloses how this community in many ways transcended its ethnic, religious, and class 
differences through attempts at public discussion and collective decision-making, even 
though such efforts were short lived.  In the context above, security was considered as a 
collective problem, even though some members of this community (especially the rich) 
were capable of tackling it individually. On the negative side, the narrative reveals one of 
the consequences of the collapse of the institutions of the State. It also reveals that the 
market was not an option for many in community. It also makes known some problems that 
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 See, Walker A. ‗Vigilante groups in Nigeria‘, BCC News Report, accessed online 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8021468.stm  5 November 2009. 
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might exist within community, notably, the problematic question of exclusion of the poor. 
It reveals the improvised nature of the understanding of democracy in that community, 
which privileged voting as opposed to dialogue as the basis of democratic expression. The 
narrative reveals the typical Nigerian problem of corruption, which eventually led to the 
demise of attempts at community organising. This is only a glimpse of the difficulties that 
can emerge with community participation, and more so, the dangers of over-romanticising 
with it.  Even so, it also shows that self or collective provisioning of economic and social 
rights seem to be the only option available to communities across the country. As such, it 
underscores the point of this thesis that any proposals for reform, which seeks to enable 
access to these human rights, cannot succeed without a comprehensive strategy that 
involves community.  It also begs the question from the perspective of the thesis of why 
problems of this nature have not been dealt with at the level of community.  
 
The most important point for the purposes of this chapter is that the community 
depicted in the narrative above is the most commonly associated meaning of the term. It is 
connected with a specific locality in a given territory. It is as such a material or tangible 
thing, one that is located in a particular place. Such type of community may exist in a small 
rural village, even though it is referred to above in an urban context. Community to recall 
from chapter one – and as depicted above – refers to a residential neighbourhood, that is, a 
group of individuals who find themselves living together in a place by accident of 
proximity.  This is obviously not the only way of describing community, but it is referred 
to in this context because of the implications of this theory on practice. The requirements 
of participation in this thesis require concrete face to face relationships in either temporal 
or permanent settings. It rests on devising opportunities of encouraging individuals to 
mobilise collectively in attempt to resolve problems that affect them where they live.  But, 
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as also mentioned in chapter one, there is a more fundamental reason for understanding 
community as locality.  It is that one‘s neighbourhood, as a type of locality, plays a 
significant – but not an exclusive part – of one‘s self-definition, meaning or cultural and 
identity formation.  As Elizabeth Frazer
459
 illustrates, this is something that comes out well 
in recent work by political communitarians.
460
 Its, therefore, not an issue that only 
sociologist have pondered about. Whilst what may constitute a locality includes places 
where people live, work, shops, businesses, schools, it also includes strong family ties and 
strong communal relations to achieve social harmony. She says, communitarian political 
theorists have also stressed the importance of local power in determining redistributive 
policies and public investment. They have even influenced debates about corporate social 
responsibility to embrace local community, internal democracy and environmental 
responsibility.
461
  But the most important point about locality is about the values that exist 
within it. The point is that the neighbourhood as locality plays an important part in 
determining ones conduct, roles, duties, relationships and most importantly, one‘s values.  
It is because of this, as regarded in this thesis, that it constitutes one of the most important 
aspects of everyday life. To understand this point further, what follows is a discussion of 
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2.2. Community as a Normative Ideal 
 
What Frazer points out is that there is more to understanding the significance community 
than locality or common residency. It is also a place where common values, attachments 
and principles are forged. What this means is that it is also possible to understand 
community as a normative ideal. This point comes out strong, and can further be expanded 
upon from Selznick‘s sociology of community.
462
  It comes from his suggestion that even 
when we consider community as a description of our social experiences; it also has an 
important normative dimension. His work importantly invites us to understand the 
correlation between descriptive and normative aspects of community. Part of the reason 
why he discusses the normative side of community is to dispense with the regular 
scepticism about the concept. He argues that sceptics never seem to stop highlighting the 
dark side of community and overlook that it is a ―prima facie good thing‖. 
463
 It is an end in 
itself and not just a means.  Its values are intrinsic like culture, friendship, socialisation and 
family life. Community presupposes moral values that can be nourished and protected. 
This does not mean that these presumptions cannot be rebutted, especially if a particular 
community is too narrow and exclusive. We must not forget that other concepts like 
friendship, family, law and culture also have dark sides. But this does not mean that we 
abandon them when they deviate from their principles. Rather we criticise and try to 
nurture them from our understanding of the general standards they represent.  As such, a 
normative theory of community must both affirmative and critical. On the one-hand, it is 
affirmative when ―it explores, identifies and embraces the positive contributions of a 
                                                 




particular community to human flourishing‖.
464
  On the other, it is critical when ―it asks of 
a particular community how far, in what ways and with what effects it deviates from a 
standard‖.
465
  Such standards would always differ from community in question but the 
objective will remain the same – that is, one of illuminating what a good community is, as 
well as how to construct, and nurture it when it fails.   
 
Following on from Selznick it is not only important to pay attention to living 
experiences of people, but also how a normative theory can be built – to affirm, criticise 
and reconstruct it – from those experiences.  We must seek to understand ways a 
community can contribute to human flourishing, and what ways a particular community 
fails to meet these requirements. As such, Selznick provides a list of variables that might 
help in this respect. They include historicity, identity, mutuality, plurality, autonomy, 
participation and integration.  A community will hardly have all these variables; some will 
have more than others. It always depends on the kind of community involved – that is, 
whether it is religious, ethnic, occupational, institutional or residential.  Although 
Selznick‘s variables may provide a useful guide to achieving this, they are not the only way 
of achieving this.  The Southern African concept of ubuntu466  serves as a point of departure 
from Selznick to illustrate a philosophy that can help measure the moral quality of 
community. For the sake of clarity, ubuntu is used to analogise a particular way this can be 
achieved and it is not proposed as a general moral theory for all communities.  
Nevertheless, from the concerns of this thesis, ubuntu is one way of drawing our attention 




 Le Roux J. ‗The concept of ‗ubuntu‘: Africa‘s most important contribution to multicultural education?‘ 
18(2), Multicultural Teaching, 2000, at 43–46. See also, Blankenberg N.  ‗In search of a real freedom: 
Ubuntu and the media‘, 13(2), Critical Arts, 1999, at 42–65. See also, Venter E. ‗The Notion of Ubuntu and 






to human suffering given – as illustrated below – its predisposition to compassion and 
human interdependence.    
 
Ubuntu has no standard definition. It is perhaps simply understood as group 
solidarity. Justice Mokgoro describes it in the following way: 
Ubuntu (a Zulu word) is a lifestyle or unifying world-view (or philosophy) of African societies 
based on respect and understanding between individuals. Ubuntu has been translated as 
―humaneness‖, and is derived from the expression: umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu [a person is a 
person because of other people / a person can only be a person through others]. It envelops values of 
group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and 
collective unity.467 
 
Compassion, solidarity, reciprocity and dignity, or such other values that can be found in 
community are the ethical planks of ubuntu. Ubuntu is perhaps more of a cosmopolitan 
philosophy, given that it is founded on values of shared humanity. It depicts universal 
human values that transcend boundaries of culture, ethnicity and religion. Similarly, 
territory or boundaries should not stand in the way of expressing or experiencing ubuntu.  
For the general purposes of this thesis, ubuntu may be helpful in illustrating ways in which 
people are connected through the common values of humanity, which can in turn be used 
to address common problems.  It can encourage reciprocity, tolerance, cooperation and 
trust in society, and around the globe in general. What is more, ubuntu is about human 
interdependence; it is a powerful illustration of the fact that individuals are incomplete 
without others. Without communion with family and community, individuals are 
meaningless. One‘s community is the basis on which self-definition begins. Life is 
determined through communal relationships and acts of togetherness. It presupposes that 
social cohesion or harmony cannot be understood apart from the overlapping and 
interwoven relationships that we share with others. Individuals never exist in absolute 
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isolation, except through co-existence and mutual effect on each other. It is what Kenyan 
theologian John Mbiti meant by the following words, ―I am, because we are, and since we 
are therefore I am‖.
468
   These expressions of shared humanity are truly unique. But in 
recognising its potential, one should not generalise its existence across Africa; it is 
certainly not something that exists within or between all communities. But the point in 
raising it is that this is something that can be encouraged through certain practices, customs 
and institutions.   More importantly, it can serve to measure of the moral quality of a 
community when these ideals are found wanting.  After all, it is common to find 
descriptions of African communities overwhelmed by problems of exclusion, amongst 
other things, as those that lack ubuntu.  
 
2.3. Limits of Community 
Whilst there is a lot to celebrate about community, there is also a great deal to detest. 
Bounds of inclusion can so easily translate into bounds of exclusion.  As inclusive as 
Mbiti‘s ideas seem, they can also be used to fuel discord, especially when they are 
interpreted too exclusively.  They can be interpreted in ways that reinforce the debate 
between liberalism and communitarianism, a debate that is unhelpful for the purposes of 
this thesis.  Part of the problem is really how community is defined, which in turn shapes 
its practice. It comes from – as discussed in chapter one – the consequences of defining 
community too exclusively, as the defining factor of all of one‘s social relationships. 
Perhaps in the Nigerian and African context, it comes from the failure to recognise 
anything apart from ethnicity, tribe or religion as valid community. Without attempting to 
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be exhaustive, one such example is the work of Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti. 
469
  
He argues that, ‗I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am‘ asserts the 
superiority of the community over the individual in metaphysical terms. 
 
In the strongest 
possible terms, he argues that, ―the reality of the communal world takes precedence over 
the reality of the individual life histories, whatever these may be.‖
470
 In doing so, he seems 
to generalise almost to a fault about western academic traditions when he suggests that 
communalism is what makes the African individual distinct from her western counterpart. 
Perhaps what he meant to say is that communalism makes the African distinct from the 
abstract individual, thanks to liberalism.  There are really not many dividing lines between 
African communalism and western communitarian thought on this metaphysical 
standpoint.  
Menkiti‘s views are open to contest, and it is no surprise that they have been 
questioned by African philosophical accounts.  To recall, the work of Ghanaian 
philosopher Kwame Gyekye
471
 has shown that the African is far less constrained by 
community than Menkiti seems to suggest. What Menkiti achieves is an exaggeration of 
the normative status and power of community over the individual.  The individual is 
constituted by other influences apart from her community.  Furthermore, and again to 
recall from the analysis of Gyekye in the previous chapter, individual autonomy is not 
something earned from one‘s duties to community; it is something that can be established 
in the theistic and non-theistic sense.  
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Besides (and for purposes of this thesis), Menkiti does not articulate a view about what the 
community is, or what it should or should not be, even though his views on the 
metaphysical composition of the individual seem to give some indication of what he means 
by the term. He is perhaps speaking about only a tribal or ethnic community in which 
individuals have no choice over their identity.  From his views of the metaphysical 
composition of the individual, a person‘s identity is almost exclusively defined by tribe or 
ethnicity, and furthermore, by the performance of duties.  Those arguments sufficiently 
indicate that what Menkiti might think of community is really quite impoverished. They 
are not impoverished because they privilege primordial ideas of community. After all, it 
will be wrong to deny that these are the most important defining features of individuals in 
any given society. Menkiti‘s vision is not wrong because of the appeal to tribe or ethnicity 
as constitutive of community. Rather, it is narrow because it seems to suggest that ethnicity 
or tribe are the only constitutive sources of an individual‘s identity, as well as one‘s social 
relationships.  It fails to recognise that individuals have more than one source of communal 
identity, which are formed by different interactions and relationships shared with others.  
Our ethnic, tribal and linguistic identities might be important but they are not the only ways 
in which community can be understood. 
A direct consequence of exclusively defining community which re-enforces the 
problem above is that it is articulated in profoundly nostalgic terms. It is encouraged by the 
appeal for the restoration of primordial values, identities or norms believed to have been 
lost either as a consequence of colonialism or capitalist modernity. Without reviving such 
values or practices, as it is often argued, social change would seem impossible. It is not that 
there is a problem with primordial representation of community; the difficulty is rather that 
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they are often expressed in melancholic terms. A corollary effect is that it gives a false 
depiction of the community itself – it is depicted as a place without conflict or disharmony.  
Attempts to assert traditional or cultural authenticity is an exaggeration of the potentials 
that lie within a community, especially its capacity to resolve the problems expected of it. 
The attempts to rediscover lost values of family, hard-work or cooperation found in a 
traditional community not only exaggerate, but generalise that these values existed in all 
communities of the past. To describe this in the words of a critic of the African 
authenticity, ―the traditionalist perspective paints the African world before colonialism as 
peaceful, cooperative, and fulfilling. Order, authority, and hierarchy, in this vision, created 
families and communities without discord, unhappiness, or alienation.‖
472
 As such, there is 
a lack of appreciation of the hierarchies and divisions within or between nostalgic 
communities and families.   
We cannot, of course, deny the values of history or tradition – these are, after all, 
values that make us who or what we are today. At the same time, we must not over 
romanticise with such aspects of history, especially in ways that overlook how they might 
contribute to a number of problems today. The grip of tribe and ethnicity, and the violence 
it often provokes in many parts of the world, not necessarily in Africa, arises from this 
problem. The question then becomes how can community be re-imagined in new ways that 
build on the strengths of the past, but at the same time, discards its weakness?   How can 
community to be re-imagined without necessarily denouncing aspects of its authenticity, 
but including other values which have now become part of the reality in African societies? 
More so, how can community be defined in ways that unlocks the grip of tribe, ethnicity or 
religion as the only source of one identity or social relationships?  These are all similar and 
difficult questions, but some answers can be found if we think of community – as Selznick 
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suggested – as a variable aspect of a group‘s social relationships. This helps recognise 
other – at least more contemporary social relationships – as valid communities. It does not 
discard tribe, ethnicity or religion as valid communities; neither does it valorise one over 
the other. Instead, it finds space to accommodate all of them. This is something – as will be 
considered next – that can be explored through the writings of both Amartya Sen and 
Giorgio Agamben.   
 
2.4. Re-imagining Community  
One important way of overcoming such narrow depictions of community, particularly 
recognising other experiences which are constitutive of our communal identities can be 
found in Amartya Sen‘s book entitled Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny.
473
  
Sen‘s contribution is not about community, but rather about the universality of humanity, a 
point, however, that thinking about community can also profit from.  Sen is animated by 
identity related violence, which, he suggests, emerges from the tendency to depict identity 
in singular terms. This has, and continues to be the source of many conflicts across the 
world today, including the September and post-September 9/11 conflicts.
474
 The pursuit of 
single-based identities, Sen concludes, can be used to fuel violence and to kill without 
regret.   
Sen‘s point of entry into these discussions is taken through an explanation of the 
contradictory nature of identity.
475
 On the one-hand, it can be a great source of strength, 
pride, comfort and encouragement for many. He acknowledges that it has served as an 
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important foundation for the pursuit of inclusion and social justice. Sen argues that one 
cannot overlook some of the successes of identity politics today, as it has served as an 
important way of bringing the plight of certain minority groups to attention.  At the same 
time, identity has encouraged conflict, as group or communal solidarity has tended to be 
matched by group hatred and discord.  The inclusion shared within certain groups tends to 
exclude others. According to him, the gift of inclusion has corresponded with the adversary 
of exclusion. This can be traced back to the pursuit of single identity as its main cause –  
the imposition of a single identity either by, or without choice, is often the source of 
violence and exclusion. 
 Sen‘s central thesis is quite rational. Individuals are not defined by single but 
shared relationships, which are indeed constitutive of the different ways our identities are 
formed. Consider this example: ―a Hutu laborer from Kigali may be pressured to see 
himself only as a Hutu and incited to kill Tutsis . . . he is not only a Hutu, but also a 
Kigalian, a Rwandan, an African, a laborer and a human being.‖
476
  The point is that, 
individuals have more than one identity, which extends beyond culture, religion or 
nationality. To put this argument into the perspective of community, we are all certainly 
members of more than one community. Our (communal) identity sometimes overlaps 
across nationality, class, gender, race, ancestry, language, amongst others things.   The 
remedy then following Sen‘s logic is to maximise – and not diminish – the plurality of our 
identities.  The power of competing identities is that it reinforces what we share in common 
– that is, our common humanity.  But, the difficult question is how can or should our 
multiple identities be maximised?  Sen seems to think that this can be made by choice, 
even though he acknowledges that such choices are difficult to make. Besides – a point that 
Sen agrees with but does not resolve is that – it might be easier to choose or reject certain 
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identities, but what is more difficult to reject are identities ascribed on us by others. He 
doesn‘t adequately address this question and also why certain identities take priority over 
others, or even how conflicts between identities can be resolved. These are generally very 
difficult questions, however, some of Sen‘s suggestions above about encouraging people to 
understand different ways in which they are connected to each other is a helpful way out of 
such problems. In doing so, Sen believes in the power of critical reasoning in exploring this 
possibility and reducing some of these problems. In contrast, Sen rejects communitarian 
theories that suggest that identity is something predetermined by a fact of nature, as such, 
not open to critical reasoning.
477
 Agreeing with Sen, received identities, customs, traditions 
and practices should always be open to critical scrutiny.  They are not in any way 
unquestionable. Reasoned questioning is the only way we can explain changes in abhorrent 
conservative practices today. The point is that we should never leave such things 
unquestioned otherwise we would succumb to unacceptable conservativism.  
 
It is not difficult to see the value of such ideas. They undoubtedly help address the 
tendency of community to exclusively be understood in ethnic, tribal or religious terms. 
More importantly, by understanding that we belong to multiple communities, we may 
understand how we connect with others in other ways, and in ways that bring out the 
shared nature of our humanity. This is one of the more interesting points that comes out 
from Sen‘s work above. It is really about human interdependence – about how individuals 
are all connected to each other in multiple dimensions.  A view of community – as in my 
narrative in the beginning of this chapter– does also analogise this point. It shows the 
interlocking nature of relationships that cannot readily be reduced to a single affiliation.  
This is the point of referring to a community in the metropolis. It is used to suggest that the 
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richness and diversity within metropolitan communities can encourage thinking out of the 
narrow perceptions of community. It is not – as suggested in the previous chapter – meant 
to imply that metropolitan communities should take priority over rural communities. 
Whilst the bounds in residential areas may not be as strong as those of family, tribe or 
ethnicity, shared space – the neighbourhood – can be a different source of solidarity 
amongst strangers. What is important is that it doesn‘t negate opportunities of belonging to 
other communities. It is also not a suggestion that the relationships within metropolitan 
communities are unproblematic or without conflict. Not all neighbours get along or are 
expected to get along. The fact that such problems exist does not mean that they cannot be 
overcome or at least reduced for purposes of participation. This can be achieved by 
emphasising on the more positive relationships or the problems that affect everyone 
collectively, rather than the things that divide.     
 
Giorgio Agamben‘s work on The Coming Community
478
 achieves the emphasis on 
humanity in exactly the opposite way from Sen by negating any condition of belonging to 
community altogether. I am not concerned about the differences between their approaches, 
but rather how they arrive at the same conclusion. It is also important to begin by noting 
that Agamben looks at the difficulties with community from the perspective of 
metaphysics. His attempt is to offer a vision of community in ways that it can transcend 
either identity or universality as a criterion of belonging.  Agamben takes as his starting 
point the limitations of community, and attempts to re-imagine it in a way that it can exist 
without exclusion. In a rather dense and complex formulation, he suggests that this can be 
achieved if conventional standards of belonging or singularity are re-conceptualised by an 
understanding of what he calls ―the whatever being‖:  
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...The whatever in question relates to singularity not in its indifference to a common property (to a 
concept, of example: being red, being French, being Muslim), but only in its being such as it is. 
Singularity is thus freed from the false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose between the 
ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal.
479
     
 
The coming community is not constituted by individualism or universalism such that it 
excludes others from it. Rather, the coming community understands and represents the 
multiple or horizontal relationships that exist in society.  It opens up the community to 
more inclusive and fluid interpretations. For Agamben, this rests on understanding the 
concept of singularity in ways that are not attached to any condition of belonging, whether 
it is biological, or social like class, or tribe, or race, or ethnicity. Rather, it should be 
defined on its own terms, or for want of a better description, this singularity is not 
representable. The point is that there really are no words that can describe this community; 
the condition of belonging can only be represented by itself.
480
 This is something, 
Agamben says, that can further be established from a rather mundane example of love. 
Love is a good example of the condition of belonging in the coming community. It is 
―never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being small, 
being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favour of an insipid 
generality (universal love).‖
481
 Thinking of community can certainly benefit from the 
above. It illustrates how new communities might be constituted without prior conditions of 
belonging – that is, without rules, duties or identities.   
In doing so, it also calls dominant way of thinking about solidarity into question 
once new ways of mobilising community are appreciated. Solidarity is built through 
undifferentiated singularities, which are reconciled by belonging rather than the 
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―conditions of belonging itself‖.
482
 It is built across different categories by creating diverse 
relationships of being with others. Unfortunately, Agamben‘s views above may seem too 
abstract to be useful, apart from being extremely difficult to propose in practical terms. 
Even Agamben (as noted above) recognises that no language can adequately depict the 
coming community. But at least one can argue that it may be regarded as an example that 
can attract practice to it. After all, the right practical solutions cannot be made available 
without a background philosophy. Besides, such questions are equally about a change of 
mindset as they are about the legal and institutional frameworks that can attract practice to 
them. Whilst it is true that framing the right kind of law or designing the right institution 
might be an important way of achieving such goals, but it is all contingent upon getting the 
philosophy right from the outset.   
 
One problem that still needs to be overcome is that, not only does it depend on how 
to understand community in different ways, but also how it is defined without the problems 
of nostalgia. This is difficult, but also important since single based depictions of 
community are also a product of this sort of thinking.  One way of overcoming this is made 
possible through the work late Ghanaian President, and philosopher, Kwame Nkrumah.  
Although his idea of philosophical consciencism
483
 was proposed for a different objective 
in mind, it provides a useful analogy for encouraging new thinking of community, 
particularly in the African continent.   
Philosophical consciencism is helpful in this context because it attempts to grapple 
with the notion of African identity and society in light of colonial and postcolonial 
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experiences.  Nkrumah‘s starting-point is how best to grasp the African society, which as 
suggested above, cannot be defined today solely by its authenticity. He acknowledged that 
there were three distinct influences that have come to shape what Africa or the African 
means today. Quite apart from African tradition, western (and Christian) modernity and 
Islam now call to question what is authentically African. Though his idea of a social 
revolution was an attempt to recover African authenticity, it was more inclusive and 
pragmatic than often acknowledged.  It was a vision of African authenticity that recognised 
and accommodated the influence of western modernity and Islam:  
What is called for as a first step is a body of connected thought which will determine the general 
nature of our action in unifying the society which we have inherited, this unification to take 
account, of all times, of the elevated ideals underlying the traditional African society.
484
 
Philosophical consciencism is the key to the objective above, but really as a philosophy for 
practice. Nkrumah argued that no valuable practice could exist without thought just like 
thought cannot exist without practice.  What Nkrumah meant is that the social revolution – 
he was proposing – had to be preceded by the intellectual revolution, one that had as its 
objective the task of reinventing African societies. This revolution, he urged, should be 
founded on a philosophy, which ―must find its weapons in the environment and living 
conditions of the African people‖.
485
  Pivotal to this social and intellectual revolution is 
mediating between the historical fact of colonisation, the reality of decolonisation and the 
contemporary political, economic or social forms life.  This is in essence what 
philosophical consciencism means:     
[…] it is born out of the crisis of the African conscience confronted with the three strands of present 
African society. Such a philosophical statement I propose to name philosophical consciencism, for it 
will give the theoretical basis for and ideology whose aim shall be to contain the African experience 
of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence as well as the experience of the traditional African society, 











This was a very pragmatic attempt not only to interpret the nature of postcolonial Africa, 
but also the contradictory nature of African identity, in particular.
487
 There was a realistic 
distinction between pre-colonial and postcolonial Africa, which has now become a melting 
pot of different people and influences. What this called for were processes of discursive 
engagement with the influences that now shape identity as well as the very nature of the 
body politic.  Even though he articulated most of his ideas in nationalistic terms, Nkrumah 
was more forward looking and cosmopolitan in his outlook. Consciencism was cast in 
philosophical terms to provide the ideological underpinnings to re-invent Africa in light of 
these new experiences. To use his words again: 
   
[C]onsciencism is the map in the intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable 
African society to digest the Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa and 
develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African personality is itself 




Nkrumah was not the only postcolonial leader with this vision, others such as Leopold 
Senghor‘s idea of Negritude, Kenneth Kaunda‘s ‗Humanism‘ and Julius Nyerere‘s 
‗ujamaa‘, were all – with considerable differences – different attempts to assert African 
communal authenticity in the postcolonial context.
489
 Take ujamaa as another example.  
Like Nkrumah, Nyerere shared the vision of building a postcolonial African polity on the 
basis of African communal principles. Again like Nkrumah‘s vision, ujamaa was at best a 
mixture of Fabian socialism, Catholic socialism and the application of principles of African 
communalism.
490
  Nyerere gave primacy to extended family relations reminiscent of 
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traditional African society in his vision of a new African political community.  Nyerere 
considered the family not antagonistic class relations as the basis for the socialisation of 
individuals. Nonetheless, it can be argued that Nyerere was overly romantic about pre-
colonial Africa, especially in ways that have been criticised above.  The social and cultural 
revolution he proposed, however, was to be achieved through an emphasis on education. 
And this was for the all important objective of reviving values of community.  Like the 
others, there was a high sense of morality in community that needed to be revived, 
particularly African notions of reciprocity and care in community. These were themes 
rehearsed in Nyerere‘s Arusha declaration – the policy document that formally inaugurated 
ujamaa. 
491
 Like Nkrumah‘s consciencism, it was an attempt to integrate the strengths of 
traditional African communalism, and those elements ushered in by the colonial encounter.  
It was on this account far from a nostalgic or retrospective articulation of communalism.   
In terms of rhetoric, the political, economic and social policies that emerged from it 
showed a preference for small-scale agricultural and industrial projects. In practice, there 
was little evidence of this, as nationalisation was pursued to the fullest, leaving the only 
alternative to a limited role for the private sector, which was allowed to preside over areas 
in which the State could not occupy. This was, no doubt a clear contradiction of the 
philosophy of ujamaa and the values of authentic African communalism it sought to 
espouse. Instead of this, developmentalism thrived as the postcolonial State colonised all 
aspects of social, economic and political life. Instead of reinventing the African, it re-
enforced tribal, ethnic and national identities. Grassroots or community activity was, to say 




                                                 
491 Young above n 490, at 246.  See also, Nyeyere above n 490. 
492
 Adelman S. ‗Constitutionalism, Pluralism and Democracy in Africa‘, 42, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 
1998, at 73-88. 
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In spite of these limitations, or the fact that those ideas were deviated from in practice, they 
still can contribute to how we ought to think about community, amongst other things, 
today. It calls us to reflect on the strengths, commitments and failures of strategies and 
struggles of the past, in ways that reveal achievements, limitations or our unfulfilled 
aspirations. This is indeed one way of thinking of community as something new something 
new, and yet preserving the strengths of tradition and history. The idea of consciencism is 
also an important way of understanding the world we live in is different from the past, and 
now a product of a clash of cultures or values of conflicting worlds, those inhabited by 
complex individuals. After all, much of post-colonial Africa is different, rich and diverse 
from what it was in history. There are interlocking influences from across Africa, as well 
as influences from the western world. This, in my opinion, was what Nkrumah was talking 
about when he suggested that such influences have to be gestated along with the remnants 
of what is truly African. If this is the case, then, this helps us re-imagine community in 
different sorts of ways, not only on the basis of the past.   
 
One further way of contributing to this objective is to conceive community in a 
temporal dimension – that is, as something that is always emerging.
493
 What I mean is 
simply to think of community in asymptotic
494
 terms, the end of which will always remain 
in a state of constant definition. That way, the identities or imaginary boundaries that often 
constitute communities will remain more open, given that they can never fully be 
determined. What this mean is to think of community as a state of ongoing definition and 
                                                 
493
 One helpful analogy here is the way Emilios Christodoulidis speaks about ‗reconciliation‘ in his 
important essay on the ‗truth and reconciliation‘ process in South Africa.  Reconciliation is a paradoxical way 
of rebuilding community, through some sort of solidarity generated by the conflicts which provoked the need 
for reconciliation in the first place. As such, reconciliation generates a risk that may or may not be overcome. 
The process of rebuilding community, therefore, is one ―always attuned to the aspiration of being-in-common 
and aware of its vulnerability‖. It always draws its meaning from a vision of a better future. Christodoulidis 
E. ‗Truth and Reconciliation as Risks‘, 9(2), Social and Legal Studies, 2000, at 198. 
494 I wish to acknowledge and thank Professor Neil Walker for making me aware of this term.  
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re-definition, especially in ways that includes those that are not currently part of 
community. This is what I believe is the powerful analogy that one gets from the 
metropolitan residential community. Its membership always changes in time. Some 
members move out, whilst others move in. Some die, whilst others are born. Membership 
of this sort of community is never fully determined. It draws on its sense of history, 
however minimal it might be, but it also looks to the future to define what it is. It is a 
process that can never be concluded.  
 
Unfortunately, these sorts of views have not often been emphasised enough in 
Nigerian thoughts or practices of community.  Dominant views about community have 
often failed to acknowledge community in the temporal nature above, or that individuals 
are not only shaped by ethnic communal identities, but rather by a range of other 
communities.  This is the reason why the arguments in this section are even more important 
for the Nigerian context.  Irrespective of how hard this might be, it is what we ought to 
strive to achieve. Given that the following conditions might not exist in all communities, 
the question from the point of view of this thesis is how it can be encouraged, and 
furthermore, how communities can strive for collective solutions in the face of differences 
that may often contradict each other?  After all, it is possible to understand that 
fundamental differences in a community can raise practical difficulties for collective 
organisation or participation.  Any proposal for collective decision-making in diverse or 
multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria can only be achieved through dialogue. There must be 
an attempt for shared understanding of not only what divides, but also what unites 
members in community. It is only then that communities can understand what is shared in 
common.   What is shared in common does not necessarily have to be common values, but 
could also common problems. Ordinarily, it should not really matter whether individuals 
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have irreconcilable differences; all that should matter is that they share a given territory, 
and that there are common problems within it that affect everyone.    Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that the very processes of dealing with common problems may themselves 
motivate better understanding of the degree of interdependence that exists within 
community. This is arguably the most important moral from narrative about the Nigerian 
community. Even if it was short-lived, their common problems inspired discussions to 
search for collective solutions to substantially improve their security in ways that benefited 
all. In this sense, the proposals that follow must be seen as part of encouraging new 
thinking of community.  
 
3. Community Participation 
 
The second component of the theory of community entails offering specific vision of how 
individuals can take part in community. It is based on the understanding that participation 
is dependent on certain local practices and institutions. This component is mindful of the 
fact that community participation is something that might emerge spontaneously, but it is 
also acknowledged that it is something that has to be engineered by conscious design.  Not 
all communities are as unique as the Nigerian community in the beginning, which seemed 
to create the environment for participation.  Even so, the narrative about the Nigerian 
community does raise important questions about how to sustain such engagements 
whenever they emerge, given that participation there was short lived.   
 
Whatever the case may be, a lot depends on the ability to create the right social and 
institutional environment where individuals can become more accustomed to dealing with 
matters concerning their continued existence – including collective needs, norms and 
institutions – or other things that structure their lives.  A component is required to 
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encourage suitable social arrangements that allow values and solidarities in community to 
prosper. And this entails institutionalising processes where values of kinship, solidarity, 
cooperation, reciprocity, sympathy and trust can be strengthened.  Institutionalisation – 
used here in its loose sense – is a way of building stronger civic friendship, since this can 
create the environment for relationships outside the family structure, and more importantly, 
types of relationships than those encouraged by the State or market. Much of the literature 
on institutional design is quite helpful here. It elaborates on the importance of institutions 
in shaping the capacity of agents to acquire different behavioural habits and dispositions.
495
 
Without pursuing the language of institutional design too far, the point is that there is really 
no reason why the community cannot be understood as an institution that orients the 
behavioural activity of individuals within it. There is a much wider significance of 
institutionalisation. It may also have a further effect of increasing the normative content of 
democracy by localising it and promoting ideals of participation, equality, and 
empowerment or, in this case, human rights. More importantly – a point that will be 
pursued later – community participation is one way of contesting the narrow domain of 
politics, which is often restricted to political parties or formal public institutions.  
 
The issues outlined above call the standard relationship between community and 
State into question. The discussions presented so far can so easily be misconstrued as an 
argument for community as an exclusive alternative. This is partly correct, in that the 
community doesn‘t necessarily have to be articulated in opposition to the State. Proposing 
the role for community is however a means of challenging the exclusivity of the State over 
                                                 
495
  See, for instance, Hubert Dreyfus on institutions and the development of ‗ethical expertise‘.  Dreyfus H. 
‗What is Moral Maturity? Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise‘, in Ogilvy J. (ed.) Revisioning  
Philosophy, State University of New York, 1992, at111-123. 
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the production of human rights.
496
   The strength of the argument is perhaps its weakness; 
the community must rely on the State (regional or local government‘s) to devolve its 
powers onto it.  This will entail several things, one of which is the need to devise policies 
and programmes that would enable communities to participate in public affairs. These 
would, of course, vary as between budgetary allocations, training and recruitment of 
community workers, and most importantly, it would entail the creation of what might be 
called ‗Community Forums‘ within neighbourhoods through which decisions over the 
provisioning of certain public goods (or human rights) can be subjected to democratic 




3.1. Community Forums  
It is important to note from the outset that the use of the term Community Forums is 
slightly different from how it is used in an article co-authored with Maksymillian Del 
Mar.
497
 There ‗Community Forum schemes‘ were proposed to create a critical space for 
reflection on the limitations of our normative languages or institutions in seeing and 
responding to different forms of suffering and vulnerability.  It was conceived as a space 
through which ―the particularities of suffering and vulnerability within a specific 
community can be recognised and communicated in a multiplicity of ways.‖
498
  In doing 
so, the schemes were proposed to serve as a main resource for policy making in relation to 
different problems, including those regarding public goods in different communities. The 
Community Forum schemes were to be composed of representatives of local communities, 
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I am also aware that the suggestions here have profound constitutional implications, which are, however, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 




government and international economic institutions, as well as local and external persons 
with scholarly and artistic specialisation.  The inclusion of that element was an attempt to 
give a more comprehensive depiction of various forms of suffering and vulnerability, 
especially through media and other forms of representation. It was an attempt to move 
away from the over-dependence on dominant modes of representations, such as statistics, 
or economic analysis, or even political forms of expression or representation. This is 
consistent with the central thesis on incompleteness promoted in that article.  In general 
terms, the article sought to provide a general theory to assess and improve the moral 
quality of work of international economic institutions, by rejecting the 
compartmentalisation of behavioural values – that is, activities that either appeal to rules, 
or forms of institutional design. The article called for a more integrated approach where 
normative resources that appeal to such different behavioural capacities can be reconciled –
that is, a more balanced understanding of rules and institutional design. There was also a 
third element, one that focused on the application of the theory. It aimed at encouraging the 
ability of international economic agents to come into terms with the limitations of their 
ways of seeing and acting. There, Community Forum schemes were proposed to fulfil this 
aspect of this theory. It was conceived – with work of international economic institutions in 
mind – to create a space to encourage a variety of ways for actors within those institutions 
to see and react to problems.   
 
Without in any way deviating too much from the original intention, the Community 
Forum, here, is framed quite differently even though there are certain aspects of the initial 
proposal that are retained.  The first is the normative function of the Community Forum. It 
is indeed necessary to retain its function as a site for rehabilitation. It is a personal but yet 
collective space, where individuals face up to their limitations of their ways of seeing and 
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acting. In this case, it can be used to encourage critical reflection over common problems, 
especially in ways that appeal to the understanding of common values and differences.  
Participation of the kind proposed cannot succeed outside an environment of love, 
friendship, cooperation, mutual understanding, and most importantly, a space where the 
limitations of seeing and acting can be understood collectively.  And it is not difficult to 
see how some of the insights from Simone Weil discussed in previous chapters is one way 
of achieving this. The Community Forum can serve other purposes, for instance, 
encouraging social activities, so as to assist strengthen relationships, quite apart from its 
primary reflective or deliberative function. It can serve as a way of building civic and other 
forms of friendships. As mentioned in chapter‘s one and three, Community Forums can 
provide a forum for discussions around competing values, particularly how tensions 
between the need to main individual and collective autonomy, amongst other values, can 
be reduced. In terms of its composition, this should be determined by the community in 
question, which might choose to include representatives of State, local government 
councils, and whosoever the community might deem necessary to participate.  Most 
importantly, it must be open to all residents of that community.  
 
The second aspect of Community Forum that is retained from its original form is 
the policy-making component – that is, Community Forums should be understood as a 
source for decision-making concerning problems of access to water, electricity, education 
or healthcare.  The Community Forum in this context takes the view from below as its 
point of departure. It is interested in maximising the quality of interactions and the agency 
of community to instigate social change. It is in this respect ultimately interested in 
creating opportunities for self-determination and self-governance.  The capacity for self-
governance would, of course, vary from community; some communities would obviously 
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have more decision-making capabilities than others. This does not mean that this proposal 
should lose any appeal; it just means that poorly organised communities need to be 
encouraged in ways that they can fulfil their potential.  This could also be achieved by 
retaining aspects of the previous proposals for the role of the State, scholarly (and indeed 
artistic) experts –– in this case, the role of the latter will primarily be focused on 
facilitating dialogues, and nurturing the environment for collective decision-making.  
Community Forums as such, will ultimately form the main institutional framework for 
organising participation within neighbourhoods, as well as building solidarity around 
common problems, and democratic decision-making.  
 
One should be clear that as appealing as this proposal may seem, it is a bit over-
romantic. It is true that it is plausible to understand community as a catalyst for change 
through processes of critical reflection, solidarity and collective action. It is no doubt 
plausible to understand the importance of neutral spaces where individuals can make 
connections through aggregate personal experiences in trying to deal with the problems 
that affect the life of their community. They clearly need an atmosphere of patience, 
communication and shared understanding of collective problems.  There will always be 
differences in how these problems are understood given the diversity of culture, history and 
social status that may make up a particular community.  It is quite possible to speculate that 
communities may be united around a particular problem, but it is also possible that they 
would be disunited by attempts to find solutions.  It is very possible that the richer or more 
privileged classes would not be opposed to solutions like privatisation. At the risk of 
speculation, this is a proposal that the poor might reject.  The emphasis on what is shared – 
whether values or problems – can also serve as a precondition for conflict. We must not 
forget that, even in the most egalitarian of communities‘ exclusion, discrimination, 
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unreasoned decision-making, conflict, and disagreement always persists.  The recent 
controversies surrounding the town hall debates over healthcare reform in the United States 
are clear indications of the kind of difficulties that can be predicted.  It begs the following 
question for current purposes: how can possible differences be defended in the processes of 
participation without necessarily destroying the harmony in community? This is, of course, 
a very difficult question but some possible answers may be found in certain strands of 
deliberative democratic theory, which have sought to address similar problems.  What this 
suggests is that decision-making in community needs a further component; it needs a 
theory of democratic deliberation.  
 
4.   A Deliberative Theory of Incompleteness  
 
The aim in this section is to offer a deliberative theory suitable for participation within 
Community Forums.  It is argued that participation within Community Forums can only be 
sustained through what is called a deliberative theory of incompleteness. It is a theory that 
embraces a range of deliberative traditions rather than a single one. In particular, it takes 
the standard deliberative democratic model as a starting point, but also accommodates 
criticisms of it, including alternatives proposed by radical democratic theories.  As a 
consequence, no single theory of deliberation is privileged in the context of Community 
Forums. It begins by recognising the importance of dialogue but it does so without placing 
too much emphasis on consensus building.  At the same time, it does not fall into the trap 
of over-emphasising disagreement, as these may have an effect on provoking the worst of 
outcomes in the most divided communities.    As a result, this component defends views 
that suggest that agreements, including the rules about how to constituting them, ought to 
be understood as temporal settlements, which can be revisited and reworked in light of 
future circumstances. The potential of the approach adopted in this chapter can only be 
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appreciated in the context of a discussion about the strengths and limitations of deliberative 
democracy, and indeed, the radical deliberative alternative.  
 
4.1. The Primacy of dialogue   
The importance of deliberation automatically calls the prevailing conception of democracy 
into question. Deliberative theories of democracy have arisen out of the impoverished 
nature of the dominant aggregate model of democracy.
499
 They are framed to respond to 
the limitations of the aggregate model, which is primarily concerned with the collation of 
voter preferences and the election of leaders.  This is indeed the dominant model of 
democracy across the world, which is simply a process of competition by political parties 
and candidates to offer their platforms and attempt to satisfy the greatest amount of 
preferences. The aggregate model of democracy restricts political participation only to 
elections, representation and political parties. Democracy as such is understood 
instrumentally, as system of procedures with very little normative content.   
 
There are, of course, many other problems with the aggregate model, which cannot 
possibly be discussed in this chapter, except to say that some of these problems are clearly 
visible in the context of Nigeria today.
500
 For instance, being a plural society, competition 
for the control of the State has only reinforced the weakness of elections and 
representation, as a means of aggregating preferences and differences.
501
  This is indeed 
                                                 
499 The aggregate model of democracy owes much of its influence to the work of Joseph Schumpeter. See, 
Schumpeter  J above n 183. 
500 For interesting critiques of the aggregate model of democracy, see; Young I. Inclusion and Democracy, 
Oxford University Press, 2000. See, Benhabib S (ed.) Democracy and Difference, Princeton University Press, 
1996.  Mouffe C. ‗For an agonistic model of democracy‘, in O‘sullivan N. (ed.) Political Theory in 
Transition, Routledge, 2000, at 113.  Gutmann A and Thompson D. Democracy and Disagreement, Harvard 
University Press, 1996.  
501  There are also questions about whether representation adequately deals with questions of difference. 
Representation is problematic for another reason, that is, it always sits at a distance from the needs and feel of 
the represented. According to Hardt and Negri, representation operates as a ―disjunctive synthesis‖: ―it 
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one explanation for the electoral related violence in the country, which has often taken 
religious and ethnic dimensions.  Quite surprisingly, commentaries on the democratic 
deficit in the Nigeria
502
 have failed to make these connections – and neither have they seen 
the need to engender more inclusive democratic models apart from questions of electoral 
reform.
503
 Electoral democracy – as prioritised by the aggregate model – is an insufficient 
way of responding to these problems; instead, what it seems to encourage is deep discord.  
Democracy becomes the competition for the control of the State at different levels, most 
often by the competing identities, vulnerable to capture by dominant elites. This is, of 
course, very often achieved by the manipulation of the electoral system.  Seen this way, 
there are perhaps wider implications of deliberative democratic theories than their 
relevance to Community Forums; they no doubt can enrich the practice of democracy in 
the country.  It is not possible to pursue in detail how this might be achieved, except to say 
that deliberative theories of democracy provide a useful way of responding to the 
superficial nature of aggregate models of democracy, given the primacy of elections as the 
most important form of democratic expression. The starting point for most deliberative 
theories is that all political decisions within a body politic must be reached through 
processes of dialogue amongst free and equal citizens.
504
 Theories of deliberative 
democracy are interested in creating various forums for dialogue, in which decisions of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
simultaneously connects and cuts, attaches and separates‖ the represented from government. Hardt and Negri 
above n 67, at 241. 
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 Except for Ilan Kapoor‘s interesting article which compares Habermas‘s and Mouffe‘s approach to 
deliberative democracy, not much has been done to situate deliberative theories of democracy within the 
wider context of Third World politics. Mouffe‘s work constitutes a slight exception as it is mentioned in the 
work of Arturo Escobar in relation to social movements. But, it must be noted that, like Habermas, Mouffe 
does not really have Third World politics in mind when she proposes her theories of agonistic pluralism. See, 
Kapoor I. ‗Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? The relevance of the Habermas-Mouffe debate for 
Third Wold Politics‘, 27 (4), Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 2002, at 459-487.  
503Nigeria has a long history of violence, not the least electoral violence since its inception as an independent 
country in 1960. However, there seems to have been an escalation of (electoral related) violence in more 
recent times with the end of military rule, and the emergence of democratic politics from 1998. The appeal to 
violence around elections is a testimony of the weakness of the dominant aggregate model, especially the 
inadequacy of elections in dealing with deep difference. Surprisingly, the only attempts at democratic reform, 
quite visible from elite grievances, only address questions of electoral reform.   
504 Mouffe above n 501.  
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public nature can be influenced. Deliberative democracy is not particularly concerned with 
the conduct of elections or even plebiscites.  
 
Deliberative models of democracy are mainly framed to respond to the deficit in 
participation, the absence of which is believed to account for the formal nature of 
democracy today. Deliberative democracy attempts to assert a normative dimension to 
democracy by creating sufficient procedures for dialogue, with the aim of guaranteeing 
agreement between parties. The key for a successful democracy for deliberative theorists is 
the removal of structures that impede authentic dialogue, so as to foster agreement between 
parties. There is an underlying emphasis on finding agreement, the probability of which 
lies in creating incentives and ensuring the commitment of groups to sustained dialogue.  
The main presupposition is that in deliberation parties in conflict propose their respective 
positions and solutions to collective problems by offering reasons for them. Such reasons 
put forward by individuals are then criticised, as they also criticise proposals and reasons 
of others. Deliberative democracy encourages participants to be concerned with the 
interests of others, just as they are concerned about their own interests. This is, of course, 
on the condition that such interests are ultimately compatible with the interests of justice.  
Deliberative theories of democracy aim to reduce the influence of power in political 
decision making. They posit that the outcomes of deliberations should be reached by 
reasoned argument, without threats or the use of force.  Deliberative democracy is 
considered as a superior way of dealing with the most difficult political questions, as those 
that concern groups and identities with deep differences. It is a more plausible way of 
reducing, if not, eliminating the aggressive instrumental nature of partisan politics. 
Theories of deliberative democracy presuppose that dialogue can only function with the 
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right type of institutions. And this would reduce the possibility of domination of 
individuals by other individuals or groups.  
 
Dialogue is, for instance, the primary objective of Jurgen Habermas‘s
505
 procedural 
theory of democracy which, amongst other things, attempts to provide a framework for 
unhindered channels of communication in what he calls the public sphere. Harbemas‘s 
theory builds on his early ideas about the bourgeois public sphere in the European 
eighteenth century, which he described as an avenue for a whole range of debates over 
diverse public issues. The public sphere comprised of a whole range of spaces of a public 
nature, including salons, literary societies, cafes or it included the formulation of public 
opinion through the media.
506
 To put it simply, the public sphere is an open space for 
informed public discussion over issues that benefit everyone in society. Individuals achieve 
this by engaging in rational-argument over such public issues. The only condition for 
achieving success is that they leave out their vested interests or preferences. The public 
sphere is conceived as a non-coercive, secular, and rational arena. The public sphere is 
described as a space that accommodates everyone who participates without limiting their 
input on themes, questions, time, resources, or the actual content of the discussions. It 
recognises the value of individual rights to ensure the protection of citizens from others, 
and the State. 
 
All these permutations about the public sphere can be found in Habermas‘s more 
recent focus on deliberative democracy, a theory of which is depicted as the rules or 
                                                 
505 See generally, Habermas above n 448. See, Calhoun C (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press. 
1994 at 2. For an interesting critique of Habermas‘s concept of deliberative democracy, see; Scheuerman W. 
‗Between Radicalism and Resignation: Democratic theory in Habermas‘s Between Facts and Norms‘, in 
Dews P (ed.) Habermas: A critical Reader, Blackwell Publishers, 1999. 
506 Habermas J. Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, Burger T and Fredrick L. (Trans.) MIT Press, 1989. 
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procedures to assist reduce the possibilities of disagreement in the process of public 
decision-making. Democratic will-formation, as he calls it, is dependent on public 
conversation according to certain procedures and reason.   Public deliberation is only 
guaranteed through fair procedures, which in turn facilitate ―ideal speech situations‖
507
 – 
that is, inclusive, non-coercive, and open deliberative procedures.  For him, the agenda and 
participants should not be restricted by any rules that impede the deliberation. All that 
matters is that individuals initiate an agenda or show that they are affected by the subject-
matter of deliberation.  Habermas does concede that procedures may not always 
sufficiently accommodate all interests or always encourage agreement.  Nevertheless, the 
ultimate goal is for procedures that are acceptable to all, and this in many ways depends on 
their moral impartiality.  Agreement, on this view, emerges only when the procedure is 
neutral to competing moral views. The processes of deliberation as such, ensure conditions 
for ideal discourse.  Dialogues must be open amongst equal participants to be effective.  
This depends on consensus building as a means of ensuring that all interests are taken into 
consideration.  According to him, these procedures must be constitutionalised in order to 
give them legitimacy, apart from providing criteria for rich democratic politics. The 
ultimate goal is to increase the area of influence of the public sphere and to ensure the 
accountability of administrative or bureaucratic entities.  Rationality is important in 
deliberations, which must in itself be communicative through arguments and counter 
arguments.  Decision-making must be based on consensus, which can only be transformed 
by the strength of better arguments. Whatever the case may be, all decisions (as already 
mentioned) must be reached through reasoned argument.   
 
 
                                                 
507 See, Habermas J. ‗Three Normative Models of Democracy‘, in Benhabib above n 501, at 21-30.  
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4.1.1. Application of Theory 
It is not difficult to see the ideas above about deliberation might be a potentially useful 
resource for decision-making within various communities and their respective Community 
Forums. What it entails is repeating some of the practices of deliberation within such 
Community Forums. The proposals for deliberation here are quite modest; they are not – 
like most deliberative theories – concerned with participating in wider political decision-
making processes of the State. Neither are they concerned with deliberating in decision-
making processes of market institutions. The concerns here depart from the standard 
deliberative democratic theories, which are framed with institutions of the State – such as 
legislatures, courts, public enquiries, committees, and administrative tribunals – in mind.  
The concern for deliberative theories has rarely been about participation beyond those 
spheres, except in the case of formal consultation exercises. Even in such situations, the 
goal of deliberation is really to influence rather than directly take control of governance. 
508
 
This is quite different from what Community Forums seek to achieve; the aim here is to 
take part in governance.  
 
Deliberative theories of democracy are relied upon here to understand how 
individuals in community can actually participate. And this makes them very relevant for 
the work of Community Forums. Habermas‘s work in particular achieves this by 
importantly recognising the communicative power of civil society, even though it does not 
seek to give real control or ownership over processes of actual governance.  His more 
recent theories are succinct in this respect, given that they are reformulated in light of 
criticisms of the public sphere for its narrow base for participation.  After all, the public 
sphere in its original form is conceived as a single arena comprised of educated middle-
                                                 
508 Iris Young makes a similar argument by what she calls the decentred model of deliberative democracy, 
see; Young above n 501, at 46. 
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class gentlemen with the gift of eloquence or rational argument.  Nancy Frazer‘s 
formulation of subaltern counterpublics
509
 or multiple arenas has been particularly helpful 
in increasing the scope of participation, especially for subordinated groups whose status 
naturally excludes them from the public sphere.  
 
But even if the public sphere has benefited from such reformulations, which now 
allow it to include excluded groups, it does not seem to adequately respond to further 
problems and limitations with the deliberative model of democracy. This is mainly the 
inability to deal with deep disagreement and difference within such spaces, not the least in 
fragmented societies. After all, formulating alternative sites for marginalised groups to 
inscribe their own imaginations into politics – like Frazer‘s subaltern counter-publics – 
does not go far enough to question the exclusion unique in those contexts.  Problems of 
exclusion can be anticipated even with subaltern counter-publics, quite apart from 
questions of disagreement and conflict.  The point is that, there is a further need to 
understand how conflicts and disagreements can be addressed within those contexts.   
 
The point that I am trying to make is that Habermas‘s deliberative theory cannot 
simply be dispensed with in light of the observations above. Even in saying so, there are 
difficulties with it which need to be understood, and then transcended to make it more 
relevant to Community Forums. One potentially useful way of understanding the 
limitations, and at the same time, a potential way of re-thinking deliberative theory is 
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 Nancy Frazer challenges the unitary bourgeois public sphere and deliberative processes therein. For her, 
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254 
 
provided by the work of Iris Marion Young.
510
  She mounts several criticisms of 
deliberative theory, which cannot be explored here in detail. For the moment, only certain 
aspects of her criticisms which seem relevant to Community Forums are considered in this 
context.  The most interesting point she makes in this regard can be seen from her 
criticisms of the dominant form of political communication in deliberative democratic 
theory, which – as seen above – places emphasis on reasoned argument. It gives priority to 
a chain of reasoned argument, beginning with a premise and leading to a logical 
conclusion.
511
   Whilst the importance of good arguments cannot be overlooked, Young 
argues that, they are not the only method of political communication.  Most theories 
usually depict deliberation as something that proceeds on the basis of generally accepted 
premises, concepts and frameworks, including the types of speech permitted. One 
consequence is that, it may disguise certain expressions that do not readily fit into those 
accepted categories or modes of expression.  Formulating general rules or practices for 
deliberation cannot prevent certain problems that do not find expression in the language 
already agreed upon.  The norms of articulation she speaks about are typical of the forms 
of expression common of ―highly educated people.‖
512
 It is often the case that written, 
formal, general or circuitous speeches take precedence over other modes of expression. 
513
 
This is perhaps because the norms of articulateness, as she puts it, are culturally specific. 
Socially privileged individuals usually have better qualities of expression than others.  
Because of this, deliberative processes are not open to everyone in equal terms.  Though 
public speaking may be difficult, everyone should nonetheless be encouraged rather than 
                                                 
510 Young above n 501, at 37. 
511 Ibid.  
512 Ibid. 
513 Young also argues norms of good argument often exclude modes of political communication which are 
disorderly or disruptive. Ibid at 47. 
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discouraged from participating, even if they fail to express themselves according to 




The second limitation with deliberative theories that needs to be transcended is that 
it usually presupposes discussions around the common good.  The idea of the common 
good here is simply understood as common problems that need to be addressed collectively 
without any pretentions of the existence of common values or interests. It is usually 
proposed that such values and vested interests should be kept away from such public 
debates, and confined to the private sphere.  There are usually two ways of interpreting the 
common good in deliberative theories. First, they refer to some shared values prior to 
discussions, which would provide a basis for deliberation. Alternatively, they refer to 
common values, which deliberation should strive to achieve. Both positions, Young argues, 
are wrong.  
 
First, it is doubtful that this would be a plausible theory for plural societies, where 
values and interests would always be in conflict. A common good based theory of 
deliberation only succeeds in circumscribing the public sphere, limiting it only to those 
values that can be found compatible. In doing this, it tends to exclude incompatible values 
or interests.   There are similar problems with the alternative way of understanding the 
common good view of deliberative democracy – that is, those views that propose a certain 
common objective that deliberation should strive to attain.  This approach is predicated on 
the ability of individuals who, in spite of their differences (i.e., background or identity), 
shelve them for purposes of the common good. In such a case, differences must either be 
                                                 
514 Ibid. This is perhaps something that can be assisted by the inclusion of artistic experts in initial proposals 




domesticated or transcended by public discourse. Asserting such differences and vested 




 seems to agree with this criticism in her critique of the work of 
John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas.  She, like Young, rejects prior agreement as a starting 
point for deliberation.  For Mouffe, deliberative democrats seem too fixated on the 
question of consensus and rational agreement, thereby ignoring the conflicting nature of 
democratic politics itself.  Mouffe, as will be demonstrated later, offers an agonistic model 
of democracy in response to the limitations of deliberative democracy. Her starting point is 
the rejection of consensus, and she proposes a theory of politics that acknowledges the 
inevitability of disagreement.  For her, democratic politics should be about maximising all 
opportunities for disagreements to be expressed.  Mouffe‘s main grievance is that the 
emphasis on agreement only succeeds in disavowing the value pluralism that exists within 
society.  The argument for deliberative democracy is, after all, that consensus can be 
reached if, and only if, certain vested interests are kept beneath the surface of dialogue.    
 
Before looking more closely at Mouffe‘s perspective, it will be helpful to explore a 
few more reasons why the common good approach is problematic, and in this respect, how 
their limitations can be transcended.   On the general level, the common good approach is 
not capable of dealing with conditions of deep social inequality. Differences in social status 
or economic position will prove advantageous to some, but they will always also be 
disadvantageous to others. This was one of the implications of the story of the Nigerian 
community in the beginning, where the poor rarely attended meetings because of their 
inferior economic and social backgrounds. But, it must be recognised that this is a problem 
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that may not be easily overcome even if the poor are able to participate. It may only lead to 
the formal inclusion of the poor in certain deliberative institutions.  
 
There is a further difficulty with the over-emphasis on the common good. Young 
says that it is likely to narrow the agenda for discussions, thereby effectively silencing 
certain view points.  A good way of addressing this problem, as she suggests, is that rather 
than think of deliberation in such terms, individuals should come to the table without pre-
conceived notions about how collective problems should be addressed. Parties to 
deliberation should not be in a hurry to accept a common good in ways that the consensus 
model presupposes. Real agreement only emerges when parties are willing or open to 
change their original positions. A more productive approach would be to think of this as an 
open ended, and context specific process of cooperation. As such, decisions on particular 
problems can always be revisited and open to change.  In this way, methods of resolving 
specific problems might be agreed upon without repressing various differences.   
 
 
Whilst the following insights are valuable, it must be recognised that, the concerns 
by Young and others should not ordinarily affect Community Forums. The anxieties above 
may be exceptional, and they are not always the norm. The point is that problems relating 
to access to water or electricity are not so difficult to identify, and it is possible to have 
dialogues around such commonly held problems, or the common good.  The potential 
difficulty, however, is with the nature of decision-making process. It is here that Young‘s 
insights will be most useful. On her approach, decisions should not be preconceived before 
processes of deliberation.  At the risk of being too speculative, what this may entail is that 
solutions could range from the direct involvement of community say, through co-
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operatives to other market alternatives, i.e., through an independent private provider, or 
even by resorting to the role of the State. What matters the most is that such decisions over 
choices are not be preconceived prior to deliberations. This, as has already been 
highlighted, is one of weaknesses of the Bretton Woods Institution‘s participatory 
approaches as discussed in chapter two. Participation does little to change the preconceived 
content of such policies.
516
  Policy decisions are often reached before they are offered out 
for participation.  
 
One inescapable aspect of this question of openness in dialogue is the recognition 
of the inevitability of conflict and disagreement. The emphasis on consensus (in a bid to 
preserve the common good) can sometimes be articulated in such a way that it seeks to 
remove divisive issues from the subject of discussions.  In doing so, it may have an effect 
of silencing issues that are the source of discontent or harm to parties in deliberation.  
Dialogues or even solutions that are produced by such dialogues are not likely to be 
sustained if they are reached under the pretensions of consensus.   Alternatively, agreement 
is better reached and sustained through mutual acknowledgment and cooperation amongst 
individuals, in ways that bridge their differences. In such a situation, agreement will always 
be temporal and always be open to constant negotiation and renegotiation.  In conditions of 
deep structural conflicts, Young argues that such processes of ―political communication are 
more about struggle than agreement‖. 
517
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 In the next chapter (chapter seven), I revisit the question of access to electricity, and the extent to which 
an ‗electricity co-operative‘ may be a potential alternative to deal with this problem.   
517 Young above n 501. 
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Quite a similar approach is that offered by James Tully, who proposes a brand of 
constitutional democracy based on the irreducibility of differences.
518
 Again, it must be 
noted that, the point I am concerned about is quite different from Tully.  He is concerned 
with the legitimacy of constitutional practices in light of the principles of constitutional 
democracy. For him, a constitutional democracy is legitimate if it upholds certain 
principles, one of which is the practice of agonistic deliberation. This is because the 
exercise of democratic freedom carries the requirement that citizens ought to participate 
according to rules, principles and procedures in democratic-constitutional institutions or 
various policy related activities. In highlighting the importance of participation, Tully 
fleshes out a unique brand of agnostic politics, which ought to serve as a precondition for 
democratic legitimacy.  And it is here that his approach can be linked up with the 
Community Forums, especially his emphasis on the temporal nature of agreements, and 
furthermore, the importance of mutual recognition. Here agreements are seen as temporal 
settlements, which are always open to negotiation, given that no final agreement can ever 
be reached.  Agonistic dialogues according to Tully‘s should be modelled on a framework 
that recognises the irreducibility of disagreement. Disagreements are irreducible because 
there is no final consensus on the subject matter of deliberation, including the principles or 
procedures, which regulate such processes: 
 Agreement, when it occurs, is always non-consensual to some extent. At its best, free individuals 
and groups establish a certain provisional overlapping consensus as the result of a critical dialogue 
within and on the spatial-temporal field of power and norms in which they find themselves. But, for 
any number of reasons, the best of agreements remain potentially open to reasonable disagreement  




It is not difficult to see how the proposals above can be repeated within the Community 
Forums. The deliberative theory of incompleteness would place emphasis on processes of 
                                                 
518  Tully J. ‗The Unfreedoms of the Moderns in comparison to their ideals of Constitutional Democracy‘, 65, 
Modern Law Review, 2002, at 210. See also, Tully J. ‗The Agonic Freedom of Citizens‘, 28, Economy and 
Society, 1999, at 116.  
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negotiation, bargaining and compromise, processes in which positions can be altered with 
the benefit of hindsight. Participants to dialogues can always ―...start over again, reach a 
provisional agreement or agree or disagree or agree to disagree...‖
520
 It is important to 
understand that there is a premium placed on deliberation only in so far as it recognises the 
irreducibility of disagreement.  But, there is a much wider significance of such processes of 
agonistic deliberation; it seems to offer more scope for inclusion. Everyone is allowed to 
participate, so are the rules of participation open to question. This is not surprising, given 
that agonism generally works within a framework of pluralism, one that recognises the 
diversities with the same degree of equivalence.  
 
To underscore the importance of maximising pluralism, it will be helpful to 
consider a similar approach to Tully‘s, even though its conclusions are quite different, and 
only partially helpful for the theory of incompleteness.   Along similar lines with Tully and 
Young, Chantal Mouffe‘s theory of ‗agonistic pluralism‘ cannot be overlooked in light of 
Community Forums.
521
  Agonistic pluralism and theories of deliberative democracy are 
united on the limitations of the aggregate model of democracy, but depart on alternatives 
proposed to it.  The main difficulty (and point of departure for Mouffe) is that the 
consensus-based model does not accommodate ethical, cultural or other backgrounds in the 
pursuit of agreement.   Again, it is important to emphasise the relevance of Mouffe‘s work, 
for present purposes, is different from which she herself intends – that is, she intends  to 
propose an alternative to the deliberative theory of democracy. The relevance of Mouffe‘s 
work here is how it might assist in encouraging pluralism within Community Forums in 
decision-making processes. This cannot only be appreciated through a background 
explanation of Mouffe‘s central ideas.  
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The failure of Habermas to recognise the relationship between legitimacy and power is 
Mouffe‘s starting point. This is what Habermas does when he posits that power can be 
eliminated by rational argumentation or pure rationality. For her, once the reality of power 
is recognised, then it is possible to imagine an alternative democratic model to both the 
aggregate and deliberative models. This alternative is what she calls ‗agonistic pluralism‘.   
Teasing out what she means by this term lies in the distinction between politics and ‗the 
political‘.
522
 The political refers to the inherent antagonistic nature of human and social 
relations, whilst politics refers to the aggregate of practices, discourses and institutions, 
which seek to establish a certain order and social relations. For Mouffe, the difficulty with 
politics is the attempt to conceal hostility, which is always a feature of human relations. 
Once politics is recognised as political, then the next question becomes how unity can be 
established in the face of conflict and diversity. It is a question about the dichotomy 
between ‗us and them‘, a dichotomy that cannot be easily transcended.  But, it is wrong to 
try and silence it; rather it can be articulated differently, especially in ways that reflect the 
plural character of society.  Given this, the aim of agnostic pluralism is not to conceive the 
‗them‘ as the enemy, but as an ‗adversary‘. A party to a dialogue is conceived as: 
…a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared 
adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. We disagree, 
however, about the meaning of liberal principles, and such disagreement cannot be resolved through 
deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of values, there is no 





What she means is that deliberation should not entail either tacit approval or the rejection 
of opposing views. Rather, it entails recognising alternative views as legitimate, and those 
who hold them as adversaries.  Accepting the position of an adversary is itself seen as a 
process of the transformation of political identity.  Whilst compromises in positions are 
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part and parcel of politics, decisions can only be considered as temporary settlements.  But 
Mouffe does not in any way suggest that parties would never reach agreement. Her views 
are not too different from Tully and Young here, who emphasise the temporary nature of 
agreements. Disagreements or conflicts do not impede democracy, but the only problem is 
when such disagreements manifest in antagonistic terms.   The aim of democratic politics 
according to Mouffe should be to transform antagonism into agonism, or enemies into 
adversaries. Agonistic politics seeks to create an environment for agonistic confrontation 
between adversaries, and not antagonistic confrontations. This is what she thinks 
democratic politics should be concerned about; it should provide a framework where 
differences are expressed. This is, for her, a plausible way of deliberating, even if this is 
not entirely her goal. Mouffe is saying, agonistic confrontations are symptomatic of a good 
democracy, and to say this, is not a contradiction in terms: 
A well functioning democracy, in short, calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If 
this is absent, there is the danger that democratic confrontation will be replaced by confrontation 
among other forms of collective identification, as is the case with so-called ‗identity politics‘. Too 
much emphasis on consensus, and the refusal of confrontation, leads to political apathy. Worse still, 
the outcome of may be a crystallization of collective passions which cannot be contained by the 
democratic process, with the consequent collapse of agonism into an explosion of antagonism that 
may appear to tear up the roots of civility.524 
 
Mouffe‘s approach seeks to maximise such differences in such a way different values and 
principles are expressed. And it is not difficult to see the potentials of agnostic politics for 
the Community Forums, especially as a helpful way allowing different opinions to come to 
light. Rational debate or pure rationality is not sufficient enough to eliminate disparities in 
power, or confer legitimacy in community. The challenge for community politics is the 
recognition of the pluralism visible in our societies. To use Mouffe‘s terms, we should 
embrace rather than renounce value pluralism. This should be the starting point for 
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entrenching rich processes of deliberation within community; it is not a problem that we 
should seek to overcome.  
 
One should not be too quick to accept Mouffe‘s position, without at least subjecting 
it to critical scrutiny.  The major limitation is that much of Mouffe‘s criticisms do not lead 
to a plausible alternative to follow. At least, the consensus model – unlike Mouffe‘s – 
implies that decisions can be made.  But, agonism on the other hand, only seems to point to 
the need for decisions to be subjected to further contestation. It seems certain that even if 
differences are recognised, a further approach is needed which allows decision-making in 
the face of such diverse identities. These definitely cannot be resolved simply by 
acknowledging the primacy of differences; it needs something more than that. Recognition 
of differences on its own is not sufficient to ethically orient the kind of decision-making 
proposed. Besides, the temporal nature of agreements may lead to a framework of 
instability, given that positions can easily be altered by deliberating parties. Outside any 
rules that prevent this from happening, agonistic politics will always be vulnerable to 
unpredictability. Moreover, agonism seems to place a lot of expectations on the part of 
participants that it can actually guarantee.   This is because it seems to rely heavily on the 
good faith of participants. It is true that any kind of democracy cannot function without 
parties willingly conceding their incompatible positions. But it is not clear how all groups 
will recognise such differences or act honestly. It is certainly not clear how participants to a 
discussion will recognise opposing positions as legitimate ones. Mouffe‘s position seems 
to invite a pluralism that can so easily slide to the antagonism, which she is trying to 
prevent.  It expects that participants will act democratically, without actually showing how 
they might do so. For instance, why would a historically dominant ethnic or religious group 
concede its positions to a less dominant group?   
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A more fundamental difficulty here stems from arguments made in the first component of 
the theory of community – that is, the point about recognising the multiplicity of identities. 
Even though Mouffe defends a type of politics that would not lead to the clash of identities, 
it is not clear how the clash of political positions would not end up being a clash of 
identities.  Democratic politics, after all, is sometimes about the identity positions of 
participants.  This is often the case in the kind of pluralistic societies that she imagines in 
her theory. The point is once the importance of identity is emphasised; the clash she 
conceives can also become hostile, violent or eventually unproductive.   What is needed is 
(as seen from Sen) for the multiplicity of identities to be emphasised, especially showing 
different ways in which individuals are connected. This possibility doesn‘t seem available 
with the agonistic model. Even Tully‘s brand of agonism, which emphasises cultural 
recognition,
525
 cannot prevent this difficulty mentioned above.  
 
The point in moving forward is to recognise that agonistics‘ does have some value 
despite limitations just mentioned.  It demonstrates the chaotic nature of democratic 
politics, even though it does not show how such differences can be resolved, or decisions 
reached.   What is required, for purposes of Community Forums, is a theory that not only 
allows the expression of differences, but also one that recognises that – in spite of such 
differences, (including modes of expressing them) – the ultimate objective is for all 
individuals to contribute to the decisions in the Community Forums.  Dialogue as such, is 
not just an inescapable necessity, but a prerequisite for Community Forums.  A plausible 
way of thinking of this proposal is to consider how agonism, deliberation and such other 
models can contribute to the equilibrium of the framework. As such, the theory of 
deliberation for Community Forums embraces agonistic pluralism – which might provide a 
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sufficient theory of plural politics – but it still maintains the primacy of deliberation in the 
process of decision-making.  It must be appreciated that both approaches are responding to 
the same problem, they only differ on how to resolve it. Looking at it this way, agonism 
and deliberation are not really conflicting theories.  
 
Furthermore, the theory of deliberation proposed here must be open to the existence 
of any local deliberative democratic models. Local models of politics, deliberation and 
dispute resolution ought to be encouraged in their specific country contexts.  Again, these 
are issues that can only be sorted out on a country specific basis. There has been a lot of 
work on traditional or informal judicial systems but there is very little literature on 
alternative democratic systems.  This is perhaps something that might be unravelled 
through a research agenda in the Nigerian and other contexts. In spite of this potential, it is 
something that cannot be addressed here in any detail.   
 
5. Conclusion 
It is quite unlikely that Nigerian communities will be challenged by most of the 
apprehensions raised above, especially about the plausibility of deliberation in general. It 
may not be so difficult to identify common problems that may form the basis of coming 
together.
526
 After all, access to water, electricity, education and healthcare are problems 
that would affect everyone in common. Even if common problems are recognisable, one 
must not be under any illusions that the proposals for participation here would be easy to 
achieve. They will certainly take time to achieve, just like real change will take time to be 
nurtured. These proposals nonetheless provide an alternative to what is currently available 
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in the Nigerian and other contexts. Nevertheless, the arguments in this chapter have by no 
means been exhaustive, and sceptics may find them too idealistic. For instance, who is it 
for? How are these proposals going to get implemented? How will it be funded? Forms of 
taxation or subsidies could be devised. Funding from the State can be mobilised, since – as 
discussed – its role cannot be dispensed with entirely. As much as Community Forums 
require initiatives from particular communities involved, they also require the State to 
devolve some of its powers.  Sometimes these sorts of initiatives might have to be created 
by the State, since as also mentioned such forms of collaboration and participation are not 
always spontaneous.  What is important here is that concrete proposals must be drawn up 
with the contributions and participation of those most affected by such problems.  The 
















Chapter Seven  
 








The main purpose of this chapter is to sketch out models of community electricity co-
operatives, as a further step towards encouraging participation amongst individuals in 
various communities. It aims to build on discussions in the previous chapter by 
considering, in rather hypothetical terms, a particular option, amongst a possible range of 
others, that might be open to various communities through their Community Forums.  In 
doing so, it also revisits previous discussions in chapters one and four about electricity to 
propose an approach that firstly acknowledges it as both a human right and public good in 
the more ethical sense of the term. Secondly, it is an approach that recognises the 
importance of cooperation and participation in the quest for electricity, which is ultimately 
built on a social market philosophy that allows this possibility. The main objective is to 
demonstrate the possibility of creating a social model of electricity that can avoid the short 
comings of dominant profit market model, one that can also create the atmosphere for 
solutions to be worked out with the participation of those mostly affected by the problems. 
Co-operatives provide a practical example of how a community can participate in the 






The chapter begins with a discussion on the significance of co-operatives in general 
conceptual terms. What follows is a discussion of co-operatives in Nigeria, the origins of 
which are traced to its colonial history. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the potential 
of co-operatives in electricity, as a way of enabling access, cooperation and participation 
within and between communities. It sketches out in theoretical terms how to reframe the 
legal and institutional framework and then proceeds to sketch out the internal design for 
three similar types of co-operatives – that is, community supply co-operatives, community 





Broadly speaking, the co-operative model has a long history, one that can be traced to early 
periods of industrial capitalism. In more recent times, economic globalisation has given 
rise to what might be called a second co-operative moment, and co-operatives now 
constitute a common phenomenon across the world today.  Co-operative activities have 
permeated different geographical boundaries in attempt to deal with different sorts of 
problems. Whilst co-operatives have varied in type, their activities have also been diverse.  
Co-operatives have been in the forefront of attempts to address many pressing problems 
like the lack of access to public goods.   
 
Conceptually, co-operatives can best be described as democratic, self-help 
economic organisations, which are formed to assist in alleviating poor socio-economic 
conditions of its members, and sometimes, problems of a community in which it operates. 
Co-operatives usually function by aggregating individual market power into a collective 
whole, so as to tackle problems vital to its members, communities or societies. The origins 
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of this sort of activity can be traced to England during the period of industrial capitalism.  
The rise of co-operatives was provoked by the poverty of the times, given that many 
peasants could only find poorly paid work in the existing capitalist factories. The industrial 
revolution aggravated the conditions of many leading to situations where shop-keepers and 
private traders became exploitative, quite apart from individuals having no alternatives but 
to purchase inferior goods from such exploitative traders.   
 
Given these reasons, and other difficulties, the foundations for what is now 
regarded as a global co-operative movement began at Toad Lane, Rochdale, Lancaster in 
1844.
527
  The Rochdale consumers‘ co-operatives emerged in response to the inadequate 
wages, poor working conditions and the pervasiveness of poverty caused by poor factory 
wage. More specifically, the co-operative began by buying high-quality consumer goods at 
low cost and traded them at affordable prices to workers or other customers. The work of 
social reformer Robert Owen and nonconformist Churches supported these initiatives, and 
furthermore, encouraged the creation of other co-operative communities across the country. 
Co-operative activities not only underscored the strength of collective action, but also the 
value of integrity in business, given the importance attached to values of autonomy, 
participation, equity and solidarity. These values have now been formalised into the seven 
guiding principles for worldwide co-operative activities today: 
 
1) Membership is voluntary and open (co-operatives are always open to new members).  
2) Democratic control by the membership (members vote on all important decisions according to 
the principles of ―one member, one vote‖, regardless of the capital contribution made by each 
member, or of his or her role in the cooperative). 
3) Economic participation by members, both as solidarity owners of the co-operative and as 
participants in decision-making concerning profit distribution. 
4) Autonomy and independence in relation to the state and other organizations. 
5) A commitment to educating cooperative members to help them participate more effectively. 
6) Co-operation amongst cooperative members to help them participate more effectively 
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These principles have no doubt been integral to ensure ownership and control over the 
business of its members. The democratic element seems to constitute the most important 
attribute that make co-operatives unique.  One may speculate but, it is fair to argue that co-
operatives may have a wider effect on deepening the practice of democracy by extending 
values of participation into the economic sphere.  This is, after all, one of the limitations of 
the practice of democracy today – it is restricted to the political sphere. The lack of 
political accountability in the economic sphere is, of course, an old problem, one that can 
be understood from developments in Eighteenth century Europe.
529
 This became an issue 
after the emergence of the market economy as a substitute for centralised economic 
systems. The ability of markets to maintain individual autonomy was obviously one its 
main sources of attraction, quite apart from its ability to determine the distribution of 
society‘s resources.  This was, to recall justified by the work of Fredrick Hayek, who 
emphasised the epistemic superiority of markets. In comparison, his views were different 
from Adam Smith, who in spite of supporting markets, emphasised the importance of 
―sympathy and benevolence‖.
530
 He believed this ought to be ―the basis of social relations, 
and economic action‖;
531
 as such, ―its political settings were not separable from, but rather 





The emergence of modern capitalism, however, caused a distortion of Smith‘s ideas 
about the proper foundations of the economy. The civic dimensions of Smith‘s thought 
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were replaced by ideas about personal gain and self-interest.  This can be recalled from 
Yunus‘s insights in chapter three, which illustrated that the emphasis on profits was a 
consequence of an incomplete reading of Smith‘s idea – that is, The Wealth of Nations 
without The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In other words, profit oriented markets were 
considered apart from the importance of social markets. One consequence of this has been 
the prevalence of the economic sphere as a separate entity, even though the political realm 
still presides over economic policies.  
 
Scott Veitch‘s work explains a further extenuating factor from the emergence of 
rights to equality, especially voting rights of citizens in European political societies. The 
difficulty arose from extending voting rights to citizens on the basis of universal suffrage. 
This attracted a different consequence from granting voting rights according to property 
qualification. The effect – as we learn from Karl Marx – was the creation of two different 
constituencies, that is, the political as separate from economic constituency. As such, the 
―forum of political principle, with its ideals of equality, freedom and citizenship, was not 
co-extensive with the economic realm and its practices of domination, exploitation and 
insecurity.‖
533
 Instead, the ―political and economic identity are held apart, and the idea of 
participation or representation in the two realms are treated as disconnected achievements, 
despite the enormous impact of the latter on people‘s daily life experiences.‖
534
 The effects 
of these circumstances are very evident in many contexts, not the least in the Third World. 
Although economic actions continue to take more political dimensions, many societies 
including in the Third World seem to lack the same kind of accountability mechanisms in 
the political realm. These are of the kind capable enough to deal with these problems. 
Whilst the activities of many economic actors are ―undoubtedly political‖… they ―do not 
                                                 




register as political activities, nor—crucially—as subject to the same demands of political 
justification.‖
535
 Instead, the separation between the political and economic sphere is 





The separation of the political from the economic realm described above is one of 
the things co-operatives can assist remedy. They importantly illustrate how businesses can 
be more democratic, and furthermore, how this might have a spill-over effect on the polity. 
But, it is fair to say that the internal democracy within co-operatives is by far its greatest 
novelty. A lot can be said about members of co-operatives being allowed to vote on 
decisions regardless of the level of their investments. These democratic principles 
importantly address concerns of equity, since they take into consideration possible 
disproportionate effects of linking participation to level of individual investments.  
Furthermore, education is recognised as a crucial element for more meaningful and 
effective democratic participation in activities of co-operative. Accountability to the host 
community is also a key principle that must be mentioned in this respect. One other 
important factor about co-operatives is their obligations to assist alleviate problems of the 
host community in which they operate. What this means is that, even though co-operatives 
may evolve for purely instrumental reasons, there is an obligation to extend such concerns 
beyond the realms of the organisation.  
 
It is understandable in light of the above why several enthusiasts have proposed 
substituting the current economic model with an economic system organised around co-
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operatives.  But, these aspirations are yet to come to light for several reasons. 
537
 One 
explanation is that the method of control in co-operative businesses actually prevents the 
kind of expansion typical of profit-making enterprises. The democratic content of co-
operatives actually prevents them from the kind of capitalisation characteristic of profit 
oriented firms.  Moreover, co-operatives are unlikely to appeal to investors, since their 
level of influence does not extend beyond a single vote despite their investments.   
 
Regardless of what some might consider a shortcoming, proposals for the 
expansion of co-operative activity has featured in proposals and policies of the major 
international development institutions. The UN – and its inter-governmental organisations 
– has by far been the strongest advocate of the expansion of co-operatives. Co-operatives 
have been acknowledged at different forums, including at the General Assembly (GA) 
through a resolution recognising how they can contribute to social development, 
employment generation and poverty reduction, amongst other things. 
538
 GA Resolution 
No. 56/114
539
 encourages governments and the relevant international institutions to 
collaborate both internationally or locally to provide suitable legal and institutional 
frameworks for co-operatives to function.  Furthermore, the UN encourages governments 
in partnership with co-operatives to promote programmes that will strengthen their 
activities.  Most recently, an Expert Group Meeting (EGM) of the UN‘s Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs have made quite stringent appeals for more meaningful 
recognition of co-operatives within the UN development framework.
540
 This call was made 
in the context of the current global financial crisis. The EGM recognised that co-operatives 
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274 
 
might be more suitable to address some of the current economic problems. The EGM 
underlined this point by drawing comparisons with the performance of investor-owned and 
consumer co-operative banks during the crisis.  The point is that unlike the most investor-
owned banks, cooperative banks seemed to have fared better during the crisis. Why this 
was the case is because of their different philosophical orientation, which prevented them 
from the kind of excessive risk-taking synonymous with investor-owned banks.  The UN 
joins other advocates in encouraging a new co-operative driven economic model, so as to 
make business more ethical and place humanity, including the environment at the core of 
its activities.   Comparatively speaking, co-operatives have not received the same degree of 
recognition in the work of the Bank. They are not, for instance, specifically mentioned in 
the Bank‘s CDF or the PRSPs, despite emphasis on participation of the poor in aspects of 
the design and implementation of these policies. Nonetheless, the role of co-operatives may 
be implied in the emphasis on civil society in the CDF. But, it is also fair to say that some 
other aspects of the Bank‘s work recognise the value of co-operatives. The Bank 






2.1. Co-operatives in Nigeria 
Like in other parts of the world, co-operatives are also an important social business 
institution in Nigeria, as they are in other Third World countries.  Most co-operatives have 
emerged by institutional design, even though others have emerged spontaneously.  In the 
Third World in general, the relationship between cooperatives and the State is not clearly 
distinguishable. The State in many contexts has used co-operatives to serve as an 
instrument of social control.  Regardless of this, co-operatives have also evolved 
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independent of State backing, some of which mitigate the hardships of economic 
globalisation.  Such co-operatives operate informally through activities ranging from thrift 
to associations of garbage pickers.
542
 The rise of Third World co-operatives has also been 
encouraged by the international co-operative movement. It has done this by encouraging 
the formation of co-operatives independent of State control. But the expansion of co-
operatives has not been successful without an element of State support. It is fair to say that 
the State plays a similar role that it does for markets. The role of the State is (or ought to 
be) restricted to creating the suitable environment for co-operatives to function.    
 
Looking specifically at Nigeria, co-operative activity emerged before it became 
independent.
543
 Co-operatives in Nigeria have their origins in colonial rule, which was a 
period in which several marketing, production, thrift and consumer co-operatives 
emerged.
544
  Agricultural related co-operatives were, and still are, by far the most 
successful organisations.  Notable amongst them was the ‗Cocoa Marketing Co-operatives‘ 
of Southern Nigeria. This comprised of several co-operatives with 20,000 members, who 
belonged to 300 primary co-operatives, which were part of a federated network of 12 
unions.  Whilst they existed, their activities led to the production 10, 000 to 15, 000 tons of 
cocoa annually. Interestingly, the cocoa co-operatives competed with middlemen for the 
supply of cocoa to British firms like Cadbury‘s and Fry‘s and Rowntree. Indeed, it was the 
sharp practices of the middlemen that led the colonial authorities to set up co-operatives to 
guarantee fair deals for firms and farmers.    
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Apart from producing and marketing cocoa, such co-operatives performed other functions, 
some of which extended beyond trading. For instance, they provided short-term loans to its 
members, even though these were loans connected to the production of cocoa. The point is 
that co-operatives enjoyed nearly a 90% return rate despite not being created to perform 
this function.  But, there were also distinct cocoa co-operatives formed to encourage the 
practice of thrift. The Yoruba farmer‘s co-operative society, for instance, was unique in 
this sense. Its members succeeded in saving £15,870 between the periods of 1947-48.
545
  
The co-operatives functioned as banks as well as financial educational institutions for its 
members.  Similarly, co-operatives provided sites for agricultural education, especially for 
transferring knowledge of new farming techniques. Quite apart from that, such co-
operatives provided sites through which members could voice their grievances against the 
authorities.  It must be noted that on a wider scale, not all agricultural co-operatives were 
as successful as the cocoa producing, or marketing co-operatives.  To be specific, 
groundnuts, cotton and palm sectors were not as successful.  The most rational explanation 
as to why this was the case is that they were not given the same level of institutional and 
organisational support as the cocoa co-operatives.  
 
Consumer co-operatives on the other-hand were partially experimented with in 
certain villages and rural communities with very little success. The problem was that it was 
quite difficult to diffuse practices typical of Western societies to a predominantly rural 
country, one not accustomed to the workings of capitalist systems. Nonetheless, consumer 
cooperatives were able to supply the needs of host communities in which they operated. 
Such needs were quite material and ranged from the provision of soap, salt, kerosene, to 
bush lamps and tobacco. More positively, consumer co-operatives extended their activities 
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beyond trading in cheap consumer goods.  They contributed to various community or 
village institutions, such as maternity centres from the surpluses of their profits. 
546
 Apart 
from consumer co-operatives, thrift associations of various kinds emerged during this 
period.  They seemed to have laid foundations for what has now become a thriving thrift or 
craft practice in contemporary Nigeria.   Esusu, Isusu or Adashi are Nigerian terms for 
indigenous thrift systems. But, it is fair to say that they are really local interpretations of 
Western thrift practices introduced during colonial rule. As such, thrift co-operatives might 
best be described a hybrid of local and dominant practices.
547
 Regardless of their origins, 
thrift practices are now widespread across Nigeria performing different functions ranging 
from assisting the poor build up capital for particular business activities to assisting the 
sick search for medical care to assisting families bury their dead.
548
   Such activities are 
usually driven instrumentality, quite apart from sometimes being exploitative by charging 
exorbitant interest rates on loans. 
 
Most co-operative associations exist informally, even though a limited number of 
them are registered under formal law. They are regulated by the Nigerian Co-operative 
Societies Act of 1993, which makes it mandatory for them to be registered as limited 
liability co-operatives irrespective of whether they exist as industrial co-operatives or 
primary and secondary co-operatives.
549
 Whilst it is really not possible to give an accurate 
figure of the number of co-operatives in Nigeria today, the most organised type can be 
found in the agricultural sector. Such co-operatives have even benefited from policy and 
institutional support from a quango called the Nigerian Investment Co-operative Agency 
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  Details of its activities can be found on its website, which states that the 
agency was created to provide institutional support for co-operatives as part of Nigeria‘s 
government‘s current economic reforms, which partly attempts to build what it calls a 
‗caring‘ market economy.  This, it suggests, cannot exist without ‗popular participation‘ in 
the economy. It acknowledges that most Nigerians do not have the economic means to 
participate given the relative level of poverty in the country. As a consequence, the body 
seeks to provide loans through which they can achieve inclusion.  As it suggests, 
cooperatives are ―one of the vehicles for economic empowerment‖
551
… [and] ―the national 




The developments above are indeed commendable, but the basic justification for 
the introduction of co-operatives – as indicated from these statements – does raise some 
questions. It would seem the purpose for co-operatives here is conceived in narrow 
economic terms, which is in turn considered as the only way of promoting social 
empowerment. But these assumptions can be questioned, thanks to the work of Amartya 
Sen, whose critique of such perceptions of development has already been discussed in 
chapter three. The main point being that they helpfully illustrate that economic 
development alone is no guarantee for human or social development. The point in raising it 
is that co-operatives have much wider significance to the Nigerian society than what seems 
to be acknowledged by the policy. As it is framed, the social and humanistic side of co-
operatives is hidden from view.  Moreover, apart from the agricultural sector, there seems 
to no clear agenda for co-operatives in other sectors of the economy. A case in point is the 
absence of a role for co-operatives in the provisioning of electricity, water, healthcare and 
                                                 
550 Nigerian Cooperative Investment Agency, accessed online at  http://www.nicanig.org/poda/institutes.php   





education.  Even Nigeria‘s PRSP, NEEDS fails to acknowledge the role for co-operatives 
as part of the goal of reducing poverty.  This is not surprising given that it originates from 
the Bank‘s CDF, which also fails to formally establish a role for co-operatives. There needs 
to be a more affirmative statement of recognition and support for co-operative businesses 
on the institutional level.  Setting up cooperatives is indeed not a simple task.  It does not 
rest only on a question of providing loans to the poor; it also requires legal, technical, 
educational and other forms of support. 
  
3. Community Electric Co-operatives 
Having looked at co-operatives in general terms, the focus in this section is to address 
questions of internal design of electricity co-operatives. Community electricity co-
operatives 
553
 are proposed as a new element of the existing market framework, which to 
recall is composed of six generation companies, one transmission company and eleven 
distribution companies. As a new component of this framework, three types of community 
electricity co-operatives are proposed for purposes of this thesis. These are namely 
community supply co-operatives, community generation and supply co-operatives and 
finally, off-grid generation and supply co-operatives.  In addition to the following, the 
creation of a National Co-operative Electricity Agency (NCEA) and various State Co-
operative Electric Agencies (SCEA) is proposed to provide financial, technical and 
institutional assistance for the operation of electricity co-operatives.    
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It is important to note from the outset that the proposals offered here are quite hypothetical.  
The aim is really not to provide a comprehensive blue-print on how to create electricity co-
operatives; rather it is to provide a vision that can attract practice to it. It must also be noted 
that several issues with respect to these proposals cannot be sufficiently dealt with in detail 
here. Part of the reason is really a question of expertise, since the proposal here overlaps 
into various disciplines, including economics, engineering, science and technology, 
architecture, amongst others areas. It must be appreciated that these are issues that are 
better worked out by relevant experts in the relevant local contexts.   One important 
preliminary question that is dealt with at this point is the extent to which co-operatives can 
be accommodated under the current legal and regulatory framework.  This is a question of 
significant magnitude more so because the proposals here are mainly legal in nature.  
 
3.1. Reframing the Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Proposing a role for co-operatives in the Nigerian electricity sector generally depends on 
whether they can be accommodated within the existing legal, regulatory and institutional 
framework.  The conclusion here is that without any significant changes to legal and 
regulatory framework, the inclusion of co-operatives cannot be possible. For electricity co-
operatives to operate, they need a framework that accommodates different entities without 
any discrimination of who can participate.  This entails re-thinking the current framework, 
but not necessarily creating a new one from scratch.  It must be appreciated that electricity 
co-operatives cannot operate effectively through a legal regime that relies solely on market 
incentives. The point is that, apart from limitations of markets, the current framework is 
not accommodating to other entities like community. As such, a new regulatory approach 
is the first step towards establishing a role for community – through co-operatives – in 
electricity. What is proposed in this light is an approach that accommodates a range of 
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actors, including their values and interests. It is an approach that has as its keywords, 
diversity, pluralism, collaboration and participation. The legal and regulatory framework 
must be inclusive enough to encourage the adoption of a wide variety of approaches.  More 
importantly, it must give legitimacy to the interest of community in such a way that they 
are equivalent with market interests. Seen this way, it is possible to understand how 
electricity provisioning can benefit from other entities, apart from traditional institutions of 
State and market. 
 
One of the best ways of understanding how such proposals can be achieved is 
through Gunther Teubner‘s concept of reflexive law.
554
 Reflexive law is a theoretical 
approach that creates the type of legal structure required for the proposals. It 
accommodates a wide range of parties, including their values and interests. It achieves this 
by translating regulatory designs into practical regulatory frameworks. Law is reflexive 
when it does not take over the regulatory responsibility of social processes itself, but rather 
enables it by installing, correcting and redefining democratic self-regulatory mechanisms.  
Teubner argues that the complexity of modern life is such that it requires a different system 
of regulation, one that law functions at the background by restricting itself to facilitating 
the coordination of other social systems. In doing so, reflexive law increases the self-
referential capacities of other social institutions. Not surprisingly, Teubner builds such 
insights from Niklas Luhmann‘s work on system theory which enables the legal system to 
perform this function by enabling communication amongst radically closed social systems.  
He develops a new perspective on the legal process of legal and social change that points to 
a new evolutionary stage of law – reflexive law. Law becomes a system for the 
coordination of action within and between semi-autonomous subsystems.  It is developed 
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from both Philip Selznick and Philip Nonet, and also, Habermas‘s work on Luhmann‘s 
evolutionary theory of law.
555
  They both identify different types of law, and show the 
progression from one type of law to another. Their theories are formulated with the crisis 
of formal rationality in mind. 
 
 The work of Selznick and Nonet is used as a point of entry into how Selznick 
develops the idea of reflexive law. According to them, the evolution of law can be 
understood by looking at how it evolves from being repressive to autonomous, and finally 
to a responsive stage.  As the most important stage of the development of law, responsive 
law emerges to increase the level of participation and responsiveness in the creation of law 
as well as other societal processes.  But responsive law is really no more than a product of 
internal developments of the autonomous characteristics of law. These are developments 
that also contradict the formal characteristics of law. Nonet and Selznick pick up most of 
their arguments from Max Weber‘s accounts of legal rationality in attempt to explain how 
law progresses in the direction of substantive and reflexive rationality.  As such, responsive 
law includes substantive and reflexive elements which are combinations of two different 
forms of legal rationality.   
 
Regardless of this, Teubner questions the extent to which responsive law 
sufficiently provides a stable framework to respond to the crisis of legal rationality. On this 
point, he suggests that responsive law is better understood as a further stage in the 
development of law.  Apart from that, Teubner questions the priority given to the internal 
as opposed to external elements of legal change in most accounts of responsive law. 
Teubner finds this insufficient because it leaves out external accounts of how legal 
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transformation takes place.  Reflexive law responds to this shortcoming by uniting internal 
and external accounts of legal change,
556
and furthermore, illustrating how law itself creates 
the complex environment for functionally differentiated, semi-autonomous subsystems to 
operate.  Teubner calls this a post-responsive legal order, which encourages self-reflective 
processes within different social subsystems.  Reflexive law as such, responds to the 
limitations of responsive law, particularly the inability of the latter to deal with social 
complexity, as well as the purposive and substantive aspects of responsive law. What 
Tuebner means is simply that reflexive rationality facilities rather than imposes itself on 
social structures. It guarantees the autonomy of social institutions and creates the 
opportunities which allow problems to be resolved: 
Reflexive law tends to rely on procedural norms that regulate processes, organization, and the 
distribution of rights and competences. The new procedural orientation characteristics of reflective 
law can be observed in different legal fields as an emerging alternative to formal as well as substantive 
rationality. Under a regime of reflexive law, the legal control of social action is indirect and abstract, 
for the legal system only determines the organizational and procedural premises of future action.557 
 
 The point is that law provides the background structural framework for the reflexive 
processes of other social systems. One of the best ways of understanding this, as Teubner 
himself notes, is through obligations in contract law.  He illustrates this by comparing how 
disputes are settled under formal, substantive and reflexive law.  Firstly, Teubner shows 
that the formalistic approach is always concerned with the fulfilment of formal, general and 
objective conditions of such contractual obligations.  Formal law does not pay attention to 
the social effects of such obligations. It does not even take account of the relationships that 
parties are enabled to create.  Substantive law as second approach – and as the term implies 
– is concerned with the actual outcomes, especially how interventions might produce 
substantive effects for individuals.  Reflexive law as the third and more superior approach 
departs from the others by encouraging negotiations between different actors. In doing so, 
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it provides a level playing field in which bargaining relations can take place between 
contractual parties. Reflexive law paradoxically influences results without really getting 
involved in the processes of bargaining. 
 
  One can indeed argue that neutrality assumed by reflexive law ignores 
asymmetries of power, which distorts the quality of outcomes. It is fair to argue that such a 
framework he proposes is only sufficient in conditions of equality, and not those dealing 
with deep asymmetry. It would make more sense to have a reverse-discriminatory type of 
law that can upturn such huge inequalities. This perhaps rests on the balancing of the 
reflexive and substantive aspects of law, as certain situations will need a more biased than 
neutral type of law. Teubner accepts this when he talks of the importance of developing 
reflexive structures which can compensate inequality of power and information. Here he 
particularly speaks about having standards of substantive judicial intervention.  Even here, 
law is still reflexive in so far as it is the legal system that stimulates social self-regulation. 
The legal system adapts to such situations in order to provide a framework through which 
disempowered parties can challenge or assert their positions.
558
 Reflexive law not only 
enables grievances of silent voices to be heard, but also enables them to be written into the 
logic of the system. Even so, there is something to be said here about the importance of 
autonomy, which reflexive law is also about.  Looked at this way, then it is not difficult to 
understand the importance of a reflexive approach in light of proposals for the inclusion of 
electricity community co-operatives. Reflexive law can be a way of creating an 
environment in which distinct communal values and modes of operation can be recognised.  
More importantly, it can indeed open up opportunities for counter-hegemonic responses to 
the dominance of State and market discourse. Through this approach, communities can 
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participate in equal terms – that is, with the same powers, rights and freedoms – with the 
State and market institutions.  What it achieves is that it creates incentives for different 
parties – including community – to achieve their desired objectives.  
 
3.2. Institutional Architecture 
The discussions so far have described the potential inclusion of community electricity co-
operatives legal theoretical terms, what follows here is an attempt to also understand it in 
institutional and organisational terms. For the sake of emphasis, this is proposed 
hypothetically, given that the substantive aspects of such proposals can only be worked out 
in relevant local contexts.    Given this, I begin here with a hypothetical scenario – that is, 
by assuming that a community through its Community Forum wants to provide its own 
electricity, and furthermore, want to know the implications of setting up a co-operative.  A 
logical starting point entails considering the relevant laws that apply in this context, 
particularly the extent to which they permit the formation of co-operatives.  In light of 
discussions above, electricity co-operatives can only be created if the legal and regulatory 
frameworks permit it as such. Whilst the impetus lies on the ability of the community to 
organise themselves, electricity co-operatives can only come into effect if they are 
permissible in law. What this means is that there is also a burden of the responsibility on 
the State to create a suitable legal and institutional environment for the operation of co-
operatives.  In light of previous analysis, the Electric Power Reform Act 2005 and the 
Nigerian Co-operative Societies Act of 1993 do not consider a role of co-operatives in the 
electricity sector. The first recommendation as such is for amendments to the legal and 
regulatory framework to pave way for the creation of electricity co-operatives.  Following 
on from that, there needs to be an institutional mechanism to provide support to 
communities seeking to establish co-operatives. Because of this, a further recommendation 
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is made for the creation of a specialised agency called the National Co-operative Electricity 
Agency (NCEA). It should be established on the national level with the objective of 
initiating, administrating and supervising a policy programme of co-operative electricity in 
Nigeria.   Such an agency should be funded by the State and ought to be responsible for 
providing interest-free loans to various communities seeking to set up co-operatives.  
Similarly, regional State governments should work in collaboration with the NCEA to set 
up State Co-operative Electricity Agencies (SCEA), which will in turn provide local 
support for community co-operatives in electricity.  
 
 3.3. Internal Design of Co-operatives 
 A further aspect of the hypothetical scenario relates to the internal composition of the 
proposed co-operates. For the sake of emphasis, the proposals here will only be possible if 
amendments have been made to relevant laws. If this is able to take effect then, it is 
proposed that communities should have an option of choosing from three types of co-
operatives. Such choices would depend on the size of the community given that economies 
of scale might impede the creation of co-operatives in small communities.   However, this 
does not mean that the co-operative model cannot work under such circumstances. What it 
means is that small communities may have to unite with others to establish co-operatives. 
At the very basic level, the first proposal here is for the creation of supply co-operatives by 
a single Community Forum or a combination of Forums.  As expected, supply co-
operatives will operate on a non-profit basis, quite apart from being democratically owned 
by members of such communities. Supply co-operatives ought to be considered as an 
additional element of the emerging Nigerian electricity market, and they shall be 
responsible for purchasing electricity from market-owned generating companies at minimal 
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costs. The purchased electricity will in turn be re-sold to members of the community at 
affordable prices. 
 
 As expected, community supply co-operatives ought to operate under the seven co-
operative principles discussed above.  An eighth principle is however proposed to 
strengthen the operation of co-operatives. These are principles of human rights, which will 
provide the normative framework for co-operative operations. Specifically, the distinct 
human rights approach – that is, with human suffering at its core – is proposed to assist in 
drawing obligations amongst members of community (chapter one and four). The approach 
is one way that might increase the moral consciousness amongst individuals in community 
– and an important step towards tackling exclusion.  It might be speculative to suggest 
what actions might be taken in those circumstances. One thing is certain that the primary 
response in community shall not be to disconnect the poor if they are unable to pay for 
electricity. Rather, other modes of payment might be considered, as well as other methods 
of providing assistance to poor. The distinct human rights approach here is proposed to 
enable individuals in community to see the value of fixing prices at the barest minimum. 
Cases of electricity poverty must be distinguished from the classical free-rider problem. 
But this is not in any way a suggestion that the question of free-riders would not constitute 
a problem.  It certainly would, but the point is that those who their circumstances prevent 
them paying for electricity ought not to be categorised as free-riders. It is believed that one 
way of understanding such problems in their proper contexts, and furthermore, to ensure 
deeper understanding of specific needs individuals in community, a special Committee on 




In terms of internal structure of the proposed framework, Community Forums are proposed 
as the main decision-making body. The success of electricity co-operatives lies with 
Community Forums. Much will depend on its ability to provide a space for dialogue, 
shared understanding and collective decision-making over questions of access to 
electricity.   Community Forums shall be responsible for the creation of co-operatives and 
such other matters like budgeting, tariff system and pricing, which will always vary from 
time to time. Some possible alternatives that might be explored is that members of 
Community Forums shall have the option of electing a governing board of directors, which 
will in turn, appoint a manager and management staff for the day to day running of the co-
operative.  The proposed internal structure is illustrated in sketchy form in the diagram 
below.  It is important to emphasise that co-operatives are not restricted to the proposals in 
the diagram; Community Forums should be open to other ideas about how co-operatives 
should be formed. For the sake of emphasis, the aim here is really to illustrate that this is 






















































3.3.1. Community Generation and Supply Co-operatives 
 
The proposals above are not unquestionable; there are several problems that can be teased 
out from those suggestions. One question is that those proposals are framed in such a way 
that they seem to be too dependent on markets, as with the monopolistic forms of 
producing electricity. This would seem like one of the most noticeable objections to what 
has just been proposed. It is true that co-operatives need markets to function, but (as will be 
seen) sole dependence on markets for purposes of electricity can have disastrous 
consequences. As it is framed, co-operatives can only provide (cheap) electricity through 
privatised generation companies.   Quite apart from questions of costs (which can be 
avoided by enforcing strict concession agreements), the most pressing problem is simply 
Community Forum 











that the Nigerian electricity market system is simply not working. The promises of market 
reform have simply failed to live up to expectations. It would seem a contradiction in terms 
if the only option open to co-operatives is the current malfunctioning system of electricity.  
The point is that Nigerians should not have to wait for the market or State system to 
function before they have an opportunity to enjoy or provide their own electricity. Supply 
co-operatives in this context can only work if the market system is efficiently functioning. 
As a consequence the supply co-operatives might be a logical starting position but they 
should not be seen as the end in itself. The ultimate goal for communities should be to 
achieve own autonomy, and this can only be achieved when communities are able to 
generate and supply their own electricity. A different kind of co-operative might provide a 
different alternative, one that combines both elements of generation and supply.  The 
suggestion here is that a number of generation and supply co-operatives can be formed by 
several Community Forums to achieve this objective.      
 
There is a much wider implication of the creation of community-owned generation 
and supply co-operatives.  They invite a potential of moving away from the national grid 
system, its cost implications, and the burdensome forms of generation it presupposes.  
Technological developments – especially renewable technology – now make it possible to 
generate and supply electricity at much cheaper costs, and in ways that do not depend on 
huge power stations. There is very little recognition of this in Nigeria‘s electric reform 
proposals – at least not in the urban areas. Off grid renewable technology only seems to be 
proposed for rural areas. This type of co-operative offers a strategy and potential for the 
introduction of environmentally friendly technologies.  To recall, renewable electrical 
sources like solar, wind, biomass, water organic matter and hydro can definitely play an 





 Electricity will not only be generated at cheaper costs, but also through 
much smaller electric plants, which are arguably more compatible to the needs of 
communities and their environment. Cost effectiveness is also guaranteed when such off-
grid generation co-operatives re-sell surplus electricity requirements to the national grid or 
privately owned generation companies.   Renewable electrical products are not subject to 
price fluctuations that occur with non-renewable sources. Whilst these alternatives may be 
expensive from the outset, they are, nonetheless, much cheaper in the long term. It must be 
acknowledged that renewable sources also suffer from a number of technical challenges, 
since they are generally dependent on good weather – that is, either sunlight, wind or other 
conditions.  Regardless of this, the dynamics of the relationship between new technology, 
poverty and the environment have been scientifically researched and documented.
560
 There 
is consensus amongst governments and international development institutions today that 
renewable electric technology has positive effects on both poverty and the environment. 
Under such dire circumstances in Nigeria today, the potentials it offers seem to outweigh 
its disadvantages. It is, therefore, not too idealistic to strongly conclude by suggesting that 
off-grid renewable electricity co-operatives offer a lot more promise for cheap, sustainable 
and efficient access to electricity than any other alternative in Nigeria today. It is only 
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 See, World Bank, Development and Climate Change, World Development Report, 2010. 
560
 See, Karekezi S and Waeni K. ‗Renewable Energy in Africa: Prospects and Limits‘, paper prepared for 
Workshop for African energy experts on operationalising the NEPAD Energy Initiative, 2003.  
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4. Conclusion  
 The chapter has been a modest attempt to sketch out the possibility of community 
participation as a way of enabling more access to electricity through co-operatives. The 
potential of co-operatives have been discussed, so have three co-operative models been 
proposed. Discussions have been set in the context of Nigeria, and this has entailed 
understanding how the existing legal and institutional framework can be reformed to 
accommodate co-operatives. The chapter is an extension of the arguments of the previous 
chapter and goes beyond the actual processes of deliberation to pre-empt the kind of 
decisions that can emerge from participation. The proposals here are by no means an 
imposition on communities; their deliberations can lead to different outcomes. The 
proposals, however, should be seen as widening the range of options that communities can 
choose from, if this possibility exists. As with Community Forums, the proposals are also 
not exhaustive, quite apart from being hypothetical. Apart from questions of funding, other 
important dynamics are implicated, including questions of expertise. Regardless of this, the 
proposals should best be understood as a vision of what can be achieved in any given 
context in so far as the will to do so exists. Once it exists, then the practical modalities can 
be worked out in consideration of context specific needs. The intention here, as the thesis 
in general, has not been to provide a blue-print for how it would work in practice, but 






                                                  Chapter Eight 
 
 





This thesis has offered a theory, through which the values and solidarities created in 
community can potentially be maximised towards the promotion of electricity, not only as 
a human right, but also a public good in the more ethical sense of the term. The theory of 
community comprised of three related parts. The first has dealt with what community 
means, its normative weight, and why it ought to be relevant in contemporary social, 
economic and political contexts. Following closely, the next component has dealt with 
actual spaces for participation, where Community Forums have been proposed to fulfil this 
requirement. The final component offered a theory of deliberation for Community Forums, 
partly as an attempt to anticipate and mitigate challenges of deliberation and participation.  
There was, however, a prior task before explaining the substantive elements of this theory. 
This entailed justifying and teasing out the prospect of a mutual relationship between 
human rights and community.  It was an attempt to discursively establish a relationship 
between both concepts, appreciating that there may be circumstances in which the 
principles of community may gain priority over human rights, whilst in other situations; the 
requirements of human rights would assume priority over community. The relevance of the 
arguments in future practice will depend on how the theory can be adapted or applied to 
different Third World country contexts, as well as to different problems related to other 
economic and social rights like water, education and healthcare. The family resemblance 
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between electricity and these other rights – and the similarity of the problems – is some 
indication that the theory can be applied in different contexts, as well as to different 
problems in so far as this is carried out in a context specific way.   
 
The thesis has been an attempt to respond to limitations of Bretton Wood inspired 
neoliberal reform approaches, which have recently attempted to structure the way human 
rights are provided in the Third World.  This discourse, as was seen, is facilitated by the 
concept of good governance which, amongst other things, can be understood as an attempt 
to create a new social, economic, legal and political order in the Third World. Whilst good 
governance is a term unique to the Third World, it emerges in the context of shifts in 
perceptions of governance in recent transnational academic debates. This is, of course, 
reference to discussions of the rise of new forms of governance, which have emerged as 
substitutes to traditional State centred forms of governance.  Not only was a critique of 
good governance offered, it was linked up with its assumptions about human rights vis-à-
vis markets. This has encouraged the privatisation of numerous traditional responsibilities 
of the State, including the human rights of particular concern.  Methodologically, a case 
study of the reform proposals for the Nigerian electricity sector has been used to instantiate 
the problems that arise from such narrow assumptions, and furthermore, how the theory of 
community – through a creative dialectic with human rights – offers an alternative. A 
further aspect of this theory has been to hypothetically sketch out the potential of co-
operatives in the context of electricity. These proposals have been made under no illusions 
that they will be easy to achieve. There are, of course, many hurdles that need to be 
transcended, including the potential difficulty of securing the autonomy of communities 
within the existing market framework. In practical terms, this may entail – as was argued – 
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creating generation and supply co-operatives to allow communities to achieve this 
objective. 
 
One important point that must be stressed here is that the proposals in the thesis 
have not only entailed appreciating how community can strengthen human rights, but also 
how the latter can strengthen the former.  This has meant reformulating human rights in 
ways that they may serve the goals of community. This is simply because the thesis has 
also been about appreciating the moral value of human rights, even with their numerous 
imperfections.  There are many reasons why human rights remain (and should remain) 
relevant in different social and political contexts today, especially in community. To 
repeat, without human rights, individuals would be too weak to withstand being 
overwhelmed by certain demands of community. One does not have to be a feminist to 
appreciate the significance of the famous slogan – the ‗personal is political‘. This, amongst 
other things, draws our attention to the harms that takes place within the household or in 
community. Aside from this, one must not forget also that human suffering is essentially 
(but not exclusively) an individual affair.  As such, human rights may be one way of 
protecting and alleviating these sorts of harms. This is on the condition that one of their 
more fundamental inadequacies is transcended. The thesis has been an attempt to equip 
human rights with the proper tools to overcome this shortcoming. The thesis has tried to 
rescue human rights from their limitations of seeing and ameliorating human suffering. 
Simone Weil‘s famous critique of rights has been most helpful in this context. It was used 
to draw attention to the epistemic inadequacy of human rights, and furthermore, to 
understand the inevitability of alleviating human suffering through love. The importance of 
love has not been proposed in an antagonistic way, but rather based on a mutually 
dependent relationship with human rights. These arguments as such, have importantly 
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brought to light aspirations for an ethical framework of human rights, in which obligations 
to assist the poor are based on love and compassion. This is the sort of philosophy that 
should underpin human rights.  It is one way of encouraging reciprocal practices amongst 
individuals in community.  
 
Generally speaking, the defence of human rights in this thesis has in part been on 
account of their continuing dominance in various contemporary economic, political and 
social contexts, such that they unfortunately sit well with numerous incompatible interests. 
This was the point of the critique of market-friendly human rights discourse carried out in 
chapter three.  It can be argued, nonetheless, that for all attempts to capture, co-opt, misuse 
or abuse them, human rights always seem to leave a residue that paradoxically makes them 
adaptable to progressive struggles. Whilst they may be captured by the dominant neoliberal 
market ideology, for instance, they can be re-appropriated by the poor through social 
markets. The point is that human rights can never be closed or definitely reduced to a 
single meaning. They are always open to different interpretations and serve different 
purposes. In many senses, they are like love; it, too, cannot be definitely understood given 
its metaphysical nature. It is difficult to explain what love really is, even though one often 
accepts that it is a good thing. Human rights are quite similar, and this might explain why 
there is little agreement on what they are or their proper function. It is this remainder that 
they leave that make them so unique, and very importantly, why they have a moral appeal. 
 
One implication from the above is that this thesis has itself instantiated this 
dimension of human rights, that is, their potential for emancipation within hegemonic 
discourses. Looking back, the intentions here have been quite modest; they have not been 
an attempt to oust dominant neoliberal human rights discourse, but rather to understand the 
297 
 
paradox that lies within it, one that always leaves a space to be occupied. There are 
obviously dangers of working within dominant discourses, given that it can simply be 
interpreted as a form of acquiescence. The strength of the approach here, however, is that it 
does not operate under some false sense of idealism that the only way of achieving 
transformation is only by defeating hegemonic discourses. Rather, it accepts the reality of 
such discourses and seeks to disturb them from within. It is an approach that is certainly 
consistent with some of the arguments in this thesis, especially the approach to co-
operatives or social markets. There are other ways of illustrating this approach, one of 
which is, to recall, Hardt and Negri‘s work on the multitude. There have certainly been 
others who have argued along similar lines,
561
 but Hardt and Negri is used here to illustrate 
this point. As described by them, ―the multitude is the living alternative that grows within 
Empire,‖
562
 the latter of which is seen as a new form of global sovereignty comprising of 
certain dominant nation states, supranational institutions and major capitalist corporations. 
What this simply means is that they accept that Empire has spread its network of control 
across the globe through its vision of globalisation. It has, at the same time, unintentionally 
created new opportunities for a different kind of globalisation, one based on cooperation 
and collaboration: 
 
Globalisation, however, is also the creation of new circuits of cooperation and collaboration that 
stretch across nations and continents and allow an unlimited number of encounters. This second face 
of globalisation is not a matter of everyone in the world becoming the same; rather it provides the 
possibility that enables us to communicate and act together. The multitude too might thus be 
conceived as a network; an open and expansive network which all differences can be expressed 
                                                 
561 For instance, this was the point of Andre Gorz on ‗non-refomist reforms‘. Another good example is 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos‘s idea of ‗subaltern cosmopolitanism’ ; it is an attempt to theorise ways in which 
groups marginalised from dominant narratives of economic globalisation have networked alternatives to it. 
One good example of the arguments above is the struggles of indigenous peoples, who resort to courts and 
the language of human rights to press their claims. In doing so, they seem to create a counter-hegemonic 
discourse. Of course, one cannot speak in such terms without reference to Antonio Gramsci‘s work on 
hegemony and counter-hegemony, see; Gramsci A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Hoare, Q and 
Smith, N. G (ed. and trans.), Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, 1971. 




freely and equally, a network that provides the means of encounter so that we can work and live in 
common.563 
 
The argument above is an important analogy of what has been attempted in this thesis.  
Whilst opposed to dominant neoliberal human rights discourse, the thesis has not been 
opposed to working inside it, especially exploring opportunities for transformation and 
collaboration within it. There are always potential dangers of co-option with such an 
approach or that communities might inadvertently contribute to neoliberal human rights 
discourse. There are countless examples of strategies that have emerged from the 
grassroots, which have been embraced by international institutions and transformed into 
something else. What this perhaps means is that communities need a mechanism that 
secures their autonomy,
564
 but, at the same time, opens them up for collaboration with 
other communities or institutions. This is another way of understanding the value of 
Teubner‘s work on reflexive law and system theory, discussed in the previous chapter. It 
helpfully demonstrates how communities can remain radically closed, but simultaneously 
communicates with other systems, through the idea of structural coupling. It is the 
mechanism that works at the background to enable communication amongst autonomous 
systems.  A downside of Teubner‘s work generally is that it is often too abstract to be 
useful, or translated into concrete terms. For present purposes, however, systems theory 
does metaphorically analogise how communities can secure their autonomy from 
neoliberal human rights discourse, and simultaneously assert their claims of authorship of 
human rights.  
 
                                                 
563
 Ibid. 
564  Robert Cover‘s seminal thesis on ‗interpretive or paidiec communities‘ – communities that ascribe their 
meanings onto law – is relevant here. The important point is that such communities use the rights guaranteed 
by law, such as freedom of association, to secure their associational autonomy. See, Cover R. ‗Nomos and 
Narrative‘, 97(4), Harvard Law Review. 1983, at 22-33.  
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One final – but important – point that needs to be understood in this context is what is the 
commitment to observe human rights principles in such non-State settings? In other words, 
what is, or should be, the source of human rights obligations between individuals in 
community? Another way of putting this question, but from a legalistic standpoint, is what 
is to become of a country‘s international obligations under international human rights law 
in non-State settings?  To what extent do actions of those below the level of the State – 
who now exert power – embrace the responsibility from the State‘s human rights 
obligations?   
Legally speaking, there seems to be no reason to suggest that members of 
community are absolved from such human rights commitments; they would still operate 
irrespective of the change of circumstances.  Even so, there are also other ways to achieve 
this, for instance, by aligning human rights horizontally through some sort of device, such 
as in constitutional law. 
565
 Whilst it is true that the horizontal application of fundamental 
rights offers a unique opportunity, the argument here, as with most of this thesis, is that 
such legal devices, or law cannot make sense outside an operating moral framework that 
establishes what binds individuals together.  It is something that must be done before 
proposing such obligations in legal terms. One must appreciate how individuals can be 
committed to respect rights of others prior to how they are legally bound, or the duties they 
owe community are proposed.
566
 It is in this context that the analysis of Alan Gewirth‘s 
thesis in chapter five on the community of rights becomes most relevant. This is his point 
                                                 
565
 Here I am referring to the horizontal effect of fundamental rights. See, Van de Wault J. ‗Blixen‘s 
Difference: Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights and the Resistance to Neocolonialism‘, 1, Law, 
Social Justice and Global Development, 2003.  Some other attempts to align human rights horizontally 
include, the draft declaration on Human Responsibilities, which is similar to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights, 1981 or the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 1948. See, Knox J. 
‗Horizontal Human Rights Law‘, draft paper presented at Colloquium at Vanderbilt Law School, 2007.  
566 I am aware that natural rights theories are justified on the basis that rights exist prior to the emergence of 
sovereign authority. In spite of being one way of understanding individual obligations, I find them too 
individualistic for present purposes. See, Waldron above n  40.  
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about how individuals cannot enjoy human rights without considering the rights of others. 
Human rights create relationships between right-holders and duty-bearers, which entails a 
kind of social practice that also involves rules and institutions. What he means is that there 
is a principle of solidarity entailed in human rights and this has a further effect of linking 
human rights with the idea of community. It achieves this by transforming members of 
society into communities of concern.  There is hardly any difficulty in appreciating that 
right-holders and duty-bearers share a certain degree of solidarity, what is more difficult to 
understand is one‘s obligations to non-duty holders. After all, the right – duty relationship 
leaves out a range of individuals from the solidarity implied. To repeat, it excludes the 
vulnerable, disabled, children, nature, future generations or such others not capable of 
bearing duties. As such, the rights – duty relationship is only partially helpful in this 
context.  One can propose a different way of understanding solidarities and relationships in 
community. This can be understood if one appreciates that the essence of community is 
equally about love and compassion. More importantly, it is about assisting vulnerable and 
less fortunate individuals in community.  
Discussions about the significance of human suffering further illustrate how 
horizontal obligations in community can be created. This point, of course, takes us back to 
how this thesis began. It refers to the arguments about the significance of human suffering 
as the core reason behind human rights.  This is an important way of generating obligations 
in community, quite apart from strengthening human rights itself. Without such kinds of 
relationships, human rights seem too weak or inadequate to draw the kind of obligations 
required in community or society as a whole.  
In this case, it would seem difficult to rebuild human rights in ways that have been 
suggested without reference to Simone Weil‘s work, especially her concepts of attention 
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and love.  Love not only draws our attention to human suffering, but also the obligations 
necessary to ameliorate it. Love – the kind that embraces strangers – not only makes the 
invisible visible, but can potentially help recreate human rights, including the obligations to 
observe them. This is quite evident from Weil‘s discussions on human obligations.
567
 It is 
symptomatic of the kind of obligations that individuals in community should strive to 
achieve. Her discussions on obligations are important for another reason; they reveal that 
she was not as opposed to human rights as it is generally believed. Apart from their 
inability to come to grips with suffering, her difficulty was the primacy given to human 
rights over everything else.  For her, human obligations should always come first, but this 
is not to say that human rights have no value. Obligations are important because they 
express a profound longing in the human heart for good, one which can never be 
placated.
568
 Obligations are based on mutual respect and it is what binds individuals 
together.  For Weil, even though obligations have their divine origins, everyone possesses 
the power to turn their attention and love to the divine, who would in turn, channel our 
obligations towards each other. The point is that without such obligations, human rights 
would themselves be ineffective.  There are always conditions attached to human rights, 
but human obligations are unconditional. Such obligations analogise the kind of horizontal 
theory of rights that has been anticipated in this thesis. It is the type of obligations that 
ought to be shared, without condition, by all individuals, whether in community or outside 
it.  It certainly creates new opportunities to promote non-instrumental relationships 




                                                 
567  See; Miles S (ed.), Simone Weil: An Anthology, Virago Press, 1986, at 105-112; 221-237. 
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